{
  "id": "arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11",
  "name": "Arctic Wolf - AntiFox ARTEX fork web-shells IIS and reads AWS production secrets",
  "date_reported": "2026-11-10",
  "researcher": "Arctic Wolf Labs, Adversary Research",
  "org": "Arctic Wolf",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md",
      "title": "Arctic Wolf Labs pack alert: AntiFox on Alibaba Cloud",
      "publisher": "Arctic Wolf Labs"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-use-antifox-ai-agents-in-aws-credential-theft-attacks/",
      "title": "BleepingComputer: AntiFox AI agents in AWS credential theft",
      "publisher": "BleepingComputer"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/antifox-ai-pentesting-platform-linked.html",
      "title": "The Hacker News: AntiFox linked to AWS credential theft",
      "publisher": "The Hacker News"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://blog.gitguardian.com/another-new-ai-hacking-agent-vs-the-same-credential-problem-antifox-targeting-aws-credentials/",
      "title": "GitGuardian: AntiFox targeting AWS credentials",
      "publisher": "GitGuardian"
    }
  ],
  "magicsword_coverage": [],
  "borderline": false,
  "borderline_note": null,
  "ai_role": "attacker_uses_ai_as_operator",
  "ai_role_secondary": "ai_credential_theft",
  "ai_role_detail": "Arctic Wolf tied live IIS and AWS intrusions to source IPs that hosted AntiFox consoles, a Chinese-language fork of ARTEX",
  "technique_summary": "Arctic Wolf Labs (pack alert committed Nov 10, 2026) describes AntiFox, an open-source Chinese-language agentic pentest platform forked from ARTEX, running multi-agent workflows on TCP 8787 and requiring an Anthropic or OpenAI key. Self-hosted consoles on Alibaba Cloud were tied to real intrusions. On an internet-facing IIS app, w3wp.exe wrote an ASPX web shell (pwn*.aspx in upload directories) and then ran whoami, icacls, and write tests into the web root. PowerShell used System.Web.Configuration.WebConfigurationManager and WebConfigurationFileMap to parse web.config connection strings and app settings, then copied config and log files into web-reachable cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt, and tried an internal production database with the extracted credential. The initial exploit was not identified. In AWS, valid IAM users and in one case an assumed EC2 role ran GetCallerIdentity, ListUsers, ListRoles, ListPolicies, ListKeys, and an attempted ECR GetAuthorizationToken. One intrusion cycled multiple identities through hundreds of List, Get, and Describe calls across IAM, EC2, S3, Lambda, Secrets Manager, KMS, RDS, ECS, EKS, Redshift, Athena, Glue, Systems Manager, API Gateway, CloudWatch, CloudFormation, DynamoDB, and Bedrock in about 30 minutes. Most calls were denied. Some succeeded, ending in ListSecrets then GetSecretValue on a production secret. Another case ran S3 GetObject, CopyObject, and DeleteObject. User agents were Boto3/1.43.125 and Botocore/1.43.125. Source IPs 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210. Console title AntiFox autonomous pentest console. Banner hash c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab. AntiFox source https://github.com/AntiFox-AI/antifox. Upstream fork https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX. IOC file https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools.",
  "initial_access": "Unknown exploit of an internet-facing IIS application; separate activity started from already-valid AWS credentials",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "AntiFox (https://github.com/AntiFox-AI/antifox), forked from ARTEX",
    "Anthropic or OpenAI API key required for the agent loop"
  ],
  "frameworks": [
    "antifox"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [
    "ASPX web shell written by w3wp.exe",
    "Boto3 1.43.125 / Botocore 1.43.125"
  ],
  "victims_and_sectors": "Internet-facing IIS applications and associated AWS accounts, including a production secret",
  "regions": [
    "Multiple regions"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "Unnamed operators. Arctic Wolf gives no country. The platform is Chinese-language and the consoles were on Alibaba Cloud. Arctic Wolf links the activity to AntiFox through the hosting consoles.",
  "scale_and_metrics": "Several intrusions. One AWS burst of hundreds of API calls in about 30 minutes, ending in GetSecretValue.",
  "prevention_angle": "Alert when w3wp.exe writes .aspx files or spawns cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, or icacls.exe. Hunt web roots for pwn*.aspx, cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt. Alert on GetSecretValue from 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210 and on Boto3/1.43.125 after a burst of AccessDenied. Block TCP 8787 consoles titled AntiFox.",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [],
  "source_notes": "Host commands, file patterns, AWS API sequence, user agents, IPs, banner hash, and port are from the Arctic Wolf README. The AI link is that the attacking IPs hosted AntiFox consoles. No government source covers AntiFox.",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-11-12",
  "iocs": {
    "domains": [],
    "ips": [
      "47.79.4.33",
      "8.208.101.210"
    ],
    "hashes": [
      "c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab"
    ],
    "urls": []
  },
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0016",
      "rationale": "Operators run AntiFox, an agentic fork of ARTEX, from Alibaba Cloud consoles",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0049",
      "rationale": "w3wp.exe on an internet-facing IIS app wrote an ASPX web shell. The exploit itself was not identified.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0055",
      "rationale": "PowerShell parsed web.config connection strings and app settings, then a later call read a production secret",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0012",
      "rationale": "Valid IAM users and an assumed EC2 role were used for the AWS enumeration",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "webshell",
        "title": "IIS worker writes an ASPX shell",
        "description": "w3wp.exe creates pwn*.aspx in an upload directory and runs whoami, icacls, and write tests.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "webconfig",
        "title": "Parse web.config",
        "description": "PowerShell uses WebConfigurationManager to copy connection strings and logs into cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "aws-enum",
        "title": "Burst of AWS List and Get calls",
        "description": "Boto3 1.43.125 from the AntiFox IPs cycles identities across dozens of AWS services in about 30 minutes.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "secret",
        "title": "GetSecretValue and S3 object changes",
        "description": "A successful GetSecretValue hits a production secret. Other activity copies and deletes S3 objects.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "webshell",
        "target": "webconfig"
      },
      {
        "source": "aws-enum",
        "target": "secret"
      }
    ]
  },
  "category": "adversary-use-of-ai",
  "attribution": {
    "actor_name": "Unnamed AntiFox operators",
    "country": "Unknown",
    "motivation": "financially-motivated",
    "attributed_by": "Arctic Wolf Labs",
    "confidence": "medium"
  },
  "ai_involvement_confidence": "vendor-asserted",
  "detections": [
    {
      "name": "Potential IIS Web Shell File Creation",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/windows/persistence_web_shell_aspx_write.toml",
      "notes": "Windows endpoint. Creation of ASPX files in IIS content directories. Matches w3wp.exe writing pwn*.aspx."
    },
    {
      "name": "Suspicious Process By Web Server Process",
      "format": "sigma",
      "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_susp_process_spawned_from_webserver.yml",
      "notes": "Windows process creation. w3wp.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, which Arctic Wolf saw running whoami and icacls."
    },
    {
      "name": "AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets Retrieval",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_rapid_secret_retrieval_attempts_from_secretsmanager.toml",
      "notes": "AWS CloudTrail. Repeated GetSecretValue. The intrusion that succeeded used ListSecrets then GetSecretValue."
    },
    {
      "name": "First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/credential_access_new_terms_secretsmanager_getsecretvalue.toml",
      "notes": "AWS CloudTrail. First GetSecretValue for an identity. Useful when the production-secret read is new for that IAM user or role."
    },
    {
      "name": "AntiFox console and file-name hunting",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "Also hunt TCP 8787 with the AntiFox console title, banner hash c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab, user agents Boto3/1.43.125 and Botocore/1.43.125, and files cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt dropped in web-reachable directories. Source IPs 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210."
    }
  ],
  "timeline": {
    "first_seen": "2026-11-10",
    "last_updated": "2026-11-10",
    "updates": [
      {
        "date": "2026-11-10",
        "source": "Arctic Wolf Labs",
        "summary": "Pack alert links Alibaba-hosted AntiFox consoles to IIS ASPX web shells and AWS GetSecretValue against a production secret"
      }
    ]
  }
}