# Plus 5.6 Custom GPT ClickFix RAT

- ID: huntress-plus56-custom-gpt-clickfix-2026-09
- Reported: 2026-09-28
- Researcher: Mark O'Halloran, Jonathan Semon (et al.)
- Organization: Huntress
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/huntress-plus56-custom-gpt-clickfix-2026-09/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/huntress-plus56-custom-gpt-clickfix-2026-09.json
- Browse title: Plus 5.6: fake ChatGPT assistant delivers a Windows RAT
- Editorial summary: A malicious Custom GPT directs users to a ClickFix page. The pasted command launches a Windows payload chain with DLL sideloading and persistence.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Windows
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/huntress-plus56-custom-gpt-clickfix-2026-09.json

## Technique
Attacker Custom GPT 'Plus 5.6' on chatgpt.com (Google Ads) directs users to Google Sites ClickFix; paste runs PowerShell → MSI → DLL sideload via Canon COTFileReadApp.exe / ceiinfolog.dll / rdCore.dll (later Stardock DeElevate64). Dual persistence Run key + scheduled task. Multi-stage obfuscated RAT.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Review Custom GPT links and pasted commands; investigate unusual script and installer process chains.
- Relationship: lure; tools: chatgpt; OS scope: windows; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: A malicious Custom GPT directs the user to a ClickFix page and a Windows payload chain.
  Condition to check: The user must encounter the malicious Custom GPT / page and execute the pasted command.
  Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Custom GPT social engineering → ClickFix paste → MSI

## AI tooling and models
- [ChatGPT](https://chatgpt.com/) Custom GPT 'Plus 5.6'

## Other tooling
- Google Sites / gptverification.com
- [PowerShell](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell)
- msiexec
- Canon CaptureOnTouch sideload
- Stardock DeElevate64 sideload
- GOMCam follow-on

## Victims and sectors
40+ Huntress incidents; 2 confirmed via Custom GPT; ongoing as of 2026-10-14

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
40+ related incidents; OpenAI took down first GPT ~2026-09-25; replacement appeared 09-27

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Custom GPT attracts a user [access]
Ads promote an attacker-controlled Plus 5.6 GPT hosted on ChatGPT.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

### step-2: Chat directs the user to ClickFix [ai]
The GPT points to a Google Sites page that requests a pasted command.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

### step-3: PowerShell launches the payload chain [execution]
The command retrieves an MSI and triggers DLL sideloading.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

### step-4: RAT establishes persistence [impact]
The chain adds Run-key and scheduled-task persistence.
Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- Qualification: Correlate ads and the custom GPT referral with the reported external delivery workflow; ordinary ChatGPT use is not a signal.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- Conditional MagicSword policy: Use MagicSword to review and enforce a policy restricting unneeded Windows script hosts, shells or installer utilities identified in this branch.
- Policy scope: The Windows script and installer execution boundary. Separate allow rules for required software can leave parts of this chain reachable.
- Policy limitation: Policy opportunity, not tested incident coverage. Requires enrolled Windows devices, a policy covering the actual executable, and enforcement. Audit mode records decisions without blocking; allowed tools and in-process / cloud actions can remain reachable.
- Policy reference: https://www.magicsword.io/use-cases/application-control?utm_source=openattacks&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=stage-control
- Community intelligence: HijackLibs — https://hijacklibs.net

### step-4: New persistence → recurring execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/persistence.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/persistence.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes; Process creation and file provenance; User / administrative change records
- Investigate: Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
- Investigate: Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
- Limitation: Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0073: Impersonation — An AI-branded Custom GPT provides a social-engineering pretext.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0073
  Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat
- AML.T0052: Phishing — The GPT directs the user into a ClickFix delivery flow.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052
  Evidence: https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

## Defensive notes
Prevent signed binaries from user folders; HijackLibs entries for ceiinfolog/DeElevator64; hunt COTFileReadApp/DeElevate64 under %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Programs\\

## Sources
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat
