# Exposed AWS keys mass-tested for Bedrock LLMjacking

- ID: datadog-bedrock-key-testing-2025
- Reported: 2025-06-01
- Researcher: Datadog Security Labs
- Organization: Datadog
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/datadog-bedrock-key-testing-2025/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/datadog-bedrock-key-testing-2025.json
- Browse title: Exposed AWS keys mass-tested for Bedrock LLMjacking
- Editorial summary: Datadog observed automated, internet-scale testing of exposed AWS keys specifically for Amazon Bedrock model access, a reconnaissance step toward LLMjacking.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Cloud & SaaS
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/datadog-bedrock-key-testing-2025.json

## Technique
Datadog documents automated testing of exposed AWS keys specifically for Amazon Bedrock access (ListFoundationModels / Invoke / Converse patterns), showing LLMjacking reconnaissance at internet scale beyond generic AWS abuse.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Inventory Bedrock-enabled keys, rotate exposed credentials and correlate discovery calls with actual model usage.
- Relationship: credential; tools: bedrock, ai-api-keys; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The campaign tests exposed AWS keys for Bedrock access.
  Condition to check: Confirm that the credentials belong to AWS and have Bedrock permissions; a product subscription alone is not the condition.
  Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [Amazon Bedrock](https://aws.amazon.com/bedrock/)

## Other tooling
- Stolen AKIA keys

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Exposed AWS keys are collected [access]
Attackers obtain credentials exposed outside the legitimate account boundary.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/

### step-2: Automated key tests run [execution]
Requests check model listing, invocation and conversation permissions.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/

### step-3: Bedrock access is identified [ai]
Testing distinguishes keys that can use model inference services.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/

### step-4: Per-key abuse is not quantified [unknown]
The supplied entry establishes reconnaissance at scale, rather than a bill or victim count for every key.
Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- Qualification: This stage is included for completeness; a query needs a reviewed link between the described behavior and logs available to the observing party.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Bedrock discovery / key testing
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/bedrock.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/bedrock.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/bedrock.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.
- Required telemetry: AWS CloudTrail management events; Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled; Key inventory and inference usage
- Investigate: Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.
- Investigate: Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference.
- Limitation: The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Bedrock discovery / key testing
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/bedrock.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/bedrock.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/bedrock.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.
- Required telemetry: AWS CloudTrail management events; Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled; Key inventory and inference usage
- Investigate: Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.
- Investigate: Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference.
- Limitation: The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — Exposed AWS credentials are tested for model-service access.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/

## Defensive notes
Secret scanning; CloudTrail detections for Bedrock enum+invoke from unexpected keys

## Sources
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/beyond-valid-credentials-how-exposed-aws-keys-are-tested-for-amazon-bedrock-access/
