# ARTEX + Claude Code vs South Korean finance

- ID: crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-07
- Researcher: CrowdStrike Intelligence
- Organization: CrowdStrike
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Offensive frameworks: artex
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10.json
- Browse title: ARTEX and Claude Code used against South Korean financial firms
- Editorial summary: A likely Chinese-speaking actor used the ARTEX agentic pentest suite and Claude Code against South Korean financial organizations, and asked Claude where to sell the stolen data.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/crowdstrike-artex-sk-finance-2026-10.json

## Technique
Likely Chinese-speaking financially motivated actor used open-source Chinese agentic pentest suite ARTEX plus Claude Code against South Korean financial orgs. Open directories held Claude session histories, ARTEX configs, Claude memory. ARTEX used DeepSeek v4.1-flash via xcai.pro; also GLM-5.3 and Grok 4.6. Actor asked Claude where to sell Korean breach data. ARTEX later went closed-source.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: attacker\_tool\_only. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
The named AI product is used by the attacker. No reviewed mapping from owning that product to the reported victim conditions is available.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown (industry reports: loan inquiry service; employee mobile work-support system)

## AI tooling and models
- [ARTEX](https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX) — Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
- [Claude Code](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code)
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai) v4.1-flash via xcai.pro
- [GLM-5.3](https://github.com/zai-org)
- [Grok](https://x.ai/grok) 4.6

## Other tooling
- Proxy IPs listed in CrowdStrike IOC table

## Victims and sectors
South Korean financial organizations (multiple banks per industry reports)

## Target geography
- South Korea
South Korea describes victim financial organizations. Chinese language concerns actor attribution; Hong Kong refers to infrastructure. Neither is counted as victim geography.

## Attribution
CrowdStrike did not attribute the activity to a named adversary. It assessed with moderate confidence that the actor was likely a Chinese speaker and financially motivated.

## Scale and metrics
Active late Sep–early Oct 2026; number of orgs unconfirmed

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Initial access is not established [unknown]
The supplied entry does not confirm the initial intrusion route.
Evidence: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/

### step-2: ARTEX and Claude Code assist operations [ai]
The actor uses an agentic pentest suite and coding-agent tooling.
Evidence: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/

### step-3: Agents support financial-sector attacks [execution]
Open directories exposed sessions, configurations and model use tied to South Korean financial targets.
Evidence: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/

### step-4: Actor discusses selling breach data [impact]
Claude session material includes questions about selling Korean breach data; identities remain unconfirmed.
Evidence: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Web exploitation → host activity
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/web.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/web.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/web.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
- Required telemetry: Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs; Server process and file events; Outbound DNS / proxy records
- Investigate: Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Investigate: Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
- Limitation: A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- Qualification: The discussion of selling breach data is visible in exposed operator sessions, not inherently in victim endpoint telemetry.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — The supplied source explicitly describes generative-model tooling assisting the reported activity; this mapping does not establish additional autonomy or victim impact.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/

## Defensive notes
Monitor for agentic pentest suites and exposed Claude session dirs; Jose Censys notes on IOCs

## Sources
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/ — CrowdStrike Oct 7 - Unknown threat actor uses ARTEX vs South Korean finance

## Source notes
CrowdStrike's report ties the South Korean finance activity to an unnamed actor. Separate reports of ARTEX use by other clusters should not be treated as attribution for this campaign.
