# ink5725/snapshot-config-reader skill finding

- ID: lolskills-ink5725-snapshot-config-reader-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-06
- Researcher: Jose Enrique Hernandez (LOLSkills feed)
- Organization: MagicSword / LOLSkills
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: true
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/lolskills-ink5725-snapshot-config-reader-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/lolskills-ink5725-snapshot-config-reader-2026-10.json
- Browse title: ink5725/snapshot-config-reader agent skill scanner finding
- Editorial summary: A skill that extracts config from PNG images triggered scanner flags. The snapshot showed zero downloads and an incomplete scan; the finding does not establish that the skill is malicious.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Scanner finding
- Source-stated target environments: Agents & MCP
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/lolskills-ink5725-snapshot-config-reader-2026-10.json

## Evidence qualification
Scanner finding on a skill bundle; Jose explicitly not calling it malicious. Pattern of decode-from-image instructions.

## Technique
Agent skill SKILL.md instructs pulling 'config' from PNG trailer, EXIF, LSB. ClamAV Img.Packed.PngContainsDownloadCmd (high) on two PNGs; Nova DetectHiddenInstructions (low). 0 downloads; scan incomplete.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Review the full skill bundle and decoded-image instructions before approving its use.
- Relationship: workflow; tools: agent-skills; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The scanner finding concerns an agent skill that retrieves instructions from image content.
  Condition to check: Confirm whether this specific bundle or the described extraction pattern is present.
  Condition to check: The scan was incomplete, the snapshot reported zero downloads and maliciousness was not established.
  Evidence: https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
n/a (skill install / agent load path)

## AI tooling and models
- Agent skill bundle

## Other tooling
- PNG steganography / trailer / EXIF / LSB

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
0 downloads at time of post

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Skill bundle is scanned [access]
The finding concerns an agent skill with no observed downloads.
Evidence: https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c

### step-2: SKILL.md requests image extraction [ai]
Instructions tell the agent to obtain configuration from PNG trailers, metadata or low bits.
Evidence: https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c

### step-3: Scanners flag embedded instructions [execution]
The partial scan detects suspicious image content with differing confidence levels.
Evidence: https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c

### step-4: No execution is established [unknown]
The record does not confirm a victim, a completed scan or successful skill execution.
Evidence: https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Skill bundle provenance / review
- Visibility: Review / research workflow
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/skill-review.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/skill-review.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
- Required telemetry: Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes; Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history; Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed
- Investigate: Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
- Investigate: Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
- Limitation: Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.
- Community intelligence: LOLSkills — https://lolskills.io

### step-2: Skill bundle provenance / review
- Visibility: Review / research workflow
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/skill-review.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/skill-review.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
- Required telemetry: Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes; Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history; Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed
- Investigate: Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
- Investigate: Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
- Limitation: Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.
- Community intelligence: LOLSkills — https://lolskills.io

### step-3: Skill bundle provenance / review
- Visibility: Review / research workflow
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/skill-review.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/skill-review.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.
- Required telemetry: Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes; Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history; Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed
- Investigate: Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.
- Investigate: Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution.
- Limitation: Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0051.001: Indirect — The flagged skill instructs an agent to recover instructions from image artifacts; actual execution is unconfirmed.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051.001
  Evidence: https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c

## Defensive notes
Whole-bundle skill scanning; treat decode-from-image steps as signals

## Sources
- https://lolskills.io/discover/56bd2dd3473fa5a15b30dd42a262ac410148e41679ebcc51c71b33279cdbfa6c

## Published MagicSword coverage
- https://x.com/_josehelps/status/2107500883554812028
- https://x.com/_josehelps/status/2107500883554812028
