# Elastic REF3364 SANSAR takes over exposed Ray GPU hosts and hides utilization

- ID: elastic-sansar-ray-gpu-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-12
- Researcher: Salim Bitam
- Organization: Elastic Security Labs
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/elastic-sansar-ray-gpu-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/elastic-sansar-ray-gpu-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Elastic REF3364 SANSAR takes over exposed Ray GPU hosts and hides utilization
- Editorial summary: Elastic Security Labs (Salim Bitam, Nov 12, 2026) tracks REF3364. The Ray dashboard was bound to loopback, but the job agent was reachable from the internet and accepted unauthenticated Jobs API…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/elastic-sansar-ray-gpu-2026-11.json

## Technique
Elastic Security Labs (Salim Bitam, Nov 12, 2026) tracks REF3364. The Ray dashboard was bound to loopback, but the job agent was reachable from the internet and accepted unauthenticated Jobs API submissions. External probes appeared in the Ray logs on October 22, 2026. On October 24 a submitted job ran nvidia-smi and sent the GPU inventory out. On October 25 a Python reverse-shell job connected to an external listener under the account that owned the Ray session. The actor added an SSH key to that account's authorized\_keys, obtained root, and staged SANSAR under /opt/vadi\_ on three GPU hosts. SANSAR is a Rust orchestrator (v0.1.3) with Tor/Arti command and control and Lyrebird obfs4/WebTunnel. It supervises XMRig, stored as kurt, and SRBMiner-MULTI, stored as tilki (https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig and https://github.com/doktor83/SRBMiner-Multi). A replaced libnvidia-ml.so.1 wraps the real NVML library and reports GPU use as 0 percent, randomizes temperature between 36 and 46 C and power between 100 and 200 W, and filters process lists, so nvidia-smi and other NVML clients lie. An ftrace rootkit, acpi\_thermal\_mgr.ko, is built with DKMS, loaded through the initramfs, and hides processes, files, and sockets. A systemd backdoor named netns reads its command-and-control address from an Ethereum smart contract and connects on TCP 8080. Elastic publishes YARA rules for SANSAR and netns. Link shadowray-2-0-hijacks-exposed-ray-2025-11.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Unauthenticated Ray Jobs API on an internet-reachable job agent

## AI tooling and models
- Ray (https://github.com/ray-project/ray)

## Other tooling
- SANSAR orchestrator
- XMRig, filename kurt (https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig)
- SRBMiner-MULTI, filename tilki (https://github.com/doktor83/SRBMiner-Multi)
- Lyrebird obfs4/WebTunnel
- NVML wrapper libnvidia-ml.so.1

## Victims and sectors
Three GPU hosts running Ray. Elastic did not name the organizations.

## Target geography
- unknown
Elastic did not name the countries of the GPU hosts.

## Attribution
REF3364. Elastic does not attribute the activity to a named group or country.

## Scale and metrics
Three GPU hosts. Activity from October 22 through October 25, 2026, from probe to persistent access.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### probe: Unauthenticated Ray job [access]
October 22 probes, then an October 24 job that runs nvidia-smi and sends the GPU inventory out.
Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware

### shell: Python reverse shell [execution]
On October 25 a Python reverse-shell job connects out as the Ray session account.
Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware

### keys: SSH key and root [impact]
An SSH key is added to authorized\_keys. The actor then stages SANSAR under /opt/vadi\_.
Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware

### hide: NVML wrapper and DKMS rootkit [execution]
libnvidia-ml.so.1 reports 0 percent GPU use. acpi\_thermal\_mgr.ko is loaded through DKMS and the initramfs.
Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware

Connections:
- probe -> shell
- shell -> keys
- keys -> hide

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### probe: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### shell: Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution
- Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.
- Required telemetry: Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines; Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd\_create and execve where available; Network and persistence activity from the resulting process
- Investigate: Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
- Investigate: Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
- Limitation: Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### keys: Linux SSH authorized-key persistence
- Visibility: Linux endpoint and SSH logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized\_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.
- Required telemetry: Linux process creation with complete command lines; File modification telemetry for user and root SSH directories; SSH authentication and network connection logs
- Investigate: Recover the added key and identify the process, user, package, or script that changed the file.
- Investigate: Correlate the change with new SSH sessions, reverse tunnels, and other persistence artifacts.
- Limitation: Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### hide: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0049: Exploit Public-Facing Application — The internet-reachable Ray Jobs API accepted unauthenticated job submissions.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049
  Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware
- AML.T0050: Command and Scripting Interpreter — Submitted jobs ran nvidia-smi and a Python reverse shell.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0050
  Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware
- AML.T0072: Reverse Shell — The October 25 job was a Python reverse shell to an external listener.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0072
  Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware
- AML.T0034: Cost Harvesting — SANSAR mined on the stolen GPU capacity while reporting 0 percent utilization.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0034
  Evidence: https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware

## Defensive notes
Do not expose the Ray job agent. Require authentication on the Jobs API. Alert on a Python reverse shell from the Ray account, a new authorized\_keys entry, an out-of-tree kernel module, and a miner command line even when the binary is named kurt or tilki. Compare nvidia-smi with a second GPU telemetry source so a wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1 cannot be the only reading.

## Sources
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware — 0% GPU utilization: How SANSAR hides Linux cryptomining

## Source notes
Dates, paths, component names, and the seven SHA-256 hashes are from the Elastic Security Labs article. The miners are renamed, so a rule that requires the process name xmrig or srbminer will miss kurt and tilki. The NVML change is a replaced libnvidia-ml.so.1, not an LD\_PRELOAD or ld.so.preload edit, so those rules are not cited.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [
    "00c9ac44291f83c72d54302e99d155a3e26d02225a3e516764d5833a99657c9e",
    "96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46",
    "acc706afc9322a3eae1ef49049749e0a7c9f1a123895ac56dc8a289beb2fb5b7",
    "cc1ad7f14777a098ccc91fd4e8f6143da14418c2b6fdf23b7f8f6b3d1b0b7f1d",
    "675c24728f87f7aa0fa07527027c95c24c246049c65eaef89270ab04ea50a180",
    "6ba1aa275e0e2826e8b48b36473539ca56cbdc41f429e539a45f8532b084d7a4",
    "df8ab6fd699e6ae90e63e9696bae8f01342708bafc2ed88af414337e4f237194"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
