# GreyNoise PaperCut campaign uses Codex-harness agents with DeepSeek against 395 organizations

- ID: greynoise-papercut-ai-campaign-2026-09
- Reported: 2026-09-09
- Researcher: GreyNoise Intelligence
- Organization: GreyNoise
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/greynoise-papercut-ai-campaign-2026-09/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/greynoise-papercut-ai-campaign-2026-09.json
- Browse title: GreyNoise PaperCut campaign uses Codex-harness agents with DeepSeek against 395 organizations
- Editorial summary: Sep 9, 2026: GreyNoise identified campaign exploiting PaperCut NG/MF print management servers (CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351 path traversal + RCE). Attacker deploys 'Codex-harness' framework with DeepSeek…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/greynoise-papercut-ai-campaign-2026-09.json

## Technique
Sep 9, 2026: GreyNoise identified campaign exploiting PaperCut NG/MF print management servers (CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351 path traversal + RCE). Attacker deploys 'Codex-harness' framework with DeepSeek Coder and DeepSeek V3 models. Workflow: (1) Mass scan for exposed PaperCut servers (9191/tcp, 9192/tcp); (2) Exploit CVEs to gain initial RCE; (3) Deploy AI agent with 'post-exploitation', 'credential-harvesting', 'lateral-movement' skills; (4) Agent autonomously enumerates Active Directory, identifies print job logs containing credentials, extracts passwords from print queues; (5) Pivots to fileservers and workstations; (6) Deploys ransomware or sells access. GreyNoise observed 395 organizations compromised Aug-Sep 2026 (healthcare, education, government, finance). Agents generated exploits in real-time adapting to endpoint security. Detection: monitor PaperCut servers for exploitation (CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351); detect DeepSeek API traffic from print servers; alert on rapid AD enumeration post-PaperCut compromise; review print job logs for credential exposure; monitor lateral movement from print infrastructure.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Exploitation of PaperCut NG/MF servers via CVE-2023-27350 and CVE-2023-27351 (path traversal + RCE)

## AI tooling and models
- Codex-harness autonomous agent framework
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai) Coder
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai) V3

## Other tooling
- PaperCut NG/MF CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351 exploits
- Active Directory enumeration
- Print job credential harvesting
- Ransomware (some cases)

## Victims and sectors
395 organizations compromised Aug-Sep 2026; healthcare, education, government, finance; print management infrastructure

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unknown actor; financially motivated (ransomware, access sales); sophisticated AI agent deployment

## Scale and metrics
395 organizations compromised Aug-Sep 2026 via PaperCut exploitation + AI agent post-exploitation

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### scan-exploit: Mass scan and exploit PaperCut [access]
Attacker scans internet for exposed PaperCut NG/MF servers (9191/tcp, 9192/tcp); exploits CVE-2023-27350 and CVE-2023-27351 for path traversal + RCE; gains foothold on print management infrastructure
Evidence: https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf

### deploy-agent: Deploy Codex-harness AI agent [ai]
Install Codex-harness framework with DeepSeek Coder and DeepSeek V3 on compromised PaperCut server; agent loads 'post-exploitation', 'credential-harvesting', 'lateral-movement' skills
Evidence: https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf

### autonomous-post-exploit: Automated credential harvesting and lateral movement [execution]
Agent autonomously enumerates AD, extracts credentials from print job logs (users print docs with passwords visible), identifies fileservers and workstations, pivots laterally, adapts exploits to endpoint security in real-time
Evidence: https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf

### ransomware-sales: Ransomware deployment or access sales [impact]
Deploy ransomware or sell access to other actors; 395 organizations compromised Aug-Sep 2026; print infrastructure pivot enables enterprise-wide compromise
Evidence: https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf

Connections:
- scan-exploit -> deploy-agent
- deploy-agent -> autonomous-post-exploit
- autonomous-post-exploit -> ransomware-sales

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### scan-exploit: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-agent: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### autonomous-post-exploit: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ransomware-sales: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0040: AI Model Inference API Access — Attacker deploys autonomous AI agents for post-exploitation following PaperCut vulnerability exploitation
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0040
  Evidence: https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — AI automates credential harvesting and lateral movement
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf

## Defensive notes
Patch PaperCut NG/MF (CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351); segment print management servers; monitor DeepSeek API traffic from infrastructure hosts; implement least-privilege for print servers; disable print job logging where possible or encrypt logs; detect rapid AD enumeration; use EDR on print servers; monitor lateral movement from print infrastructure

## Sources
- https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ai-orchestrated-campaign-against-papercut-ng-mf — GreyNoise: AI-Orchestrated Campaign Against PaperCut NG/MF

## Source notes
GreyNoise Intelligence analysis. Campaign demonstrates AI agent use in mass exploitation and post-compromise automation. Detection: alert on PaperCut CVE exploitation attempts, monitor DeepSeek API traffic (api.deepseek.com) from print servers or unexpected hosts, detect rapid AD queries from print server IPs, review print job logs for credential exposure, monitor lateral movement patterns from print infrastructure to fileservers/workstations.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
