# LLMjacking expands to DeepSeek

- ID: llmjacking-deepseek-sysdig-2025-02
- Reported: 2025-02-07
- Researcher: Sysdig Threat Research Team
- Organization: Sysdig
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/llmjacking-deepseek-sysdig-2025-02/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/llmjacking-deepseek-sysdig-2025-02.json
- Browse title: LLMjacking expands to DeepSeek
- Editorial summary: Within days of DeepSeek going viral, LLMjacking proxies running on stolen credentials added DeepSeek alongside OpenAI, AWS and Azure access.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Cloud & SaaS
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/llmjacking-deepseek-sysdig-2025-02.json

## Technique
Within days of DeepSeek virality, LLMjacking proxies added DeepSeek alongside OpenAI, AWS, Azure. Sysdig observed dozen+ proxy servers on stolen credentials; notes Microsoft lawsuit against actors abusing GenAI services (DALL-E abusive content).

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Inventory AI service keys, scope permissions, rotate exposed tokens and investigate anomalous usage.
- Relationship: credential; tools: ai-api-keys; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The reported path uses stolen AI-service or cloud credentials to resell model access.
  Condition to check: Confirm the affected service and credential type in the source; consumer chat use alone is not the reported condition.
  Evidence: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [DeepSeek](https://github.com/deepseek-ai)
- OpenAI
- AWS
- Azure

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
Cloud LLM abuse costs can exceed hundreds of thousands USD monthly (Sysdig)

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Original credential theft is undisclosed [unknown]
The entry begins with already-stolen service credentials.
Evidence: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek

### step-2: Proxy operators add service support [execution]
LLMjacking proxies add DeepSeek to other inference providers.
Evidence: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek

### step-3: Stolen accounts provide inference access [ai]
Requests are routed through unauthorized service credentials.
Evidence: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek

### step-4: AI access is resold or abused [impact]
The report describes more than a dozen proxy servers using stolen credentials.
Evidence: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- Qualification: Proxy configuration and model-routing changes require proxy-operator records; cloud key use is investigated at the following stage.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0012: Valid Accounts — Stolen service credentials provide unauthorized inference access.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0012
  Evidence: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek

## Defensive notes
Same as LLMjacking: key hygiene, Bedrock/OpenAI anomaly detection, proxy hunting

## Sources
- https://www.sysdig.com/blog/llmjacking-targets-deepseek
