{
  "id": "forever-agents-md-hijack-2026",
  "name": "Malicious AGENTS.md hijacking coding agents via Downloads",
  "date_reported": "2026-11-04",
  "researcher": "Gal Weizman, Omer Samet",
  "org": "Forever Security",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/",
      "title": "Hijacking AI Agents via Downloads Folder",
      "publisher": "Forever Security"
    }
  ],
  "magicsword_coverage": [],
  "borderline": false,
  "borderline_note": null,
  "ai_role": "ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target",
  "ai_role_secondary": null,
  "ai_role_detail": null,
  "technique_summary": "Malicious AGENTS.md file dropped into ~/Downloads by website. When coding agent launches in Downloads directory, it reads and follows the malicious instructions. AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml and runs npm install function-color (MALFEX downloader). CLAUDE.md variant steals OAuth tokens. Attack leverages agent instruction file priority and common workflow of developers launching agents in Downloads after downloading code samples or projects.",
  "initial_access": "User visits malicious website that drops AGENTS.md into ~/Downloads",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "Coding agents (Codex, Claude, others)",
    "Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md)",
    "~/.codex/config.toml"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [
    "function-color npm package (MALFEX downloader)",
    "OAuth token theft"
  ],
  "victims_and_sectors": "Software developers using AI coding agents",
  "regions": [
    "Multiple regions"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "unknown",
  "scale_and_metrics": "Proof of concept demonstrating attack vector; actual deployment scale unknown",
  "prevention_angle": "Review Downloads folder before launching agents; scan for unexpected .md instruction files; monitor ~/.codex/config.toml and other agent config modifications; detect npm install from unusual locations; restrict agent instruction file precedence; alert on OAuth token access from unexpected processes",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [
    "LOLSkills"
  ],
  "source_notes": "Relevant detection rules:\n- Monitor file creation in ~/Downloads directory for unexpected .md instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md)\n- Detect modifications to ~/.codex/config.toml and similar agent configuration files\n- Monitor npm install executions from non-standard directories (Downloads, temp folders)\n- Alert on OAuth token access from unexpected processes\n- Note: No direct Sigma rules for agent instruction file manipulation; requires custom file integrity monitoring for agent config directories and process monitoring for agent launches from untrusted paths.\n",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-11-04",
  "confidence": "high",
  "region_notes": "Multiple regions reflects global developer population using coding agents",
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0051.001",
      "rationale": "Malicious instruction file manipulates agent behavior by exploiting instruction file loading priority",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0081",
      "rationale": "AGENTS.md contains malicious instructions that modify agent configuration and install malware",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0053",
      "rationale": "Attack exfiltrates OAuth tokens via CLAUDE.md variant",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0011.001",
      "rationale": "Malicious instructions modify agent configuration files for persistence",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "drop",
        "title": "Malicious instruction file dropped to Downloads",
        "description": "Website drops AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md into ~/Downloads folder",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "launch",
        "title": "Developer launches agent in Downloads",
        "description": "User starts coding agent in Downloads directory following common workflow for testing downloaded projects",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "read",
        "title": "Agent reads malicious instruction file",
        "description": "Agent discovers and loads AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md based on instruction file precedence",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "execute",
        "title": "Malicious instructions executed",
        "description": "AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml and runs npm install function-color; CLAUDE.md variant steals OAuth token",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "impact",
        "title": "Malware installed or credentials stolen",
        "description": "function-color MALFEX downloader installed or OAuth tokens exfiltrated",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "drop",
        "target": "launch"
      },
      {
        "source": "launch",
        "target": "read"
      },
      {
        "source": "read",
        "target": "execute"
      },
      {
        "source": "execute",
        "target": "impact"
      }
    ]
  }
}