# Arup Hong Kong deepfake video-conference $25M fraud

- ID: arup-deepfake-video-fraud-2024-01
- Reported: 2024-05-16
- Researcher: Arup / Hong Kong Police (press)
- Organization: Arup (victim disclosure via press)
- AI role: other (Other AI-enabled attacks)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/arup-deepfake-video-fraud-2024-01/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/arup-deepfake-video-fraud-2024-01.json
- Browse title: Arup Hong Kong deepfake video-call fraud (~US$25.6M)
- Editorial summary: A finance employee on a video call with deepfaked executives approved transfers of about US$25.6M. Arup said its internal IT systems were not compromised.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Business & social
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/arup-deepfake-video-fraud-2024-01.json

## Technique
Jan 2024: Hong Kong finance employee joined video call with deepfake of UK CFO and colleagues; authorized 15 transfers totaling ~HK$200M (~US$25.6M) to five local accounts. Arup said internal IT systems were not compromised.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
No reviewed selection-to-victim-condition mapping is available for this entry.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Social engineering via deepfake video conference

## AI tooling and models
- Deepfake video/audio of executives

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
Arup (engineering consultancy) Hong Kong finance staff

## Target geography
- Hong Kong
The affected finance staff were in Hong Kong. The United Kingdom refers to the parent organization and executive impersonation, not a separately confirmed victim location.

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
~US$25.6 million loss

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Finance employee joins a video call [access]
The victim is approached through a meeting impersonating company executives.
Evidence: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk ; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video

### step-2: Deepfake executives appear on screen [ai]
Synthetic video and audio impersonate the UK CFO and colleagues.
Evidence: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk ; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video

### step-3: Payment requests are authorized [execution]
The employee approves 15 transfers to five local accounts.
Evidence: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk ; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video

### step-4: Approximately US$25.6M lost [impact]
Arup disclosed the loss and said its internal IT systems were not compromised.
Evidence: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk ; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Out-of-band payment verification
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payment.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payment.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payment.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
- Required telemetry: Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit; Meeting and communication metadata; Independent callback / dual-approval records
- Investigate: Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Investigate: Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
- Limitation: A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- Qualification: This stage is included for completeness; a query needs a reviewed link between the described behavior and logs available to the observing party.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Out-of-band payment verification
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payment.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payment.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payment.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
- Required telemetry: Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit; Meeting and communication metadata; Independent callback / dual-approval records
- Investigate: Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Investigate: Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
- Limitation: A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Out-of-band payment verification
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payment.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payment.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payment.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
- Required telemetry: Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit; Meeting and communication metadata; Independent callback / dual-approval records
- Investigate: Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Investigate: Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
- Limitation: A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
- Qualification: Payment and approval records can support investigation of the loss; they do not prove that media was synthetic.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0088: Generate Deepfakes — Synthetic video and audio impersonate executives.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0088
  Evidence: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk ; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video
- AML.T0073: Impersonation — The payment request relies on executive impersonation.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0073
  Evidence: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk ; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video

## Defensive notes
Out-of-band payment verification; dual control; challenge deepfake meetings

## Sources
- https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/16/tech/arup-deepfake-scam-loss-hong-kong-intl-hnk
- https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/17/uk-engineering-arup-deepfake-scam-hong-kong-ai-video
