# Cursor MCPoison persistent MCP trust bypass (CVE-2025-54136)

- ID: cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136
- Reported: 2025-08-05
- Researcher: Andrey Charikov, Roman Zaikin, Oded Vanunu
- Organization: Check Point Research
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136.json
- Browse title: Cursor MCPoison persistent MCP trust bypass (CVE-2025-54136)
- Editorial summary: After a victim approved a benign MCP config, an attacker could swap in a reverse shell that ran on every project open without a new prompt. Fixed in Cursor 1.3.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Vulnerability report
- Source-stated target environments: Agents & MCP
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136.json

## Technique
Cursor one-time MCP approval bound to key name only. Attacker commits benign .cursor MCP, victim approves, later swaps command/args to reverse shell; re-executes on every project open/sync without new prompt. Fixed in Cursor 1.3 (any MCP change re-prompts).

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Check the vendor advisory and review ownership and changes to shared Cursor MCP configurations.
- Relationship: target; tools: cursor; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: true.
  Relevance: Cursor with a shared MCP configuration is the reported trust boundary.
  Condition to check: Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
  Condition to check: The reported path requires an approved MCP configuration and attacker write access to the shared repository.
  Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Write access to shared repo with .cursor MCP config

## AI tooling and models
- [Cursor IDE](https://cursor.com/)
- MCP config

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
Patched Cursor 1.3 (2025-07-29)

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Shared MCP configuration is approved [access]
A benign-looking configuration is approved in a shared repository.
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

### step-2: Attacker replaces command arguments [execution]
Later changes keep the trusted key name but replace its command or arguments.
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

### step-3: Cursor reuses the previous trust [ai]
The client does not request new approval for the changed configuration.
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

### step-4: Command runs on project reopen [impact]
The replacement command executes on open or synchronization, enabling persistent code execution.
Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Agent trust / configuration changes
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
- Required telemetry: File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration; Repository audit / pull-request history; Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
- Investigate: Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
- Limitation: A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Agent trust / configuration changes
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
- Required telemetry: File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration; Repository audit / pull-request history; Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
- Investigate: Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
- Limitation: A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Agent trust / configuration changes
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/mcp-config.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
- Required telemetry: File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration; Repository audit / pull-request history; Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
- Investigate: Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
- Limitation: A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
- Qualification: Compare the approved configuration digest with the changed version and the next approval decision. Missing approval logs alone do not prove a bypass.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0081: Modify AI Agent Configuration — A shared MCP configuration is changed after approval.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0081
  Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison
- AML.T0109: AI Supply Chain Rug Pull — An initially benign trusted configuration is replaced with malicious behavior.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0109
  Evidence: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/ ; https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison

## Defensive notes
Upgrade Cursor; treat .cursor/\*\* as code; code owners on MCP configs

## Sources
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/
- https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-cve-2025-54135-cve-2025-54136-vulnerabilities-in-cursor-curxecute-mcpoison
