# Rilide/Vidar via fake Sora/Gemini/Midjourney AI tools

- ID: eset-rilide-vidar-fake-ai-2024
- Reported: 2024-07-30
- Researcher: ESET
- Organization: ESET
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/eset-rilide-vidar-fake-ai-2024/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/eset-rilide-vidar-fake-ai-2024.json
- Browse title: Rilide and Vidar stealers spread via fake Sora, Gemini and Midjourney
- Editorial summary: Fake AI ads and a malicious extension delivered the Rilide stealer for Facebook credentials, and a fake Midjourney installer delivered Vidar to steal browser data, wallets and keystrokes.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Browser extensions
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/eset-rilide-vidar-fake-ai-2024.json

## Technique
Fake Sora/Gemini ads and a Google Translate extension delivered Rilide stealer targeting Facebook credentials; fake Midjourney installer delivered Vidar stealer (browsers, wallets, keystrokes).

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Verify installers and extension provenance through official vendor channels before approval.
- Relationship: lure; tools: gemini, ai-extensions; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: AI-branded advertising and a malicious extension are the lure and delivery path in this account.
  Condition to check: The source describes fake Sora / Gemini / Midjourney promotions and separate stealer deliveries.
  Condition to check: A legitimate AI service account or browser installation does not establish infection.
  Evidence: https://blog.eset.ie/2024/07/30/beware-of-fake-ai-tools-masking-very-real-malware-threats/
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Malicious ads / fake AI installers / malicious extension

## AI tooling and models
- Fake Sora
- [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/)
- Midjourney branded lures

## Other tooling
- Rilide
- Vidar

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: AI ads or downloads attract users [access]
Fake Sora, Gemini and Midjourney offers lead to an installer or extension.
Evidence: https://blog.eset.ie/2024/07/30/beware-of-fake-ai-tools-masking-very-real-malware-threats/

### step-2: AI branding disguises the lure [ai]
The advertised product provides the reason to install.
Evidence: https://blog.eset.ie/2024/07/30/beware-of-fake-ai-tools-masking-very-real-malware-threats/

### step-3: Rilide or Vidar is delivered [execution]
The report describes separate extension and installer payload branches.
Evidence: https://blog.eset.ie/2024/07/30/beware-of-fake-ai-tools-masking-very-real-malware-threats/

### step-4: Credentials and personal data are stolen [impact]
Targets include Facebook accounts, browser information and wallets.
Evidence: https://blog.eset.ie/2024/07/30/beware-of-fake-ai-tools-masking-very-real-malware-threats/

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- Qualification: Correlate the advertising pretext with extension or installer provenance rather than matching AI branding alone.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Browser extension change / data access
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/extension.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/extension.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/extension.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
- Required telemetry: Managed-browser extension inventory and update history; Extension ID, permissions and provenance; Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
- Investigate: Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Investigate: Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
- Limitation: Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
- Qualification: Treat the extension and standalone installer as separate branches; extension allowlisting is a browser control.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Avoid ad-driven AI downloads; extension allowlists

## Sources
- https://blog.eset.ie/2024/07/30/beware-of-fake-ai-tools-masking-very-real-malware-threats/
