# Arctic Wolf - AntiFox ARTEX fork web-shells IIS and reads AWS production secrets

- ID: arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-10
- Researcher: Arctic Wolf Labs, Adversary Research
- Organization: Arctic Wolf
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: antifox
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-12
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Arctic Wolf - AntiFox ARTEX fork web-shells IIS and reads AWS production secrets
- Editorial summary: Arctic Wolf Labs (pack alert committed Nov 10, 2026) describes AntiFox, an open-source Chinese-language agentic pentest platform forked from ARTEX, running multi-agent workflows on TCP 8787 and requiring an…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11.json

## Technique
Arctic Wolf Labs (pack alert committed Nov 10, 2026) describes AntiFox, an open-source Chinese-language agentic pentest platform forked from ARTEX, running multi-agent workflows on TCP 8787 and requiring an Anthropic or OpenAI key. Self-hosted consoles on Alibaba Cloud were tied to real intrusions. On an internet-facing IIS app, w3wp.exe wrote an ASPX web shell (pwn\*.aspx in upload directories) and then ran whoami, icacls, and write tests into the web root. PowerShell used System.Web.Configuration.WebConfigurationManager and WebConfigurationFileMap to parse web.config connection strings and app settings, then copied config and log files into web-reachable cfg\*.txt, wc\*.txt, and el\*.txt, and tried an internal production database with the extracted credential. The initial exploit was not identified. In AWS, valid IAM users and in one case an assumed EC2 role ran GetCallerIdentity, ListUsers, ListRoles, ListPolicies, ListKeys, and an attempted ECR GetAuthorizationToken. One intrusion cycled multiple identities through hundreds of List, Get, and Describe calls across IAM, EC2, S3, Lambda, Secrets Manager, KMS, RDS, ECS, EKS, Redshift, Athena, Glue, Systems Manager, API Gateway, CloudWatch, CloudFormation, DynamoDB, and Bedrock in about 30 minutes. Most calls were denied. Some succeeded, ending in ListSecrets then GetSecretValue on a production secret. Another case ran S3 GetObject, CopyObject, and DeleteObject. User agents were Boto3/1.43.125 and Botocore/1.43.125. Source IPs 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210. Console title AntiFox autonomous pentest console. Banner hash c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab. AntiFox source https://github.com/AntiFox-AI/antifox. Upstream fork https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX. IOC file https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Unknown exploit of an internet-facing IIS application; separate activity started from already-valid AWS credentials

## AI tooling and models
- AntiFox (https://github.com/AntiFox-AI/antifox), forked from [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- Anthropic or OpenAI API key required for the agent loop

## Other tooling
- ASPX web shell written by w3wp.exe
- Boto3 1.43.125 / Botocore 1.43.125

## Victims and sectors
Internet-facing IIS applications and associated AWS accounts, including a production secret

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unnamed operators. Arctic Wolf gives no country. The platform is Chinese-language and the consoles were on Alibaba Cloud. Arctic Wolf links the activity to AntiFox through the hosting consoles.

## Scale and metrics
Several intrusions. One AWS burst of hundreds of API calls in about 30 minutes, ending in GetSecretValue.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### webshell: IIS worker writes an ASPX shell [access]
w3wp.exe creates pwn\*.aspx in an upload directory and runs whoami, icacls, and write tests.
Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md

### webconfig: Parse web.config [execution]
PowerShell uses WebConfigurationManager to copy connection strings and logs into cfg\*.txt, wc\*.txt, and el\*.txt.
Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md

### aws-enum: Burst of AWS List and Get calls [ai]
Boto3 1.43.125 from the AntiFox IPs cycles identities across dozens of AWS services in about 30 minutes.
Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md

### secret: GetSecretValue and S3 object changes [impact]
A successful GetSecretValue hits a production secret. Other activity copies and deletes S3 objects.
Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md

Connections:
- webshell -> webconfig
- aws-enum -> secret

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### webshell: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### webconfig: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### aws-enum: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### secret: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016: Obtain Capabilities — Operators run AntiFox, an agentic fork of ARTEX, from Alibaba Cloud consoles
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016
  Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md
- AML.T0049: Exploit Public-Facing Application — w3wp.exe on an internet-facing IIS app wrote an ASPX web shell. The exploit itself was not identified.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049
  Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — PowerShell parsed web.config connection strings and app settings, then a later call read a production secret
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — Valid IAM users and an assumed EC2 role were used for the AWS enumeration
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md

## Defensive notes
Alert when w3wp.exe writes .aspx files or spawns cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, or icacls.exe. Hunt web roots for pwn\*.aspx, cfg\*.txt, wc\*.txt, and el\*.txt. Alert on GetSecretValue from 47.79.4.33 and 8.208.101.210 and on Boto3/1.43.125 after a burst of AccessDenied. Block TCP 8787 consoles titled AntiFox.

## Sources
- https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md — Arctic Wolf Labs pack alert: AntiFox on Alibaba Cloud
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-use-antifox-ai-agents-in-aws-credential-theft-attacks/ — BleepingComputer: AntiFox AI agents in AWS credential theft
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/antifox-ai-pentesting-platform-linked.html — The Hacker News: AntiFox linked to AWS credential theft
- https://blog.gitguardian.com/another-new-ai-hacking-agent-vs-the-same-credential-problem-antifox-targeting-aws-credentials/ — GitGuardian: AntiFox targeting AWS credentials

## Source notes
Host commands, file patterns, AWS API sequence, user agents, IPs, banner hash, and port are from the Arctic Wolf README. The AI link is that the attacking IPs hosted AntiFox consoles. No government source covers AntiFox.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "47.79.4.33",
    "8.208.101.210"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "c370d03542ed2ec696f7337940b14652e98e9bab"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
