# INC Ransom and The Gentlemen affiliates using Claude Opus and Kimi AI

- ID: inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-20
- Researcher: SOCRadar Dark Web Team
- Organization: SOCRadar
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-2026-10.json
- Browse title: INC Ransom and The Gentlemen affiliates using Claude Opus and Kimi AI
- Editorial summary: Oct 20, 2026: SOCRadar tracked INC Ransom and The Gentlemen RaaS affiliates deploying AI agents via OpenCode framework. Agents powered by Claude 3.5 Opus (Anthropic) and Kimi (Moonshot AI, Chinese).…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-2026-10.json

## Technique
Oct 20, 2026: SOCRadar tracked INC Ransom and The Gentlemen RaaS affiliates deploying AI agents via OpenCode framework. Agents powered by Claude 3.5 Opus (Anthropic) and Kimi (Moonshot AI, Chinese). Workflow: (1) Initial access via RDP brute-force or stolen credentials; (2) Deploy OpenCode agent with 'network-recon', 'privilege-escalation', 'data-discovery' skills; (3) Agent autonomously scans Active Directory, identifies high-value targets (domain controllers, file servers, backups), maps network topology; (4) Agent generates PowerShell/C\# payloads for privilege escalation (leveraging Kimi for Chinese-language Windows environments); (5) Automates data exfiltration staging to Mega/SFTP; (6) Deploys ransomware after validation of backup destruction. SOCRadar observed affiliates using abliterated models (uncensored variants refusing no requests). Both groups share OpenCode infrastructure and AI access via underground markets. Detection: monitor for OpenCode agent indicators (Python process with LLM API calls), alert on rapid automated AD queries, check for Anthropic/Moonshot API traffic from unexpected sources, review PowerShell/C\# script generation patterns characteristic of LLM output.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
RDP brute-force, stolen VPN credentials, phishing with malware loaders

## AI tooling and models
- [OpenCode](https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode) autonomous agent framework
- [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) 3.5 Opus (Anthropic)
- Kimi (Moonshot AI)
- Abliterated/uncensored model variants

## Other tooling
- [PowerShell](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell) and C\# for privilege escalation
- Active Directory reconnaissance
- Mega and SFTP for exfiltration staging
- INC Ransom and The Gentlemen ransomware

## Victims and sectors
Multiple organizations; sectors not disclosed by SOCRadar; Ukrainian and European targets mentioned in affiliate forum discussions

## Target geography
- Europe
- Ukraine

## Attribution
INC Ransom affiliates, The Gentlemen affiliates; financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service operations; shared AI infrastructure access via underground markets

## Scale and metrics
Unknown number of intrusions; SOCRadar tracking Oct 2026; affiliates share AI infrastructure and techniques across both RaaS families

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### initial-access: Gain initial access [access]
Affiliates compromise target via RDP brute-force, stolen VPN credentials, or phishing; establish foothold with remote access
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/

### deploy-agent: Deploy OpenCode AI agent [ai]
Install OpenCode framework with Claude 3.5 Opus or Kimi model; load 'network-recon', 'privilege-escalation', 'data-discovery' skills; agent begins autonomous operation
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/

### recon-lateral: Automated reconnaissance and lateral movement [execution]
Agent scans Active Directory, identifies domain controllers, file servers, backups; maps network topology; generates PowerShell/C\# privilege escalation payloads (Kimi assists with Chinese Windows environments); moves laterally
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/

### exfil-ransomware: Data exfiltration and ransomware deployment [impact]
Agent stages sensitive data to Mega/SFTP; validates backup destruction; deploys INC Ransom or The Gentlemen ransomware; automated process reduces dwell time and increases success rate
Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/

Connections:
- initial-access -> deploy-agent
- deploy-agent -> recon-lateral
- recon-lateral -> exfil-ransomware

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### initial-access: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-agent: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### recon-lateral: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfil-ransomware: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0040: AI Model Inference API Access — Ransomware affiliates use LLM agents to autonomously conduct reconnaissance, lateral movement, and data exfiltration
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0040
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Adversaries use AI to automate privilege escalation and payload generation
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/

## Defensive notes
Enforce MFA on RDP/VPN; monitor for rapid automated AD enumeration; detect OpenCode agent processes; block or monitor Anthropic/Moonshot API traffic from non-developer endpoints; use behavioral analytics detecting LLM-generated script patterns; implement EDR detecting automated reconnaissance; segment networks to slow lateral movement

## Sources
- https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/ — SOCRadar: INC Ransom & The Gentlemen Leverage AI for Ransomware Operations

## Source notes
SOCRadar Dark Web Team analysis. Related to n0n ransomware OpenCode campaign (socradar-n0n-ransomware-ai-2026-10). INC Ransom and The Gentlemen represent shift toward RaaS affiliates sharing AI agent infrastructure for operational automation. Detection: look for OpenCode Python agent process with network recon modules, monitor Anthropic API (api.anthropic.com) and Moonshot API traffic, alert on rapid AD queries from single source, check PowerShell/C\# scripts for LLM generation patterns (verbose comments, specific formatting, error-handling characteristics).

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
