# GTIG LLMJacking - UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS monetize cloud models

- ID: gtig-llmjacking-unc6993-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-02
- Researcher: Christopher Romano, Codi Starks, Garrett Mahoney, John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, K Singh, Mathew Potaczek, Mike Lombardi, Rik Dolfing
- Organization: Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG)
- AI role: ai_infra_as_c2 (AI infrastructure as C2)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/gtig-llmjacking-unc6993-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/gtig-llmjacking-unc6993-2026-11.json
- Browse title: GTIG LLMJacking - UNC6993, Jet Night, D1337-KAIROS monetize cloud models
- Editorial summary: Multiple threat clusters (UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS) hijack enterprise access to LLMs across AWS Bedrock, Azure, GCP. Initial access via exposed cloud identity tokens (IAM, Service Account…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/gtig-llmjacking-unc6993-2026-11.json

## Technique
Multiple threat clusters (UNC6993, Jet Night operators, D1337-KAIROS) hijack enterprise access to LLMs across AWS Bedrock, Azure, GCP. Initial access via exposed cloud identity tokens (IAM, Service Account keys, GitHub PATs, session tokens), stolen LLM API keys from public GitHub, exploited web app vulnerabilities, LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (/key/regenerate endpoint rebind). UNC6993 used session hijacking page masquerading as app portal to steal JSON payloads with active access tokens. Threat actors enable LLM services, create API keys, provision GPUs, subscribe Pay-As-You-Go, deploy LiteLLM/new-api/gcli2api gateways, host Manus agent framework with SearXNG metasearch. Monetize via LLM Mixers (Jet Night at jet-night.com $60/month unlimited, ai-relay on lookalike domains, newapi.pro). Stealthy credential validation sweeps with max\_tokens=1. Fraudulent charges $100K in single day, cumulative $1M per org. Division of labor between initial access and downstream monetization. Fireworks AI (Nov 9, 2026) reports Oct 23 third-party cloud provider hosting Fireworks R&D breached; Oct 24 attacker entered via provider, ran unauthorized workload; reached account/billing data and, for some customers, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights. Fireworks attributes to financially motivated LLMjacking group selling access to illicit routing gateways; GTIG/Mandiant report referenced; Unit 42 forensics. Notion, a Fireworks customer, published a downstream notice: Fireworks told Notion on Nov 2 that a small dataset of Notion AI synthetic test data was accessed; Notion disconnected and deleted Fireworks data by the morning of Nov 3; on Nov 6 Fireworks said customer data may have been accessed; on Nov 8 Fireworks confirmed the final dataset; on Nov 9 Notion contacted affected customers. The exposed data is Notion AI Insights chat transcripts for under 1 percent of workspaces, mostly unattributable (no user or workspace labels, and no tool-call results). No other Notion features were affected. Notion told affected customers to treat the transcripts as exposed and to rotate secrets pasted into Notion AI. On Nov 11 Notion revoked exposed Notion API keys found in affected user messages.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page masquerading as LLM portal; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vulnerability exploitation; compromised IAM credentials with cloud federation tokens; harvested exposed LLM API keys from public GitHub; LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (user ID rebind vulnerability in /key/regenerate endpoint)

## AI tooling and models
- [AWS Bedrock](https://aws.amazon.com/bedrock/)
- Azure Cognitive Services
- GCP [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/) Enterprise Agent Platform
- LiteLLM gateway
- new-api (centralized model hub and gateway)
- gcli2api (API proxy tool)
- Manus agent framework
- SearXNG metasearch
- agent-infra/sandbox execution environments

## Other tooling
- Jet Night reseller (jet-night.com)
- D1337-KAIROS persona
- ai-relay custom proxy infrastructure
- newapi.pro resale ecosystem
- [Node.js](https://github.com/nodejs/node) proxy bundles
- Burn and rotate service account strategy

## Victims and sectors
Organizations in North America, South America, Asia Pacific across financial services, retail, technology, transportation sectors; Fireworks AI customers (account/billing data, secrets, datasets, partly trained model weights for some customers); Notion workspaces using Fireworks for Notion AI Insights (under 1 percent, chat transcripts)

## Target geography
- North America
- South America
- Asia

## Attribution
UNC6993 (Mandiant); Jet Night operators; D1337-KAIROS persona; multiple financially motivated threat clusters operating globally; division of labor between initial access operators and LLM Mixer monetization operators

## Scale and metrics
Multiple incidents in 2026; fraudulent charges exceeding $100K USD in single day; cumulative charges at some orgs reaching $1M USD; Jet Night passed nearly $1M in token costs to victim org; one actor made ~800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (90% success), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours (1M+ success); 500K+ LLM API calls in \<8 hours; Jet Night offers unlimited tokens $60/month (typical market $100-$250/month)

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### initial-access: Compromised cloud identity and LLM API keys [access]
Misconfigured Service Account keys; session hijacking page for LLM portal JSON payloads; stolen GitHub PATs + web app vuln; compromised IAM with federation tokens; exposed LLM API keys harvested from public GitHub; stealthy validation sweeps with max\_tokens=1
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models

### lateral-persistence: Privilege escalation and persistence [execution]
Enumerated cloud services/repos/data stores; cloned codebases for secrets; queried data warehouse metadata; exploited LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217 (/key/regenerate rebind) to elevate Virtual Keys to PROXY\_ADMIN; created unauthorized IAM/service accounts; injected SSH keys; attached admin policies; created backdoor accounts disguised as billing utilities
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models

### llm-abuse: LLM resource hijacking [ai]
Enabled managed generative platforms; created additional API keys; subscribed Pay-As-You-Go; selected premium models; launched high-volume inference; 'burn and rotate' short-lived service accounts; provisioned GPU instances; requested quota increases; deployed LiteLLM gateways; hosted Manus agent framework with SearXNG metasearch and sandbox execution
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models

### monetization: LLM Mixer resale [impact]
UNC6993 deployed new-api and gcli2api to aggregate stolen keys and balance loads; Jet Night (jet-night.com) $60/month unlimited token plan powered by stolen keys, passed ~$1M costs to victim; ai-relay on lookalike domains siphons access to newapi.pro resale ecosystem; D1337-KAIROS persona with Node.js proxy bundles; division of labor between access and monetization operators
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models

### charges: Fraudulent billing [impact]
UNC6993 accumulated $100K+ charges quickly; cumulative charges at orgs reaching $1M; one actor 800K Bedrock calls over 30 hours (Opus 75% of calls), another 1.7M calls over 13 hours; token usage profile resembles resold coding-agent traffic with prompt caching; $100K+ estimated usage at list price for two documented cases
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models

Connections:
- initial-access -> lateral-persistence
- lateral-persistence -> llm-abuse
- llm-abuse -> monetization
- llm-abuse -> charges
- monetization -> charges

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### initial-access: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### lateral-persistence: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### llm-abuse: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### monetization: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### charges: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0000: Search Open Technical Databases — Threat actors compromise cloud compute credentials and hijack enterprise access to AWS Bedrock, Azure Cognitive Services, and GCP Gemini to fraudulently monetize through illicit gateways and LLM Mixers
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000
  Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models
- AML.T0034: Cost Harvesting — Fireworks AI third-party cloud provider breach resulted in unauthorized workload execution and customer data access
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0034
  Evidence: https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident-update
- AML.T0025: Exfiltration via Cyber Means — Attackers exfiltrated account/billing data, secrets, datasets, and partly trained model weights from Fireworks AI
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0025
  Evidence: https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident

## Defensive notes
IAM least privilege; centralized secrets management; code monitoring for API keys; routine config audits; rate limiting via Cloud Armor; network allow listing; budget alerts and API quotas; phishing-resistant MFA; shadow LLM discovery; granular API key scopes; validation sweep monitoring (max\_tokens=1); vulnerability/ML supply chain patching; gateway patch management (LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217); sandboxed execution; vetted model repositories; graph-based exposure modeling

## Sources
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/llmjacking-monetizing-compromised-cloud-models — The Rise of LLMJacking - How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources
- https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident-update — Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident Update
- https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident — Fireworks AI: October 2026 Security Incident
- https://www.notion.com/security/advisories/security-incident-involving-a-third-party-ai-vendor — Security incident involving a third-party AI vendor

## Source notes
GTIG (Google Threat Intelligence Group) responded to multiple 2026 incidents; building on previous underground LLM credential market reporting; observed division of labor between access and monetization; LLM Mixers as illicit routing gateways; 'burn and rotate' service account strategy; Jet Night advertised outages on Telegram likely due to revoked stolen keys

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "jet-night.com",
    "newapi.pro"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "23.106.46.239",
    "38.246.114.118",
    "104.243.32.50",
    "31.57.201.201"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
