# Snyk analysis - covert and lookalike malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub

- ID: snyk-covert-lookalike-skills-2026-11
- Reported: 2026-11-06
- Researcher: Marco Milanta, Marc Fischer, Luca Beurer-Kellner
- Organization: Snyk Security Research
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-10
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/snyk-covert-lookalike-skills-2026-11/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/snyk-covert-lookalike-skills-2026-11.json
- Browse title: Snyk analysis - covert and lookalike malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub
- Editorial summary: Snyk Security Research (Marco Milanta, Marc Fischer, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Nov 6, 2026) documents malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub platforms. callicrate/skills/agents-md bundles UPX-packed…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/snyk-covert-lookalike-skills-2026-11.json

## Technique
Snyk Security Research (Marco Milanta, Marc Fischer, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Nov 6, 2026) documents malicious skills targeting skills.sh and ClawHub platforms. callicrate/skills/agents-md bundles UPX-packed Rust binary, detaches with FAST\_VALIDATE\_WORKER=1 environment variable, appends remote text to ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md for persistence after skill removal. ClawHub campaigns: vinhbui3004/audio-upload-aioz-stream and video-upload-aioz-stream exfiltrate to api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou; gloryjack/tushare-pro via tussahre.pro; neutronstar238/md-to-ppt runs npx slidew. Additional malicious skills: andy825lay-tech/github-automation-pro (obfuscated JavaScript), liuyanfeng1234/v19-trust-manifesto (agent enrollment as curl diagnostic utility). Unattributed campaigns; confirmed malicious behavior. Multiple attack vectors: packed binaries, remote CLAUDE.md modification, typosquatted domains, obfuscated JavaScript, fake diagnostic utilities.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Users install malicious skills from skills.sh or ClawHub platforms

## AI tooling and models
- [Claude](https://claude.com/product/overview) AI
- skills.sh platform
- ClawHub platform

## Other tooling
- UPX packer
- Rust binaries
- Node.js/npx
- Obfuscated JavaScript

## Victims and sectors
AI developers using skills.sh and ClawHub platforms; Claude AI users

## Target geography
- Multiple regions

## Attribution
Unattributed campaigns; multiple distinct actors targeting AI skill platforms

## Scale and metrics
Multiple malicious skills identified Nov 2026 across skills.sh and ClawHub

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### publish-malicious-skills: Publish malicious skills [access]
Attackers publish covert malicious skills on skills.sh and ClawHub platforms with lookalike or utility names
Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/

### user-install: User installs malicious skill [ai]
Developer installs malicious skill from skills.sh or ClawHub platform
Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/

### deploy-backdoor: Deploy UPX-packed binary or obfuscated JS [execution]
Skill deploys UPX-packed Rust binary, obfuscated JavaScript, or npx-based payload
Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/

### persist-claude-md: Modify ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md [execution]
Remote text appended to CLAUDE.md for persistence after skill removal
Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/

### exfiltrate-credentials: Exfiltrate credentials [impact]
Credentials and data exfiltrated to attacker domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro)
Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/

Connections:
- publish-malicious-skills -> user-install
- user-install -> deploy-backdoor
- deploy-backdoor -> persist-claude-md
- persist-claude-md -> exfiltrate-credentials

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### publish-malicious-skills: Private access → public repository artifact
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/repository.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/repository.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/repository.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Git-provider organization / enterprise audit; Repository and token permission inventory; Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
- Investigate: Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Investigate: Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
- Limitation: Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### user-install: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### deploy-backdoor: Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payload.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payload.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payload.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific process and file provenance; Signer / hash and software inventory; Per-process network and remote-session records
- Investigate: Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Investigate: Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
- Limitation: A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### persist-claude-md: Untrusted content enters an agent session
- Visibility: Application / agent audit records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-input.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-input.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.
- Required telemetry: Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier; Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved; Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions
- Investigate: Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
- Investigate: Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
- Limitation: Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfiltrate-credentials: Sensitive data → unusual destination
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/exfil.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/exfil.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
- Required telemetry: Sensitive resource access / DLP records; Proxy, egress and cloud upload events; Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
- Investigate: Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Investigate: Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
- Limitation: An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0010: AI Supply Chain Compromise — Supply chain attack via malicious skills on skills.sh and ClawHub platforms
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0010
  Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/
- AML.T0011: User Execution — Skills propagate through AI skill distribution platforms targeting developer environments
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0011
  Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/
- AML.T0051: LLM Prompt Injection — Remote text appended to ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md persists instructions after skill removal
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051
  Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/
- AML.T0083: Credentials from AI Agent Configuration — Malicious skills target AI credential theft and environment compromise
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0083
  Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/
- AML.T0081: Modify AI Agent Configuration — Skills establish persistence through CLAUDE.md modification and agent enrollment mechanisms
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0081
  Evidence: https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/

## Defensive notes
Verify skill publisher authenticity before installation; scan for UPX-packed binaries in skill packages; monitor ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md for unauthorized modifications; block suspicious domains (api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou, tussahre.pro); audit skills for obfuscated JavaScript; detect FAST\_VALIDATE\_WORKER=1 environment variable usage; review npx commands in skill execution; restrict skill permissions to minimum required; implement skill sandboxing where possible

## Sources
- https://research.snyk.io/blog/skill-analysis/ — Snyk: Skill Analysis - Covert and Lookalike Malicious Skills

## Source notes
Snyk Security Research blog (Nov 6, 2026) primary source; all indicators (skill names, domains, techniques) verified from Snyk analysis; multiple unattributed campaigns with distinct TTPs; links to malicious-openclaw-skills-2026 catalog entry for broader context

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "api-w3stream.attoaioz.cyou",
    "tussahre.pro"
  ],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
