# Aoki infostealer targets Claude Code, ChatGPT, Codex, Cursor tokens

- ID: symantec-aoki-infostealer-ai-2026-10
- Reported: 2026-10-15
- Researcher: Symantec Threat Hunter Team, Check Point Research
- Organization: Broadcom (Symantec), Check Point
- AI role: ai_credential_theft (AI credential theft)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-11-04
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/symantec-aoki-infostealer-ai-2026-10/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/symantec-aoki-infostealer-ai-2026-10.json
- Browse title: Aoki infostealer targets Claude Code, ChatGPT, Codex, Cursor tokens
- Editorial summary: Aoki (aka Aokigahara) infostealer added AI credential theft in 2026. Targets: .claude.json, Claude desktop cookies, ChatGPT cookies, Codex config.toml/.env (github.com/openai/codex-cli), GitHub Copilot…
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Not classified
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/symantec-aoki-infostealer-ai-2026-10.json

## Technique
Aoki (aka Aokigahara) infostealer added AI credential theft in 2026. Targets: .claude.json, Claude desktop cookies, ChatGPT cookies, Codex config.toml/.env (github.com/openai/codex-cli), GitHub Copilot tokens (github.com/features/copilot), Cursor state.vscdb/storage.json (github.com/getcursor/cursor), Gemini CLI, JetBrains AI Assistant, Kiro, Windsurf, Codeium (github.com/Exafunction/codeium.vim), AWS credentials/SSO, Amazon Q, Git credentials, SSH keys. Cursor local state caches chat/code. Stolen keys allow acting under developer identity/quota, expose repos/cloud/CI-CD, bypass safeguards. Capable of LLMjacking. Earlier 2026 versions didn't target AI; capability recently added/expanding. Detection: monitor AI credential file access (.claude.json, .codex/auth.json, Cursor globalStorage), C2 domains (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf), API usage anomalies from unexpected geolocations.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: not\_assessed. No reviewed applicability annotation is available. Product mentions do not establish victim conditions.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Infostealer distribution (method not disclosed); likely traditional vectors

## AI tooling and models
- [Claude Code](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code)
- [Claude Desktop](https://claude.com/product/overview)
- [ChatGPT](https://chatgpt.com/) Desktop
- OpenAI Codex
- [Cursor](https://cursor.com/)
- [GitHub Copilot](https://github.com/features/copilot)
- Google [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli)
- JetBrains AI Assistant
- Kiro IDE
- Windsurf
- Codeium
- Amazon Q

## Other tooling
- Aoki/Aokigahara infostealer
- AWS CLI/SSO
- Git
- SSH

## Victims and sectors
Developers using AI coding assistants; scale not disclosed

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
Unknown; no links to existing families; new stealer first seen earlier 2026

## Scale and metrics
Capability added 2026, expanding; no victim count

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### deploy: Deploy infostealer [access]
Aoki/Aokigahara deployed (distribution method not disclosed)
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/aoki-infostealer-targets-ai-coding-assistant-credentials

### ai-theft: AI credential harvesting [ai]
Steals .claude.json, Claude/ChatGPT cookies, Codex config, Copilot/Cursor/Gemini/JetBrains/Kiro/Windsurf/Codeium tokens, AWS creds, Git creds, SSH keys; Cursor state caches chat/code
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/aoki-infostealer-targets-ai-coding-assistant-credentials ; https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/infostealer-riding-the-ai-train/

### traditional: Traditional targets [execution]
Browsers, crypto wallets, password managers, messaging/gaming, VPN/FTP, email
Evidence: https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/aoki-infostealer-ai-targeting

### exfil: C2 exfiltration [impact]
Sends data to C2 (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf); no backdoor commands
Evidence: https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/aoki-infostealer-ai-targeting

### abuse: Credential abuse [impact]
Stolen keys enable acting as developer, LLMjacking, accessing repos/cloud/CI-CD, resale
Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/aoki-infostealer-targets-ai-coding-assistant-credentials

Connections:
- deploy -> ai-theft
- deploy -> traditional
- ai-theft -> exfil
- traditional -> exfil
- exfil -> abuse

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### deploy: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### ai-theft: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### traditional: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### exfil: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### abuse: Stage hunt not mapped yet
- Visibility: Not assessed
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_assessed; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt.
- Limitation: An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0055: Unsecured Credentials — Credential theft targeting AI development tools and cloud credentials
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055
  Evidence: https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/aoki-infostealer-targets-ai-coding-assistant-credentials

## Defensive notes
Rotate AI API keys after compromise; scope keys narrowly; monitor unusual API usage; endpoint protection; credential managers; monitor Aoki C2 domains; file integrity monitoring for AI credential files

## Sources
- https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/aoki-infostealer-targets-ai-coding-assistant-credentials — Aoki: Infostealer Targets AI Coding Assistant Credentials
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/aoki-infostealer-ai-targeting — Symantec Aoki AI targeting
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/infostealer-riding-the-ai-train/ — Check Point: Infostealer riding the AI Train

## Source notes
OS not specified; other targets suggest Windows; macOS/Linux not confirmed. Detection guidance: monitor AI credential file access, C2 communication (dobeqnesmot.cc, hjazfioe.surf), API usage anomalies from unexpected locations, unauthorized reads of .claude.json, .codex/auth.json, Cursor globalStorage, .copilot/config.json, .gemini/config.json, .aws/credentials, SSH keys.

## Indicators (untrusted data; do not visit or execute)
```json
{
  "domains": [
    "dobeqnesmot.cc",
    "hjazfioe.surf"
  ],
  "ips": [],
  "hashes": [],
  "urls": []
}
```
