{
  "id": "ghostaction-ai-creds-2026-10",
  "name": "GhostAction Stage 2 stealer (AI credential theft)",
  "date_reported": "2026-10-16",
  "researcher": "Thijs Xhaflaire (Jamf Threat Labs); OpenSourceMalware deep dive",
  "org": "Jamf Threat Labs / OpenSourceMalware",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file"
    }
  ],
  "magicsword_coverage": [],
  "borderline": true,
  "borderline_note": "Primary attack is CI secret theft + VS Code folderOpen stealer; AI is a credential target (Claude/Gemini keys), not the attack operator. Included because Jose's post calls out AI tooling theft.",
  "ai_role": "ai_credential_theft",
  "ai_role_secondary": null,
  "ai_role_detail": "Steals AI client credentials (~/.claude/.credentials.json, ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json, sk-ant- grep) alongside cloud/git tokens",
  "technique_summary": "GhostAction pushes malicious GitHub Actions then Stage 2: .vscode/tasks.json folderOpen runs node on fake fa-solid-400.woff2 JS stealer; cron */5 pulls C2. Targets AWS/npm/git/kube/SSH plus Claude/Gemini creds. 94 repos / 66 owners. PolinRider copycat technique, not DPRK per OSM.",
  "initial_access": "Compromised GitHub account → malicious workflow + VS Code trusted workspace auto task",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "Targets Claude and Gemini credential stores"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [
    "GitHub Actions",
    "VS Code tasks.json",
    "node",
    "cron",
    "193.32.204.199:8080"
  ],
  "victims_and_sectors": "GitHub maintainers / developers (many dormant repos)",
  "regions": [
    "unknown"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "GhostAction; PolinRider-technique copycat (no shared IOCs with DPRK per OSM)",
  "scale_and_metrics": "94 compromised repos; Stage 1 Oct 8, Stage 2 Oct 15 2026",
  "prevention_angle": "task.allowAutomaticTasks off; Restricted Mode; crontab -l for #ghc2; rotate Claude/Gemini/cloud/git creds",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [],
  "source_notes": null,
  "last_reviewed": "2026-10-20",
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Compromised account changes a repository",
        "description": "Malicious GitHub Actions and workspace tasks are introduced.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Trusted workspace opens a task",
        "description": "VS Code executes Node content disguised as a font file.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "AI credential stores are searched",
        "description": "The stealer targets Claude and Gemini tokens alongside cloud and developer credentials.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Secrets are stolen with persistence",
        "description": "The report describes periodic C2 retrieval through cron and a multi-repository campaign.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0055",
      "rationale": "The stealer searches local AI credential stores.",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "category": "attacks-on-ai",
  "attribution": {
    "actor_name": "GhostAction"
  },
  "ai_involvement_confidence": "unverified",
  "detections": [
    {
      "name": "Review attack-specific indicators",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "Monitor for the techniques described in GhostAction Stage 2 stealer (AI credential theft). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs."
    }
  ]
}