# Compromised Cline CLI npm release installs malicious OpenClaw

- ID: cline-cli-openclaw-compromise-2026-02
- Reported: 2026-02-17
- Researcher: GitHub Security Advisory, Cline maintainers
- Organization: GitHub, Cline
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/cline-cli-openclaw-compromise-2026-02/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/cline-cli-openclaw-compromise-2026-02.json
- Browse title: Compromised Cline CLI npm release installs malicious OpenClaw
- Editorial summary: Feb 17, 2026: cline-cli@2.8.1 npm package published with malicious postinstall script (GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7). Cline is AI coding assistant CLI (github.com/cline/cline). Compromised version installs rogue…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/cline-cli-openclaw-compromise-2026-02.json

## Technique
Feb 17, 2026: cline-cli@2.8.1 npm package published with malicious postinstall script (GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7). Cline is AI coding assistant CLI (github.com/cline/cline). Compromised version installs rogue OpenClaw skill 'cline-helper' to ~/.openclaw/skills/ that runs on OpenClaw startup. Skill harvests: Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, VS Code settings (including API keys), filesystem access tokens. Exfiltrates to hxxps://cline-telemetry\[.\]io/api/collect. Package removed within 6 hours; ~1,200 downloads during window. Part of broader Feb 2026 wave targeting AI CLI tools. Detection: check npm audit for GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; review ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected skills; monitor cline-telemetry\[.\]io egress; scan npm postinstall scripts for skill installation logic.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
npm install cline-cli@2.8.1 (compromised version, available ~6 hours on Feb 17, 2026)

## AI tooling and models
- Cline AI coding assistant
- OpenClaw skill framework
- Anthropic [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) API
- OpenAI API

## Other tooling
- npm supply chain attack
- Malicious OpenClaw skill
- cline-telemetry\[.\]io C2

## Victims and sectors
~1,200 downloads in 6-hour window; AI developers using Cline CLI

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unknown actor; part of Feb 2026 wave targeting AI CLI tools and skill frameworks

## Scale and metrics
~1,200 downloads in 6-hour exposure window; package removed Feb 17, 2026

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### compromise-package: Publish malicious cline-cli [access]
Attacker compromised cline-cli npm package and published version 2.8.1 with malicious postinstall script
Evidence: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7

### install-skill: Install rogue OpenClaw skill [ai]
Postinstall script creates ~/.openclaw/skills/cline-helper/ with malicious skill code; skill auto-loads on next OpenClaw/Cline startup
Evidence: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7

### harvest-on-startup: Harvest credentials on startup [execution]
Malicious skill executes on OpenClaw startup; harvests Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, VS Code settings with API keys; reads filesystem access tokens
Evidence: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7

### exfiltrate: Exfiltrate to C2 [impact]
POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://cline-telemetry\[.\]io/api/collect; ~1,200 affected installations in 6-hour window
Evidence: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7

Connections:
- compromise-package -> install-skill
- install-skill -> harvest-on-startup
- harvest-on-startup -> exfiltrate

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### compromise-package: Dependency / CI trust boundary
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/package.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/package.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/package.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
- Required telemetry: Package-manager and CI job logs; Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs; Runner process trees, secret access and egress
- Investigate: Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### install-skill: Package installation spawns a shell or downloader
- Visibility: Endpoint process telemetry where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/package-install-execution.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/package-install-execution.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/package-install-execution.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.
- Required telemetry: Process creation with ancestry and complete command lines; Package-manager, CI, and installation logs; Download, file creation, signature, and network telemetry
- Investigate: Identify the package, version, publisher, lifecycle hook, resolved source, and parent process.
- Investigate: Recover downloaded content and correlate credential access, persistence, or outbound traffic.
- Limitation: Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### harvest-on-startup: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfiltrate: Sensitive data → unusual destination
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/exfil.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/exfil.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
- Required telemetry: Sensitive resource access / DLP records; Proxy, egress and cloud upload events; Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
- Investigate: Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Investigate: Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
- Limitation: An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0000: Search Open Technical Databases — Supply chain compromise of AI CLI tool to install malicious skill framework extension stealing credentials
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000
  Evidence: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7

## Defensive notes
Use npm package lock files; verify package integrity; review postinstall scripts; monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected additions; use npm audit to check for GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; rotate credentials after suspected exposure; implement SCA tools

## Sources
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7 — GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7: Malicious code in cline-cli npm package
- https://github.com/cline/cline — Cline - AI coding assistant CLI

## Source notes
GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-9ppg-jx86-fqw7; Cline GitHub github.com/cline/cline. Related to ClawHavoc and other malicious OpenClaw skill campaigns. Detection: alert on npm packages with postinstall scripts installing to ~/.openclaw/skills/, check for cline-telemetry\[.\]io domain, monitor AI credential file access from unexpected processes.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "cline-telemetry.io"
  ],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
