# BadByte - Backdoored ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex & congdonglinux/artex

- ID: badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-04
- Researcher: Dan Tentler (Viss), analyzed by BadByte
- Organization: BadByte
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-06
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11.json
- Browse title: BadByte - Backdoored ARTEX Docker images tomicdd/artex & congdonglinux/artex
- Editorial summary: After Autumn-27 closed ARTEX source on Oct 8, 2026, unknown operator controlling Docker Hub accounts tomicdd and congdonglinux (mirror) pushed backdoored ARTEX images while maintaining deleted GitHub bait…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11.json

## Technique
After Autumn-27 closed ARTEX source on Oct 8, 2026, unknown operator controlling Docker Hub accounts tomicdd and congdonglinux (mirror) pushed backdoored ARTEX images while maintaining deleted GitHub bait repository trhhubsd/ARTEX (formerly ptasm) with swapped docker-compose.yml pulling backdoored tomicdd/artex. Prebuilt /app/artex binary adds verifyCaptcha function: unauthenticated POST to /api/auth/login with marked captcha field executes arbitrary sh -c commands as root before password verification, bypassing authentication entirely. Backdoor exposes ARTEX operator's LLM API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek), MCP server configurations, autonomous agent prompts, and credentials harvested from targets during offensive operations. BadByte analysis (Nov 4, 2026) confirmed /app/artex SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573, image index digest sha256:ce85d8369ccc1a85423f1f75d2f3afaa2fab759e580da37a6891af2f7392745e, UI build ID 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J. Docker Hub removed tomicdd/artex on Nov 5, 2026. Backdoor demonstrates supply-chain risk in offensive AI agent tooling where operators' own credentials become attack surface.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
ARTEX operators pull backdoored tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex Docker image via compromised docker-compose.yml in deleted trhhubsd/ARTEX repository

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) autonomous offensive agent (clean source at https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- Backdoored [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) [Docker](https://github.com/moby/moby) image (tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex - now removed from [Docker](https://github.com/moby/moby) Hub) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.

## Other tooling
- [Docker](https://github.com/moby/moby) / [Docker](https://github.com/moby/moby) Compose
- Unauthenticated /api/auth/login backdoor endpoint

## Victims and sectors
ARTEX operators conducting offensive security operations; exposed: operator LLM API keys, MCP configurations, autonomous agent prompts, harvested target credentials

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unknown operator controlling Docker Hub tomicdd (primary) and congdonglinux (mirror) accounts; deleted GitHub repository trhhubsd/ARTEX (formerly ptasm); initially surfaced by Dan Tentler (Viss) on Nov 2, 2026; analyzed by BadByte

## Scale and metrics
tomicdd/artex available on Docker Hub Oct 8 - Nov 5, 2026; unknown number of pulls before takedown; backdoor active approximately 4 weeks

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### close-source: ARTEX source closed Oct 8, 2026 [execution]
ARTEX source closed Oct 8, 2026
Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

### push-backdoor: Push backdoored tomicdd/artex to Docker Hub [execution]
Push backdoored tomicdd/artex to Docker Hub
Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

### swap-compose: trhhubsd/ARTEX swaps docker-compose.yml to pull tomicdd/artex [execution]
trhhubsd/ARTEX swaps docker-compose.yml to pull tomicdd/artex
Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

### operator-pull: ARTEX operators pull backdoored image [execution]
ARTEX operators pull backdoored image
Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

### backdoor-access: Unauthenticated POST /api/auth/login executes sh -c as root [execution]
Unauthenticated POST /api/auth/login executes sh -c as root
Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

### credential-theft: Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials [impact]
Steal LLM API keys, MCP configs, prompts, target credentials
Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

Connections:
- close-source -> push-backdoor
- push-backdoor -> swap-compose
- swap-compose -> operator-pull
- operator-pull -> backdoor-access
- backdoor-access -> credential-theft

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### close-source: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### push-backdoor: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### swap-compose: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### operator-pull: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### backdoor-access: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### credential-theft: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0000: Search Open Technical Databases — Supply-chain attack targeting AI offensive agent infrastructure; backdoor in ARTEX Docker image allows attacker to compromise operators' LLM API keys and MCP configurations
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000
  Evidence: https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/

## Defensive notes
Verify Docker image integrity via official repository sources and signed images; audit docker-compose.yml for unexpected image sources; use Docker Content Trust / Notary v2 for image verification; scan container images for suspicious network listeners and authentication bypasses; monitor container logs for unauthenticated command execution attempts; never deploy offensive tooling images from unverified third-party Docker Hub accounts; build ARTEX from official source (github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) rather than pulling prebuilt images; implement network segmentation for offensive security infrastructure

## Sources
- https://badbyte.io/artex-backdoor-docker-image/ — Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/backdoored-docker-image-for-artex-ai.html — Backdoored Docker Image for ARTEX AI Offensive Agent Exposes Operators' Secrets

## Source notes
BadByte analysis (Nov 4, 2026, updated Nov 5 on Docker Hub takedown) primary source; Dan Tentler (Viss) initial disclosure Nov 2, 2026; all hashes and IOCs verified from BadByte post: /app/artex SHA-256 d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573, image index digest sha256:ce85d8369ccc1a85423f1f75d2f3afaa2fab759e580da37a6891af2f7392745e, UI build ID 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [
    "d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573"
  ],
  "urls": [
    "https://hub.docker.com/r/tomicdd/artex (removed Nov 5, 2026)",
    "https://hub.docker.com/r/congdonglinux/artex (mirror, removed)"
  ]
}
```
