# Kaspersky Citrus ransomware uses LLM-written PowerShell and batch scripts

- ID: kaspersky-citrus-ransomware-llm-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-11
- Researcher: Stanislav Larinsky, Vladislav Vlasov, Boris Trefilov
- Organization: Kaspersky GERT / Securelist
- AI role: llm_generated_malware (LLM-generated malware)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-12
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/kaspersky-citrus-ransomware-llm-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/kaspersky-citrus-ransomware-llm-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Kaspersky Citrus ransomware uses LLM-written PowerShell and batch scripts
- Editorial summary: Kaspersky GERT (Stanislav Larinsky, Vladislav Vlasov, Boris Trefilov; Securelist, Nov 11, 2026) documents Citrus, a Russian-speaking ransomware group that hits Russian companies. Initial access is…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/kaspersky-citrus-ransomware-llm-2026-11.json

## Technique
Kaspersky GERT (Stanislav Larinsky, Vladislav Vlasov, Boris Trefilov; Securelist, Nov 11, 2026) documents Citrus, a Russian-speaking ransomware group that hits Russian companies. Initial access is credentials stolen from contractors' staff, used on corporate VPNs or exposed RDP. During execution the crew runs Windows commands and full PowerShell and batch scripts Kaspersky assesses as LLM-generated because the commands carry comments attackers rarely write, including a disable-admin-account example with verify-result comments, a threaded session-enumeration script, and an edited ransomware GPO deploy script. Privilege escalation includes attempts to exploit CVE-2026-54121 Certighost against AD CS, which created machine accounts named GHOST plus 8 letters (examples GHOSTAUFTAFGS, GHOSTCZYQVAZS, GHOSTIVPRLDZA), with cdc pointing at 91.210.109.118. They also use Impacket atexec and 1C-Shell on 1C:Enterprise. Credential and discovery tools include mimikatz, a modified peeping-tom keylogger at C:\\ProgramData\\Oracle\\Java\\jhost.exe, Snaffler, fscan, ADRecon, and SharpHound. Tunnels are Xray VLESS plus REALITY disguised as mirror.yandex.ru and yastatic.net, plus silent AnyDesk. Before encryption they run steal\_tgs.ps1 to collect Telegram tdata. Sn00py ransomware (Go, RSA-2048 and ChaCha20) appends .citrus and drops CITRUS\_README.txt. It is pushed by a malicious Kaspersky GPO from KasperskyGPO\_Deploy\_64.exe SFX archives and Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1. Scheduled tasks include Java rpchost agent, KasperskyAgentInstallTask, and Sysvc. Kaspersky notes TTP overlap with Toy Ghouls and no shared infrastructure. Tools: Snaffler https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler, fscan https://github.com/shadow1ng/fscan, Xray https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core, ADRecon https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon, Impacket https://github.com/fortra/impacket.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Contractor staff credentials used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP

## AI tooling and models
- LLM-written [PowerShell](https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell) and batch scripts (model not named; no prompts recovered)

## Other tooling
- mimikatz
- Snaffler (https://github.com/SnaffCon/Snaffler)
- fscan (https://github.com/shadow1ng/fscan)
- Xray (https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core)
- ADRecon (https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon)
- Impacket (https://github.com/fortra/impacket)
- SharpHound
- AnyDesk
- Sn00py ransomware

## Victims and sectors
Russian companies

## Target geography
- Russia

## Attribution
Citrus, Russian-speaking, financially motivated. Kaspersky notes TTP overlap with Toy Ghouls and no shared infrastructure.

## Scale and metrics
Newly documented group. Hashes and two IPs published. No victim count.

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### contractor-creds: Contractor credentials [access]
Stolen contractor staff credentials are used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP.
Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/

### llm-scripts: LLM-commented scripts [ai]
PowerShell and batch scripts with step-by-step comments disable accounts, enumerate sessions, and edit the GPO deploy script.
Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/

### adcs: Certighost and credential tools [execution]
CVE-2026-54121 creates GHOST machine accounts. mimikatz, SharpHound, Snaffler, fscan, and a keylogger collect credentials.
Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/

### encrypt: GPO deploys Sn00py [impact]
A fake Kaspersky GPO scheduled task runs the SFX and encrypts files to .citrus after steal\_tgs.ps1.
Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/

Connections:
- contractor-creds -> llm-scripts
- llm-scripts -> adcs
- adcs -> encrypt

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### contractor-creds: Sensitive store access → credential use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/credentials.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/credentials.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores; Process identity and command lines; Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
- Investigate: Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Investigate: Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
- Limitation: Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### llm-scripts: Suspicious Windows script execution
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-shell.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents; PowerShell script-block logging when enabled; Download / network and installer events
- Investigate: Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Investigate: Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
- Limitation: Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### adcs: Windows credential dumping with system utilities
- Visibility: Windows process and process-access telemetry where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: native
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/windows-credential-dump.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/windows-credential-dump.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/windows-credential-dump.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.
- Required telemetry: Windows process creation with complete command lines; Process-access telemetry for LSASS; Authentication and lateral-movement logs
- Investigate: Recover the dump path, process ancestry, account, and initiating remote session or scheduled task.
- Investigate: Correlate the event with new logons, DCSync, ticket creation, and credential use from other hosts.
- Limitation: Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### encrypt: Collection / encryption behavior
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/impact.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/impact.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/impact.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.
- Required telemetry: File-operation rates and process attribution; Ransomware / DLP behavior alerts; Canary files and recovery / backup audit
- Investigate: Correlate file bursts, extension changes and outbound transfer to the same process and identity.
- Investigate: Validate against bulk backup / archiving activity and preserve the research-only qualification of a PoC.
- Limitation: A file-write burst is not proof of ransomware; in-process interpreters may not spawn a separate executable.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Kaspersky assesses the PowerShell and batch scripts were generated by an LLM from their explanatory comments
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — Initial access used contractor credentials on VPN or RDP
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/
- AML.T0048: External Harms — Sn00py encryption with the .citrus extension and CITRUS\_README.txt is the ransomware impact
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0048
  Evidence: https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/

## Defensive notes
Do not reuse contractor VPN credentials. Monitor AD for machine accounts named GHOST plus 8 letters and for CVE-2026-54121 certificate requests pointing at 91.210.109.118. Block the published hashes. Alert on schtasks names KasperskyAgentInstallTask, Sysvc, and Java rpchost agent, and on Deploy-KasperskyGPO.ps1.

## Sources
- https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/ — Securelist: Citrus Ransomware - VLESS for traffic, Sn00py for encryption, and LLMs lending a hand
- https://www.kaspersky.de/about/press-releases/neue-ransomware-gruppe-kombiniert-ki-generierte-skripte-und-datendiebstahl — Kaspersky press release: Citrus ransomware and AI-generated scripts

## Source notes
Hashes, IPs, task names, file paths, GHOST account examples, and the LLM-comment judgment are from the Securelist article. MD5s: Sn00py 17b29b6c9de80402a45e321bbe1168fa and build\_64.exe 9eee984b187423c46c10a63d080da15d; Xray d631627131b90d576d77f4bf530e1abe; keylogger e251df2d0b7c3682965efb4d2009a2f4; Meterpreter stager 7107fb029e7c63523e3aca5fc8e56b38; fscan cf903e4a1629aa0582fd0363b5786676. IPs 91.210.109.118 and 91.210.108.180.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "91.210.109.118",
    "91.210.108.180"
  ],
  "hashes": [
    "17b29b6c9de80402a45e321bbe1168fa",
    "9eee984b187423c46c10a63d080da15d",
    "d631627131b90d576d77f4bf530e1abe",
    "e251df2d0b7c3682965efb4d2009a2f4",
    "7107fb029e7c63523e3aca5fc8e56b38",
    "cf903e4a1629aa0582fd0363b5786676"
  ],
  "urls": []
}
```
