# Check Point and CERT-EU exposed ARTEX operator consoles leak campaign data

- ID: checkpoint-artex-operator-consoles-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-05
- Researcher: Check Point Research, CERT-EU
- Organization: Check Point, CERT-EU
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: artex
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-10
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/checkpoint-artex-operator-consoles-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/checkpoint-artex-operator-consoles-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Check Point and CERT-EU exposed ARTEX operator consoles leak campaign data
- Editorial summary: Check Point (Nov 5, 2026) and CERT-EU (Nov 5, 2026) document exposed ARTEX operator control panels leaking database dumps containing operator prompts, model selection (primarily DeepSeek Flash and Kimi),…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/checkpoint-artex-operator-consoles-2026-11.json

## Technique
Check Point (Nov 5, 2026) and CERT-EU (Nov 5, 2026) document exposed ARTEX operator control panels leaking database dumps containing operator prompts, model selection (primarily DeepSeek Flash and Kimi), autonomous agent decision steps, and campaign targets. Three campaign fleets identified: (1) iOS signing shops - steal .p12 certificates and passwords, check against Apple revocation/expiry lists; (2) Crypto payment sites - drain USDT, swap deposit addresses; overwrite S3 buckets serving iOS IPA landing pages (supply chain); (3) Honor of Kings account tokens from stolen-account resale servers. Access methods: hardcoded admin passwords in JavaScript bundles, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR vulnerabilities. Operator who hit Claude Opus guardrails switched to Chinese LLM models. Version-tag infrastructure clusters: sco-fix2 (38.11.173.0/24, 38.11.221.0/24, 198.200.59.85-89, AS54600 PEG TECH); dev-db-resilience-20261031 (103.122.245.x, AS152918 Liberally Network, Thailand); 0.3.15-pro.\* (192.236.172.197, 198.44.123.66, 204.44.66.81, 104.168.112.237, AS36352 HostPapa). Custom framework PZZ referenced. CERT-EU reports ARTEX activity vs EU institutions; original Autumn-27 ARTEX repository down. Chinese-prompting actors, financially motivated; attributed by Check Point; confirmed AI involvement from leaked operator consoles.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Hardcoded admin passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) autonomous offensive agent (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai) Flash (primary)
- Kimi (Chinese LLM)
- [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) Opus (hit guardrails, operator switched)
- Custom framework PZZ

## Other tooling
- iOS .p12 certificate theft
- USDT cryptocurrency draining
- S3 bucket overwrite for supply chain
- Honor of Kings account token theft

## Victims and sectors
iOS signing shops, cryptocurrency payment sites, Honor of Kings account resale servers, EU institutions (CERT-EU report)

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Chinese-prompting financially motivated operators; attributed by Check Point; confirmed from leaked operator console databases

## Scale and metrics
Three major campaign fleets (iOS signing, crypto payment, game accounts); multiple exposed ARTEX panels with leaked operator databases; infrastructure across AS54600 PEG TECH, AS152918 Liberally Network Thailand, AS36352 HostPapa

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### deploy-artex: Deploy ARTEX operator console [ai]
Financially motivated operators deploy ARTEX consoles for campaign orchestration
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/

### ios-signing: iOS signing shop campaign [execution]
Steal .p12 certificates and passwords; check Apple revocation/expiry
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/

### crypto-payment: Crypto payment site campaign [impact]
Drain USDT, swap deposit addresses; overwrite S3 buckets serving iOS IPA (supply chain)
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/

### game-accounts: Honor of Kings account theft [impact]
Steal account tokens from compromised stolen-account resale servers
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/

### console-exposure: ARTEX console exposure [execution]
Hardcoded passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR expose operator consoles and databases
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/

Connections:
- deploy-artex -> ios-signing
- deploy-artex -> crypto-payment
- deploy-artex -> game-accounts
- console-exposure -> deploy-artex

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### deploy-artex: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ios-signing: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### crypto-payment: Out-of-band payment verification
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payment.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payment.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payment.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.
- Required telemetry: Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit; Meeting and communication metadata; Independent callback / dual-approval records
- Investigate: Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.
- Investigate: Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history.
- Limitation: A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### game-accounts: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### console-exposure: Web exploitation → host activity
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/web.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/web.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/web.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
- Required telemetry: Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs; Server process and file events; Outbound DNS / proxy records
- Investigate: Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Investigate: Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
- Limitation: A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016: Obtain Capabilities — Exposed ARTEX operator consoles reveal autonomous agent decision-making process and campaign orchestration
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016
  Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — AI agents autonomously exploit hardcoded passwords, unauthenticated APIs, command injection, SSTI, IDOR
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/
- AML.T0010: AI Supply Chain Compromise — S3 bucket overwrite campaign represents AI-driven supply chain attack
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0010
  Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/

## Defensive notes
Secure ARTEX deployments against unauthorized access (remove hardcoded passwords, authenticate APIs); patch command injection, SSTI, IDOR vulnerabilities; rotate compromised credentials; monitor for iOS .p12 theft; protect cryptocurrency deposit address integrity; secure S3 buckets serving app distributions; implement behavioral detection for autonomous agent patterns; block known ARTEX infrastructure IPs; detect Chinese-language prompting in logs

## Sources
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/ — Check Point: Hacking on Autopilot - Inside ARTEX Cybercrime Campaigns
- https://cert.europa.eu/blog/from-penetration-testing-to-cyber-threat-beware-of-artex — CERT-EU: From Penetration Testing to Cyber Threat - Beware of ARTEX

## Source notes
Check Point blog (Nov 5, 2026) primary source with detailed campaign analysis and infrastructure; CERT-EU blog (Nov 5, 2026) reports ARTEX vs EU institutions; all IOCs (IPs, ASNs, version tags) verified from Check Point; links to other ARTEX entries: microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11, crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10, badbyte-artex-backdoor-docker-2026-11, storm-3358-artex-bank-intrusions-2026-11, srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "38.11.173.0/24",
    "38.11.221.0/24",
    "198.200.59.85",
    "198.200.59.86",
    "198.200.59.87",
    "198.200.59.88",
    "198.200.59.89",
    "103.122.245.0/24",
    "192.236.172.197",
    "198.44.123.66",
    "204.44.66.81",
    "104.168.112.237"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
