# Trojanized anthropic.claude-code Cursor extension

- ID: anthropic-claude-code-trojan-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-30
- Researcher: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Netskope (Gianpietro Cutolo)
- Organization: Microsoft, Netskope, Cursor
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: high
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/anthropic-claude-code-trojan-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/anthropic-claude-code-trojan-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Trojanized anthropic.claude-code Cursor extension
- Editorial summary: Cursor's Nov 13, 2026 update says the attacker obtained an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks. Fireworks exposed that key. The attacker copied a read-only bucket used to share data with Fireworks.…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/anthropic-claude-code-trojan-2026-10.json

## Technique
Cursor's Nov 13, 2026 update says the attacker obtained an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks. Fireworks exposed that key. The attacker copied a read-only bucket used to share data with Fireworks. The bucket held limited coding-agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions that were not in Privacy Mode and were permitted for training. A small number of traces had unredacted credentials. Less than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed. From those credentials the attacker reached select SaaS tools, then select archived non-production Cursor repositories, limited customer-support data and email, product usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some coding-agent conversations, and credentials users had sent to support. On Oct 29, using a stolen credential, the attacker placed malicious unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension on the cache used to serve the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace. Anthropic did not publish this copy. It was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product. Open VSX never had the malware. At most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions that day potentially received it. The copies were available for about 11 hours. The marketplace was taken offline, and a hosting provider took down the attacker's server. The last attacker activity Cursor saw was Nov 1, and it was blocked. Traces were exposed for fewer than 0.05% of non-Privacy-Mode users, who were notified. Privacy Mode prompts and code were not affected. Microsoft's Oct 30 analysis of the copies that were served, anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, describes a loader in extension.js that collected hostname, username, and environment variables matching secret patterns, added SSH key svc-telemetry to authorized\_keys, opened a reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225, and beaconed to :8099/beacon. Persistence was a com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent on macOS, an @reboot cron job on Linux, and a SysMon scheduled task on Windows. The marketplace window Microsoft and Cursor's earlier notice described was Oct 29, about 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM ET.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Stolen access key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks, then a stolen credential used to place unauthorized Claude Code extension copies on the Cursor marketplace cache. Open VSX did not carry the malware.

## AI tooling and models
- [Cursor IDE](https://cursor.com/)
- anthropic.claude-code extension

## Other tooling
- Reverse SSH tunnel
- LaunchAgent persistence (macOS)
- Cron persistence (Linux)
- Scheduled task persistence (Windows)

## Victims and sectors
Cursor users who requested the specific cached extension versions on Oct 29, and customers whose non-Privacy-Mode traces or support credentials were in the copied bucket. Production systems and customer code repositories were not described as affected.

## Target geography
- Multiple regions
Multiple regions reflects the global Cursor user base. Cursor did not name affected countries.

## Attribution
Unnamed. Cursor published the Fireworks-key root cause on Nov 13, 2026. No country is stated.

## Scale and metrics
At most 5,000 users potentially received the cached copies, which were available for about 11 hours. API credentials were exposed for less than 0.01% of customers. Traces were exposed for fewer than 0.05% of non-Privacy-Mode users. Tampered versions were anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### fireworks-key: Exposed Fireworks access key [access]
The attacker used an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks and copied a read-only bucket of coding-agent traces. A small number of traces contained credentials.
Evidence: https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update

### supply-chain: Malicious copies placed on the marketplace cache [access]
On Oct 29 a stolen credential was used to place unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, on the cache Cursor used for its marketplace. Open VSX did not have them.
Evidence: https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update

### distribution: Cached versions served for about 11 hours [ai]
At most 5,000 users who requested those cached versions could receive them. Cursor's earlier notice placed the marketplace window at about 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM ET.
Evidence: https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update ; https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice

### collection: Extension collects host information and secrets [execution]
Loader in extension.js collected hostname, username, environment variable names matching secret patterns
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/

### backdoor: SSH backdoor established [impact]
Added svc-telemetry SSH key to authorized\_keys and established reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225 with beacon to :8099/beacon
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/

### persistence: Platform-specific persistence installed [impact]
com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent (macOS), @reboot cron (Linux), SysMon scheduled task (Windows)
Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/

Connections:
- fireworks-key -> supply-chain
- supply-chain -> distribution
- distribution -> collection
- collection -> backdoor
- backdoor -> persistence

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### fireworks-key: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### supply-chain: Private access → public repository artifact
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/repository.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/repository.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/repository.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Git-provider organization / enterprise audit; Repository and token permission inventory; Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
- Investigate: Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Investigate: Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
- Limitation: Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
- Qualification: The observable event is a write of unauthorized extension copies onto the marketplace cache, not a commit to anthropics/anthropic-quickstarts.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### distribution: Browser extension change / data access
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/extension.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/extension.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/extension.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
- Required telemetry: Managed-browser extension inventory and update history; Extension ID, permissions and provenance; Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
- Investigate: Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Investigate: Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
- Limitation: Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### collection: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### backdoor: Linux SSH authorized-key persistence
- Visibility: Linux endpoint and SSH logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized\_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.
- Required telemetry: Linux process creation with complete command lines; File modification telemetry for user and root SSH directories; SSH authentication and network connection logs
- Investigate: Recover the added key and identify the process, user, package, or script that changed the file.
- Investigate: Correlate the change with new SSH sessions, reverse tunnels, and other persistence artifacts.
- Limitation: Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### persistence: New persistence → recurring execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/persistence.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/persistence.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes; Process creation and file provenance; User / administrative change records
- Investigate: Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
- Investigate: Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
- Limitation: Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0010.001: AI Software — Unauthorized copies of an AI coding extension were placed on the cache that served Cursor's marketplace. Anthropic did not publish them.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0010.001
  Evidence: https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update ; https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/
- AML.T0011: User Execution — Extension established persistence through platform-specific mechanisms
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0011
  Evidence: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — The copied bucket included traces with unredacted credentials, and the extension collected environment variables matching secret patterns
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update ; https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/

## Defensive notes
Rotate credentials that were in coding-agent traces or sent to support if Cursor notified the account. Review SSH authorized\_keys for svc-telemetry, outbound SSH to 134.209.82.225, LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond, @reboot cron, and a SysMon scheduled task. Do not treat Open VSX as the source of this copy.

## Sources
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/ — Inside the malicious Claude Code-branded Cursor extension with persistent SSH backdoor
- https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice — Security notice regarding Claude Code extension
- https://opensourcemalware.com/analysis/claude-code-trojan-persistent-ssh-backdoor — Claude Code Trojan: Persistent SSH Backdoor Analysis
- https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update — Security incident update

## Source notes
The Fireworks access key, the read-only bucket, the 0.01% and 0.05% figures, the marketplace cache, the 5,000-user bound, the 11-hour window, and the Nov 1 last-seen activity are from Cursor's Nov 13, 2026 update. The loader, SSH key svc-telemetry, tunnel 134.209.82.225, beacon on port 8099, and the macOS, Linux, and Windows persistence names are from Microsoft's Oct 30 analysis. The earlier GitHub-repository explanation is not the root cause Cursor published on Nov 13.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "134.209.82.225"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
