{
  "id": "huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11",
  "name": "Huntress SCKit installs rogue ScreenConnect clients; RelayTrap source looks LLM-written",
  "date_reported": "2026-11-11",
  "date_activity_start": "2026-11-11",
  "date_activity_end": "2026-11-13",
  "researcher": "Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch",
  "org": "Huntress",
  "sources": [
    {
      "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect",
      "title": "SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints",
      "publisher": "Huntress"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-worm-like-sckit-malware-targets-msps-in-screenconnect-attacks/",
      "title": "New worm-like SCKit malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks",
      "publisher": "BleepingComputer"
    },
    {
      "url": "https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/",
      "title": "ScreenConnect attack: SCKit",
      "publisher": "Blackpoint Cyber"
    }
  ],
  "magicsword_coverage": [],
  "borderline": false,
  "borderline_note": null,
  "ai_role": "llm_generated_malware",
  "ai_role_secondary": null,
  "ai_role_detail": "Huntress Figure 6 says the RelayTrap C# source appears to have been generated by an LLM, based on detailed comments that explain what the code is intended to do. BleepingComputer reports the same inference. No prompts were published. The schema has no inferred value, so this is recorded as vendor-asserted.",
  "technique_summary": "Huntress (Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch; published Nov 11, 2026, updated Nov 13) observed Run commands on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels installing rogue ScreenConnect clients. On Nov 11, from about 17:47 UTC, at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations were hit in about 90 minutes. ScreenConnect 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 were affected. Huntress ties the activity to the third-party RMM+ extension, versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32: if the access key was never set, the extension accepted a blank key, bypassing ScreenConnect user accounts, roles, and MFA. Commands showed up as RMM+ with no matching login. ConnectWise said it had disabled five extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link) across more than 400 partner environments and had not yet identified an initial access vector when the Nov 11 advisory posted. The Run command, as SYSTEM, downloaded an attacker ScreenConnect installer to C:\\Windows\\TEMP\\sc.msi, installed it silently, and wrote C:\\Windows\\Temp\\sckit-run.bat. The dropper fetches sckit-decoder.ps1 and a kit keyed by the Windows UUID. Components extract to C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap. TrapWatch.ps1 runs as SYSTEM, compiles RelayTrap.cs into a host-specific RelayTrap.exe, and creates a scheduled task named TrapWatch that runs every 10 seconds. The legitimate ScreenConnect client is stopped and set to manual start. Huntress Figure 6 says the RelayTrap C# source appears to have been generated by an LLM because of detailed source comments explaining intent. A separate path, seen in the kit and not observed succeeding, steals the technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and tries to push WithUninstall.ps1 through the Shared Toolbox. On Nov 13 at 16:12 UTC Huntress saw another spike, 205 hosts across 41 organizations, with the client hosted at 185.241.211.197 and an installer URL ending in c=ExploitedNOTUSA. Huntress also saw c=Exploited529 and c=Exploited809. One incident used a self-hosted RMM+ plugin, a netsh portproxy from 127.0.0.1:88 to 185.241.211.197:80, and a service named Windows Update Agent running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe from C:\\ProgramData\\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\\. ConnectWise also pointed on-premises partners at ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later for CVE-2026-84869, a separate client file-transfer flaw. Huntress does not say this wave exploited that flaw. Blackpoint Cyber (Sam Decker, Nevan Beal) says RelayTrap.cs is compiled on the endpoint by TrapWatch.ps1, not shipped as a precompiled binary. When a technician connects, the replacement Guest sends TransferFilesMessage FileAction.Run after a 2.5 second delay, which is the CVE-2026-84869 file-transfer-back path. Blackpoint's test against a current ScreenConnect Host queued the transfer on the Guest, and the Host did not request or run the payload. They report no successful technician compromise. Primary panel indicators include sc.payproofkit.com (155.94.150.39) and 185.99.255.28.",
  "initial_access": "Blank access key on RMM+ 1.0.31 or 1.0.32, then ScreenConnect Run Command as SYSTEM. ConnectWise had not identified a single initial-access vector in the Nov 11 advisory.",
  "ai_tooling_and_models": [
    "RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says appears LLM-generated from its explanatory comments"
  ],
  "other_tooling": [
    "ScreenConnect (LOLRMM), including rogue clients",
    "RMM+ extension 1.0.31 and 1.0.32",
    "sqlite3.exe for .aspxauth cookie theft",
    "msiexec"
  ],
  "victims_and_sectors": "Organizations using Huntress and ScreenConnect. 48 organizations on Nov 11 and 41 on Nov 13. Sectors were not named.",
  "regions": [
    "unknown"
  ],
  "attribution_or_cluster": "Unnamed. Huntress and ConnectWise describe the activity. No country is stated. Participant name Addmin and client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091 were published.",
  "scale_and_metrics": "Nov 11: at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in about 90 minutes. Nov 13: 205 hosts across 41 organizations. ConnectWise disabled the listed extensions across more than 400 partner environments. One panel parameter reached Exploited809 (190 downstream clients on one panel).",
  "prevention_angle": "Disable RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 where the access key was left blank, including on-premises ScreenConnect. Do not triage a suspect host over ScreenConnect. Remove the rogue client service, the TrapWatch task, C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap, and sckit files under %TEMP%. Hunt msiexec installs of ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi or UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi with c=Exploited. Block 185.99.255.28 and 185.241.211.197.",
  "related_magicsword_projects": [
    "LOLRMM"
  ],
  "source_notes": "Counts, the blank-key behavior, Figure 6's LLM comment, paths, and IOCs are from the Huntress article, including the Nov 13 update. BleepingComputer reports the same LLM-looking comments. The console-takeover and Shared Toolbox spread were recovered from the kit and were not seen succeeding. Blackpoint's patched-host test is the source for the 2.5 second TransferFilesMessage and the result that a current Host did not fetch the payload. Additional acknowledged contributors include John Hammond, Tanner Filip, Tyler Marzen, Austin Worline, Ethan Williams, Sharon Martin, Ben Bernstein, Andrew Brandt, Jamie Levy, Max Rogers, Aaron Deal, and Mendy Green. File hashes are weak because scripts are rebuilt per host. ScreenConnect is tracked by LOLRMM at https://lolrmm.io/tools/screenconnect.",
  "last_reviewed": "2026-11-15",
  "region_notes": "Huntress did not name the countries of the affected organizations.",
  "iocs": {
    "domains": [
      "sc.payproofkit.com",
      "newnewnew.gotdns.org",
      "soxnewwork.homedns.org",
      "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com",
      "ns.mo7sen.dev",
      "007.from-ak.com"
    ],
    "ips": [
      "185.99.255.28",
      "155.94.150.39",
      "185.241.211.197"
    ],
    "hashes": [
      "94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11",
      "7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec",
      "3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4",
      "d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a",
      "8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af"
    ],
    "urls": []
  },
  "atlas_techniques": [
    {
      "id": "AML.T0016.002",
      "rationale": "Huntress says the RelayTrap C# source appears LLM-generated from comments that explain the intended behavior",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "AML.T0049",
      "rationale": "RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key and exposed Run Command as SYSTEM",
      "source_urls": [
        "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "blank-key",
        "title": "Blank RMM+ access key",
        "description": "RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept an empty access key when none was configured, so Run Command arrives without a ScreenConnect login.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "install",
        "title": "SYSTEM installs sc.msi and SCKit",
        "description": "The command writes C:\\Windows\\TEMP\\sc.msi and sckit-run.bat, then downloads a UUID-keyed kit into C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "relaytrap",
        "title": "LLM-commented RelayTrap",
        "description": "TrapWatch.ps1 compiles RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says looks LLM-written, and schedules TrapWatch every 10 seconds.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "spread",
        "title": "Cookie theft path not seen succeeding",
        "description": "The kit can read a technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and upload a Shared Toolbox item. Huntress had not seen that jump succeed.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "blank-key",
        "target": "install"
      },
      {
        "source": "install",
        "target": "relaytrap"
      },
      {
        "source": "relaytrap",
        "target": "spread"
      }
    ]
  },
  "category": "adversary-use-of-ai",
  "attribution": {
    "actor_name": "Unnamed SCKit operator",
    "motivation": "cybercrime",
    "attributed_by": "Huntress",
    "confidence": "low"
  },
  "ai_involvement_confidence": "vendor-asserted",
  "detections": [
    {
      "name": "Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Installation Execution",
      "format": "sigma",
      "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_screenconnect_installation_cli_param.yml",
      "notes": "Windows process creation. ScreenConnect client install command line. Matches msiexec of sc.msi and the Nov 13 UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi."
    },
    {
      "name": "Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Remote Command Execution",
      "format": "sigma",
      "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_screenconnect_remote_execution.yml",
      "notes": "Windows process creation. Commands launched from a ScreenConnect session. Matches the Run Command that deployed SCKit as SYSTEM."
    },
    {
      "name": "Suspicious ScreenConnect Client Child Process",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/windows/command_and_control_screenconnect_childproc.toml",
      "notes": "Windows endpoint. A ScreenConnect client spawning a suspicious child, including the installer and script chain."
    },
    {
      "name": "Newly Observed ScreenConnect Host Server",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/windows/command_and_control_newly_observed_screenconnect_host_server.toml",
      "notes": "Windows endpoint. A ScreenConnect client calling a host not seen before. Useful for 185.99.255.28 and 185.241.211.197."
    },
    {
      "name": "Local Scheduled Task Creation",
      "format": "elastic",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/windows/persistence_local_scheduled_task_creation.toml",
      "notes": "Windows. New scheduled task. The kit creates TrapWatch, which runs every 10 seconds as SYSTEM."
    },
    {
      "name": "SCKit paths and the blank RMM+ key",
      "format": "guidance",
      "notes": "No cited rule names RMM+ 1.0.31, TrapWatch, C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap, or sckit-run.bat. Sigma csc.exe rules key on Temp, Public, or PerfLogs paths, or on an encoded PowerShell parent, so they miss TrapWatch.ps1 compiling under C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap. The Splunk on-the-fly csc rule also requires /noconfig, /fullpaths, and a response file, which the write-up does not show. ScreenConnect path-traversal rules describe CVE-class bugs, not the blank access key, so they are not cited. Also hunt sqlite3.exe reading ScreenConnect cookies and c=Exploited in the installer URL."
    }
  ],
  "timeline": {
    "first_seen": "2026-11-11",
    "last_updated": "2026-11-13",
    "updates": [
      {
        "date": "2026-11-11",
        "source": "Huntress",
        "summary": "From 17:47 UTC, Run Command installs SCKit on at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations. ConnectWise disables five extensions, including RMM+."
      },
      {
        "date": "2026-11-13",
        "source": "Huntress",
        "summary": "A second wave at 16:12 UTC hits 205 hosts across 41 organizations from 185.241.211.197, including c=ExploitedNOTUSA. Blackpoint reports that a patched ScreenConnect Host did not fetch the file RelayTrap tried to send back with CVE-2026-84869."
      }
    ]
  }
}