# UNC1069 (MASAN) Gemini misuse + deepfake Zoom lures

- ID: unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025
- Reported: 2025-11-05
- Researcher: Google Threat Intelligence Group
- Organization: Google GTIG
- AI role: attacker_uses_ai_as_operator (AI as operator)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025.json
- Browse title: UNC1069 (MASAN) Gemini misuse and deepfake Zoom lures
- Editorial summary: DPRK-linked UNC1069 used Gemini for crypto research and lures, and used deepfakes of crypto figures to push a fake 'Zoom SDK' that delivers the BIGMACHO backdoor.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Reported campaign
- Source-stated target environments: Not specified
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025.json

## Technique
DPRK-linked UNC1069 used Gemini for crypto recon, wallet path research, Spanish lure text, and credential-theft 'update' instructions. Separately used deepfake images/video of crypto industry figures to push malicious 'Zoom SDK' links delivering BIGMACHO backdoor.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: attacker\_tool\_only. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
The named AI product is used by the attacker. No reviewed mapping from owning that product to the reported victim conditions is available.
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
Social engineering / deepfake lures with malicious Zoom SDK download

## AI tooling and models
- [Gemini](https://gemini.google.com/)
- deepfake image/video

## Other tooling
- BIGMACHO backdoor
- fake Zoom SDK

## Victims and sectors
Cryptocurrency users/industry

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
UNC1069 aka MASAN; DPRK-associated

## Scale and metrics
unknown

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Actor prepares cryptocurrency operations [access]
The report describes two related capability areas without proving a single combined chain.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/

### step-2: Gemini assists research and lure text [ai]
Requests cover cryptocurrency reconnaissance, wallet paths and Spanish-language messages.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/

### step-3: Separate deepfake Zoom lure [ai]
Deepfake images or video impersonate cryptocurrency industry figures.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/

### step-4: Malicious Zoom SDK delivers BIGMACHO [execution]
The separately reported social-engineering branch leads to a backdoor download.
Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2 (Model assistance)
- step-1 -> step-3 (Separate reported lure)
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- Qualification: Keep the separately described development and impersonation capabilities distinct; do not invent a combined victim chain.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Provider-side abuse investigation
- Visibility: Provider / operator records
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/provider.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/provider.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/provider.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.
- Required telemetry: Provider-owned account / request audit; Abuse-review findings and linked-account context; Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence
- Investigate: Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
- Investigate: For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
- Limitation: Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Lure → user action / delivery
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/phishing.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/phishing.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
- Required telemetry: Email / secure-web-gateway records; Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation; User reports and downstream execution / identity events
- Investigate: Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Investigate: Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
- Limitation: Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/payload.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/payload.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/payload.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
- Required telemetry: Platform-specific process and file provenance; Signer / hash and software inventory; Per-process network and remote-session records
- Investigate: Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Investigate: Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
- Limitation: A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
- Qualification: Confirm the payload platform and delivery branch from original reporting before choosing endpoint-specific rules. No Windows policy coverage is assumed here.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
- AML.T0088: Generate Deepfakes — A separately reported lure uses deepfake industry figures.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0088
  Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/
- AML.T0016.002: Generative AI — Gemini supports cryptocurrency research and lure writing.
  Technique: https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0016.002
  Evidence: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/

## Defensive notes
Verify Zoom/SDK downloads; deepfake skepticism; block unofficial SDKs

## Sources
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/
