# Carbonato botnet deploys Hermes agent to hunt AI keys on Docker hosts

- ID: carbonato-botnet-hermes-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-28
- Researcher: ThreatDown Labs
- Organization: ThreatDown (formerly Malwarebytes)
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/carbonato-botnet-hermes-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/carbonato-botnet-hermes-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Carbonato botnet deploys Hermes agent to hunt AI keys on Docker hosts
- Editorial summary: Oct 28, 2026: Carbonato botnet scans for exposed Docker daemons (TCP 2375/2376, unauthenticated or weak credentials). On compromise, deploys privileged container running Ubuntu with: (1) Hermes autonomous…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/carbonato-botnet-hermes-2026-10.json

## Technique
Oct 28, 2026: Carbonato botnet scans for exposed Docker daemons (TCP 2375/2376, unauthenticated or weak credentials). On compromise, deploys privileged container running Ubuntu with: (1) Hermes autonomous agent (Python-based LLM agent framework); (2) scanning modules for AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, OpenAI/Anthropic API keys, HuggingFace tokens, Docker secrets, Kubernetes service accounts; (3) XMRig crypto miner (secondary payload). Hermes agent autonomously navigates filesystem, reads environment variables, parses .env files, queries Docker secrets API, extracts credentials from running containers, and exfiltrates findings to hxxps://carbonato-collect\[.\]net/api/ingest. Agent continues running indefinitely, adapting search patterns based on discovered infrastructure. ThreatDown tracked 3,200+ compromised Docker hosts Oct-Nov 2026; hosts in cloud providers (AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean) and on-premise. Median dwell time 18 days before detection. Detection: monitor Docker daemon exposure (Shodan queries docker 2375/2376), review privileged container deployments, alert on Hermes agent indicators (Python LLM agent process, hermes CLI usage), check for carbonato-collect\[.\]net egress, monitor API key/token file access patterns from containers.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Internet-exposed Docker daemon on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) or 2376 (TLS but weak/no auth); credential brute-force or default credentials

## AI tooling and models
- Hermes autonomous agent framework
- OpenAI API (targeted)
- Anthropic [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) API (targeted)
- HuggingFace (targeted)

## Other tooling
- [Docker](https://github.com/moby/moby) container escape
- XMRig cryptocurrency miner
- carbonato-collect\[.\]net C2

## Victims and sectors
3,200+ compromised Docker hosts across AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, on-premise; AI/ML development environments, CI/CD pipelines, cloud-native infrastructure

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unknown actor; Carbonato botnet infrastructure; financially motivated (crypto mining + credential monetization)

## Scale and metrics
3,200+ compromised Docker hosts (Oct-Nov 2026); median dwell time 18 days; credential theft + crypto mining dual-purpose operation

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### scan-docker: Scan for exposed Docker [access]
Botnet scans internet for exposed Docker daemons on TCP 2375 (unencrypted) and 2376 (TLS); brute-forces weak credentials or exploits no-auth configs
Evidence: https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/

### deploy-container: Deploy malicious container [ai]
Creates privileged Docker container with host filesystem mounts; runs Ubuntu image with Hermes agent, scanning tools, and XMRig miner; container gains host-level access
Evidence: https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/

### hermes-hunt: Autonomous credential hunting [execution]
Hermes agent autonomously navigates filesystem, reads env vars, parses .env files, queries Docker secrets, extracts credentials from running containers; adapts search patterns based on discovered infrastructure; targets AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Anthropic, HuggingFace keys
Evidence: https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/

### exfiltrate-mine: Exfiltrate and mine [impact]
Hermes POSTs credentials to hxxps://carbonato-collect\[.\]net/api/ingest; XMRig mines Monero using host CPU; agent maintains persistence and continues hunting indefinitely; median 18-day dwell time
Evidence: https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/

Connections:
- scan-docker -> deploy-container
- deploy-container -> hermes-hunt
- hermes-hunt -> exfiltrate-mine

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### scan-docker: Web exploitation → host activity
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/web.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/web.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/web.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
- Required telemetry: Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs; Server process and file events; Outbound DNS / proxy records
- Investigate: Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Investigate: Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
- Limitation: A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
- Qualification: Use internet-facing Docker/API request logs for the scan, then require daemon or host activity before treating it as exploitation.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-container: Privileged container or pod with host access
- Visibility: Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/privileged-container.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/privileged-container.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/privileged-container.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.
- Required telemetry: Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events; Container runtime process and mount telemetry; Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions
- Investigate: Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.
- Investigate: Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials.
- Limitation: Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### hermes-hunt: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfiltrate-mine: Sensitive data → unusual destination
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/exfil.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/exfil.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
- Required telemetry: Sensitive resource access / DLP records; Proxy, egress and cloud upload events; Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
- Investigate: Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Investigate: Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
- Limitation: An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
- Qualification: This hunt covers the reported credential transfer. Mining needs separate process/network telemetry and is not implied by the exfiltration query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0000: Search Open Technical Databases — Attacker deploys autonomous AI agent (Hermes) to hunt for AI service credentials on compromised infrastructure
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000
  Evidence: https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/

## Defensive notes
Never expose Docker daemon to internet; require TLS with client cert authentication; use Docker socket firewall rules; implement least-privilege container policies; disable privileged containers where possible; monitor container resource usage; rotate API keys regularly; use secret management solutions (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager); network segmentation; Docker security scanning

## Sources
- https://www.threatdown.com/blog/carbonato/ — ThreatDown: Carbonato Botnet Spreads Via Exposed Docker Hosts
- https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent — Hermes - Autonomous AI Agent Framework

## Source notes
ThreatDown Labs analysis; Hermes agent GitHub github.com/Hermes-Autonomous-Intelligence/hermes. Carbonato represents evolution of botnet TTPs: combining traditional crypto mining with autonomous AI agents for credential harvesting. Detection: look for Hermes agent Python process (hermes, autonomous-agent, llm-agent), monitor Docker privileged containers with network egress to unknown domains, check for carbonato-collect\[.\]net, alert on Docker API calls from unexpected sources, review container mounts accessing host credentials.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "carbonato-collect.net"
  ],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
