# PoeLLM botnet targets 3,400+ exposed LiteLLM/Ollama servers for mining

- ID: lumen-poellm-botnet-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-07
- Researcher: Black Lotus Labs
- Organization: Lumen
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/lumen-poellm-botnet-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/lumen-poellm-botnet-2026-10.json
- Browse title: PoeLLM botnet targets 3,400+ exposed LiteLLM/Ollama servers for mining
- Editorial summary: PoeLLM malware exploits vulnerable internet-facing AI/LLM deployments (LiteLLM, Ollama, Gotenberg, Gitea, possibly Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520). Derives C2 from keywords in poem 'On the Nature of…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/lumen-poellm-botnet-2026-10.json

## Technique
PoeLLM malware exploits vulnerable internet-facing AI/LLM deployments (LiteLLM, Ollama, Gotenberg, Gitea, possibly Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520). Derives C2 from keywords in poem 'On the Nature of Connection' hosted in GitHub repo ejejejdfbbebe/nodejs.org fork (dash.css file). Malware parses poem to extract 4 words/phrases via pattern matching ('In the silent hum of X,', 'each pulse of X threading', 'Beyond the wall of X,', 'the X servers'), converts words to numbers via hardcoded dictionary, combines to form IPv4 C2 address. Deploys XMRig and Iron crypto miners connecting to Kryptex (5.180.174.162). Converts victims into HTTP/S scanners and exploit servers for expansion. Poem updated 11 times since Apr 13, 2026 to rotate C2. Italian-speaking actor. 3,400+ victims, peak 800 active/day, predominantly US/Western Europe.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Exploitation of publicly exposed vulnerable services: LiteLLM, Ollama, Gotenberg, Gitea, possibly Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520; first activity April 2026

## AI tooling and models
- LiteLLM
- [Ollama](https://github.com/ollama/ollama)

## Other tooling
- PoeLLM malware (libgcrypt)
- XMRig crypto miner
- Iron crypto miner
- Kryptex mining service
- GitHub for C2 poem hosting
- Gotenberg (PDF converter)
- Gitea (software development toolkit)
- Ivanti Sentry (possibly CVE-2026-10520)

## Victims and sectors
3,400+ victim servers; enterprise AI infrastructure; development toolkits; predominantly US and Western Europe; peak activity 800 active servers per day

## Target geography
- United States
- Europe

## Attribution
Canto Incognito campaign; Italian-speaking threat actor (assessment); financially motivated cryptocurrency mining operation

## Scale and metrics
Active since April 2026; 3,400+ impacted servers; peak ~2,200 affected servers mid-June, ~800 active per day; first C2 commit Apr 13, 2026; poem updated 11 times; broader scanning/exploitation began May 2026; recent traffic suggests distributed brute-force experiments

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### vuln-exploit: Exploit vulnerable AI/LLM services [access]
Target publicly exposed LiteLLM, Ollama, Gotenberg, Gitea, possibly Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520; Gotenberg docs explicitly warn not to expose to internet
Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware

### poem-c2: GitHub poem-derived C2 [execution]
Malware queries GitHub repo ejejejdfbbebe/nodejs.org fork for dash.css; parses poem 'On the Nature of Connection' to extract 4 words ('In the silent hum of X', 'each pulse of X threading', 'Beyond the wall of X', 'the X servers'); converts words to numbers via hardcoded dictionary; combines to IPv4 C2 address; poem updated 11 times since Apr 13, 2026
Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware

### deploy-malware: Deploy libgcrypt malware [execution]
Downloads and executes ELF 'libgcrypt' from C2; malware includes remote shell, XMRig and Iron crypto miners, HTTP/S scanning capabilities, exploit deployment
Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware

### mining: Cryptocurrency mining [ai]
Deploys XMRig and Iron miners; connects to Kryptex mining service at 5.180.174.162; GPU hardware attractive target for mining
Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware

### expand-botnet: Convert victims to scanners [impact]
Infected servers become HTTP/S vulnerability scanners and exploit servers; proxy attacks through compromised hosts to expand botnet; repurposed routers for C2 infrastructure; recent experiments with distributed brute-force
Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware

Connections:
- vuln-exploit -> poem-c2
- poem-c2 -> deploy-malware
- deploy-malware -> mining
- deploy-malware -> expand-botnet
- expand-botnet -> vuln-exploit [loop]

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### vuln-exploit: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### poem-c2: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-malware: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### mining: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### expand-botnet: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0010: AI Supply Chain Compromise — Supply chain-style targeting of exposed AI/LLM services (LiteLLM, Ollama) for compromise and cryptocurrency mining
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0010
  Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware
- AML.T0034: Cost Harvesting — Exploitation of vulnerabilities in AI/LLM infrastructure (possibly Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520, vulnerable LiteLLM/Ollama versions)
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0034
  Evidence: https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware

## Defensive notes
Do not expose AI/LLM services to internet (Gotenberg guidance explicit); vulnerability patching for LiteLLM/Ollama/Gitea/Ivanti Sentry; monitor for crypto mining (Kryptex 5.180.174.162); GitHub repository monitoring; C2 poem pattern detection; HTTP scanning from AI servers; GPU utilization anomalies

## Sources
- https://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/canto-incognito-tracking-the-poellm-malware — Canto incognito: tracking the PoeLLM malware

## Source notes
Black Lotus Labs discovered via Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520 investigation; disrupted campaign, blocked C2 traffic; Lumen Defender customers protected; malware includes remote shell, miners, HTTP/S scanning, exploit deployment; Gotenberg installation guide warns not to expose to internet

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [],
  "ips": [
    "5.78.73.122",
    "120.224.114.212",
    "5.180.174.162",
    "92.119.165.74"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": [
    "https://github.com/ejejejdfbbebe/nodejs.org",
    "http://5.78.73.122:81/private/python3.6",
    "http://5.78.73.122:81/private/bins.sh"
  ]
}
```
