# testmetest worm hijacks 42 GitHub repos with Claude/Gemini startup hooks

- ID: jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-26
- Researcher: Guy Korolevski, Yair Benamou
- Organization: JFrog Security Research
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10.json
- Browse title: testmetest worm hijacks 42 GitHub repos with Claude/Gemini startup hooks
- Editorial summary: 42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude\_code\_config.json, instructions.md) and 12.9-13.7 MB…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10.json

## Technique
42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude\_code\_config.json, instructions.md) and 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers decoding to same CI-publisher payload. Campaign uses compiled native addon (addon.node) that XORs .napi\_cache with 0x96 to decrypt JavaScript payload. Addon checks for CI/container/sandbox environment and CPU/RAM limits, skipping execution in automated scanners. Payload collects credentials, poisons repos and CI, propagates via npm. GitHub account CementBeetleSteeple hosts repositories; SafeDep identifies as Shai-Hulud-descendant Miasma-family. Shellpanel artifacts in hijacked owner cluster link to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation. Socket (Kush Pandya, Nov 6, 2026) reports RubyGems strutil-core 1.0.1 (account jamnajiea); extconf.rb downloads Bun, runs worm at install; steals .claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json, cloud/CI credentials to paleasbest\[.\]top; plants workspace-tools MCP server, SessionStart hooks, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .vscode/tasks.json; signed-commit-message backdoor (marker msync-3f7a); wiper if stolen GitHub token revoked. SHA-256 3b3f6e1bde0b28b015030a81a6d805b5b5306dc3f021e1102123971cfd83acc0; related PyPI pystr-codec. Thomas Roccia (Nov 9, 2026) documents hijacked repos with forged backdated commits: toray/XiamiSDK-lib, widget-lib, Rainbow-lib, QiniuSDK-lib, torayUtils-lib; ejaaduipitara/djp-devops, whatsapp-bot, content-service; ConcordiaDev/theme\_saimaniq; madolee/da; Imanilom/baraja-coffe; claudiohernanbesada/xenios.api. CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED block instructs agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Account hijacks via GitHub/npm credential theft from earlier worm infections; exposed npm credentials; forged commit timelines and short-lived publishing branches; cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation (Shellpanel workflows in same hijacked cluster)

## AI tooling and models
- [Claude Code](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code)
- [Cursor](https://cursor.com/)
- Codex
- [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/)
- [GitHub Copilot](https://github.com/features/copilot)
- Aider
- Continue
- Windsurf
- Cline

## Other tooling
- npm binding.gyp command expansion
- Bun 1.2.18 runtime
- Native [Node](https://github.com/nodejs/node) addon with XOR 0x96 encryption
- Caesar transformation and AES-128-GCM
- [GitHub Actions](https://github.com/features/actions) for CI publishing
- npm trusted publishing
- RubyGems strutil-core 1.0.1 (account jamnajiea)
- PyPI pystr-codec
- workspace-tools MCP server
- SessionStart hooks
- Signed-commit-message backdoor (msync-3f7a marker)

## Victims and sectors
42 GitHub repositories from 11 legitimate owners; AI development, npm package consumers

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
GitHub account CementBeetleSteeple; SafeDep identifies as Miasma-family, Shai-Hulud-descendant payload; not established that original Miasma operators responsible; linked to Shellpanel cPanel exploitation (CVE-2026-41940)

## Scale and metrics
42 armed repositories; 11 hijacked legitimate owners; multiple malicious npm packages (event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest); polymorphic wrappers 12.9-13.7 MB; discovered Oct 21-26, 2026

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### initial-compromise: Account/repository hijacking [access]
Hijacked 11 legitimate GitHub owners and 42 repositories via credential theft from earlier infections; exposed npm credentials; linked to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 Shellpanel exploitation
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

### repository-poison: AI assistant execution hooks [ai]
Armed repositories with .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude\_code\_config.json, instructions.md files; added 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; all decode to same CI-publisher payload
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

### npm-distribution: Malicious npm packages [execution]
Published event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest; binding.gyp command expansion executes index.js during install; later versions use compiled native addon
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

### evasion: Scanner evasion via native addon [execution]
Compiled addon.node checks CI/container/sandbox env vars (GITHUB\_ACTIONS, CI, VERCEL, etc.), /proc/1/cgroup for docker/kubepod, RAM \<1.5GB, CPU=1, TracerPid; returns without running if detected; skips automated scanners
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

### decrypt-payload: Runtime decryption [execution]
Addon reads /proc/self/maps for own folder, opens .napi\_cache, XORs every byte with 0x96; drops result in /tmp, chmod 0600, forks detached process with node; decrypts Bun bootstrap and credential stealer
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

### credential-theft: Credential collection and propagation [impact]
Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

### c2: Encrypted data exfiltration [impact]
Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes
Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/

Connections:
- initial-compromise -> repository-poison
- repository-poison -> npm-distribution
- npm-distribution -> evasion
- evasion -> decrypt-payload
- decrypt-payload -> credential-theft
- credential-theft -> c2
- credential-theft -> repository-poison [loop]
- credential-theft -> npm-distribution [loop]

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### initial-compromise: Credential / session use outside baseline
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/identity.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/identity.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/identity.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: Identity / service authentication logs; Device, source-IP and session context; Resource access and token issuance audit
- Investigate: Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
- Investigate: Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### repository-poison: Private access → public repository artifact
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/repository.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/repository.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/repository.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Git-provider organization / enterprise audit; Repository and token permission inventory; Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
- Investigate: Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Investigate: Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
- Limitation: Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### npm-distribution: Dependency / CI trust boundary
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/package.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/package.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/package.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
- Required telemetry: Package-manager and CI job logs; Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs; Runner process trees, secret access and egress
- Investigate: Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Investigate: Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### evasion: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The source describes anti-analysis checks inside the payload; no separate stage query is displayed without execution telemetry.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### decrypt-payload: Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution
- Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.
- Required telemetry: Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines; Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd\_create and execve where available; Network and persistence activity from the resulting process
- Investigate: Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
- Investigate: Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
- Limitation: Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### credential-theft: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### c2: Sensitive data → unusual destination
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/exfil.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/exfil.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
- Required telemetry: Sensitive resource access / DLP records; Proxy, egress and cloud upload events; Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
- Investigate: Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Investigate: Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
- Limitation: An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0010: AI Supply Chain Compromise — Supply chain attack targeting AI coding assistant users via hijacked GitHub repositories and malicious npm packages
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0010
  Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/
- AML.T0011: User Execution — Worm propagates through package registries (npm, RubyGems, PyPI) and version control (GitHub), specifically targeting AI development environments
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0011
  Evidence: https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/ ; https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descendant-malicious-ruby-gem
- AML.T0051: LLM Prompt Injection — CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks inject hidden instructions telling agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051
  Evidence: https://x.com/fr0gger_/status/2119730348699640060
- AML.T0083: Credentials from AI Agent Configuration — Worm steals AI coding assistant credentials (.claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json) and cloud/CI credentials
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0083
  Evidence: https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descendant-malicious-ruby-gem
- AML.T0081: Modify AI Agent Configuration — Plants workspace-tools MCP server and SessionStart hooks for persistent AI agent manipulation
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0081
  Evidence: https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descendant-malicious-ruby-gem

## Defensive notes
Monitor GitHub repositories for unexpected .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md/instructions.md files; native addon scrutiny; large dotfiles in packages; npm install hook abuse; GitHub Actions secret access; CI environment variable monitoring

## Sources
- https://research.jfrog.com/post/beyond-testmetest-42-hijacked-github-repos/ — Beyond testmetest: Native Addon Camouflage and 42 Armed GitHub Repositories
- https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descendant-malicious-ruby-gem — Socket: Shai-Hulud Descendant - Malicious Ruby Gem
- https://x.com/fr0gger_/status/2119730348699640060 — Thomas Roccia: Hijacked repos with backdated commits and CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks

## Source notes
SafeDep first documented npm package side Oct 22; JFrog complementary GitHub infrastructure investigation; campaign shifted to native addon camouflage to evade scanners; addon environment checks skip CI/containers/sandboxes with \<1.5GB RAM or 1 CPU

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "paleasbest.top"
  ],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [
    "3b3f6e1bde0b28b015030a81a6d805b5b5306dc3f021e1102123971cfd83acc0"
  ],
  "urls": [
    "https://github.com/CementBeetleSteeple",
    "https://github.com/toray/XiamiSDK-lib",
    "https://github.com/toray/widget-lib",
    "https://github.com/toray/Rainbow-lib",
    "https://github.com/toray/QiniuSDK-lib",
    "https://github.com/toray/torayUtils-lib",
    "https://github.com/ejaaduipitara/djp-devops",
    "https://github.com/ejaaduipitara/whatsapp-bot",
    "https://github.com/ejaaduipitara/content-service",
    "https://github.com/ConcordiaDev/theme_saimaniq",
    "https://github.com/madolee/da",
    "https://github.com/Imanilom/baraja-coffe",
    "https://github.com/claudiohernanbesada/xenios.api"
  ]
}
```
