# Multiple campaigns distributing malicious OpenClaw skills

- ID: malicious-openclaw-skills-2026
- Reported: 2026-06-23
- Researcher: Koi Security, Cyera Research
- Organization: Koi Security, Cyera
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/malicious-openclaw-skills-2026/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/malicious-openclaw-skills-2026.json
- Browse title: Multiple campaigns distributing malicious OpenClaw skills
- Editorial summary: Koi reported ClawHavoc skills distributed through fake repositories and a rogue registry to deliver infostealers and harvest developer credentials. Cyera later reported poisoned skills using fake…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/malicious-openclaw-skills-2026.json

## Technique
Koi reported ClawHavoc skills distributed through fake repositories and a rogue registry to deliver infostealers and harvest developer credentials. Cyera later reported poisoned skills using fake prerequisite lures, OS-specific installation instructions, external paste relays, and inflated README droppers. Detection should verify skill provenance, inspect companion files rather than only SKILL.md, and monitor agent-initiated shell and network activity.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
User installs malicious OpenClaw skill from fake GitHub repo, typosquat, or rogue skill registry (openclaw-skills\[.\]com)

## AI tooling and models
- OpenClaw AI skill framework
- Anthropic [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) API
- OpenAI API

## Other tooling
- AMOS infostealer (macOS)
- Raccoon Stealer (Windows)
- [Node.js](https://github.com/nodejs/node) credential harvesters
- Reverse shells
- openclaw-skills\[.\]com rogue registry

## Victims and sectors
AI developers installing untrusted OpenClaw skills

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
ClawHavoc campaign and related poisoned-skill activity; actor unknown

## Scale and metrics
Multiple malicious skills and associated payload infrastructure reported during 2026

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### distribute-skills: Distribute malicious skills [access]
ClawHavoc: 23 skills on fake GitHub repos + openclaw-skills\[.\]com registry. Unit 42: 5 skills via typosquat repos + SEO-poisoned blogs. Skills named to appear legitimate (productivity-boost, code-optimizer, security-scanner, api-connector-pro, github-integration-plus)
Evidence: https://koi.security/blog/clawhavoc-malicious-openclaw-skills-amos

### user-installs: User installs skill [ai]
User finds malicious skill via search, fake registry, or social engineering; installs to ~/.openclaw/skills/ via OpenClaw CLI or UI; skill auto-loads on next OpenClaw startup
Evidence: https://koi.security/blog/clawhavoc-malicious-openclaw-skills-amos

### execute-payload: Execute malware and harvest [execution]
ClawHavoc: deploys AMOS (macOS) or Raccoon Stealer (Windows); harvests Anthropic keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS creds, crypto wallets, browser cookies. Unit 42: Node.js credential harvester + reverse shell; targets same credential types
Evidence: https://koi.security/blog/clawhavoc-malicious-openclaw-skills-amos

### exfiltrate-persist: Exfiltrate and maintain access [impact]
Credentials POST to attacker C2; reverse shells provide persistent access; 6,900+ affected installations across both campaigns (ClawHavoc 4,800, Unit 42 2,100)
Evidence: https://koi.security/blog/clawhavoc-malicious-openclaw-skills-amos

Connections:
- distribute-skills -> user-installs
- user-installs -> execute-payload
- execute-payload -> exfiltrate-persist

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### distribute-skills: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### user-installs: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### execute-payload: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfiltrate-persist: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0000: Search Open Technical Databases — Multiple campaigns delivering malicious AI skill framework extensions to steal credentials and deploy malware on AI developer machines
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000
  Evidence: https://koi.security/blog/clawhavoc-malicious-openclaw-skills-amos

## Defensive notes
Only install OpenClaw skills from trusted sources; verify GitHub repo authenticity (org, stars, commit history); review skill manifest permissions before install; use allowlisted skill sources; monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected additions; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Raccoon; educate users on skill installation risks

## Sources
- https://koi.security/blog/clawhavoc-malicious-openclaw-skills-amos — Koi: ClawHavoc Campaign Delivers AMOS via Malicious OpenClaw Skills
- https://www.cyera.com/research/poisoned-skills-target-developer-credentials — Cyera: Poisoned Skills Target Developer Credentials

## Source notes
Koi Security ClawHavoc analysis and Cyera poisoned-skill research. Detection should monitor skill installation, unknown source repositories, unexpected network egress, and credential-file access.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "openclaw-skills.com",
    "socifiapp.com",
    "custom-registry.com",
    "openclawskills.net",
    "install.app-distribution.net",
    "openclawcli.vercel.app",
    "download.setup-service.com",
    "laosji.net",
    "letssendit.fun",
    "monster-secure.site",
    "vorderingenonline.com"
  ],
  "ips": [
    "91.92.242.30",
    "5.42.65.10",
    "45.137.65.112",
    "185.234.72.19",
    "2.26.75.16"
  ],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": [
    "https://glot.io/snippets/hfdxv8uyaf",
    "https://glot.io/snippets/hfd3x9ueu5",
    "https://rentry.co/openclaw-code"
  ]
}
```
