# Copilot Studio / Power Platform SharePoint connector SSRF (CVE-2024-38206)

- ID: zenity-copilot-studio-sharepoint-ssrf-2024
- Reported: 2024-12-01
- Researcher: Zenity Labs
- Organization: Zenity
- AI role: ai_agent_or_mcp_as_target (Agent / MCP as target)
- Confidence in AI involvement: not assessed
- Research / borderline: false
- Last reviewed: 2026-10-20
- Entry page: https://openattacks.ai/attacks/zenity-copilot-studio-sharepoint-ssrf-2024/
- Entry JSON: https://openattacks.ai/api/attacks/zenity-copilot-studio-sharepoint-ssrf-2024.json
- Browse title: Copilot Studio SharePoint connector SSRF (CVE-2024-38206)
- Editorial summary: A malicious agent action could expose a victim's SharePoint token through a connector SSRF flaw, enabling impersonation across affected Microsoft services.
- Evidence class (catalog annotation): Vulnerability report
- Source-stated target environments: Agents & MCP
- Stage hunts and conditional defenses: https://openattacks.ai/api/defenses/zenity-copilot-studio-sharepoint-ssrf-2024.json

## Technique
SSRF in SharePoint connector used by Copilot Studio/Power Automate/Power Apps/Copilot 365. Malicious agent List-folder action with attacker URL could harvest victim SharePoint JWT when they connect/retry, enabling impersonation. Microsoft patched Dec 2024.

## Stack relevance (editorial)
Assessment: mapped. Editorial applicability reviewed against the catalog source account; not a scan or independent incident verification.
First action: Check the connector advisory and audit shared agent actions, connector permissions and destinations.
- Relationship: target; tools: copilot-studio; OS scope: not OS-specific / not stated; requires existing MCP connections: false.
  Relevance: The source describes a SharePoint connector token-exposure path used by Copilot Studio.
  Condition to check: Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
  Condition to check: The path depends on the affected SharePoint connector, a malicious agent action and the victim connecting or retrying.
  Evidence: https://labs.zenity.io/post/the-power-of-one-ssrf-vulnerability-a-multi-platform-threat ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38206
A product mention alone is not a victim-side applicability mapping. Selection does not verify affected versions, permissions or compromise.

## Initial access
unknown

## AI tooling and models
- [Microsoft Copilot Studio](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/products/copilot-studio)
- Power Platform SharePoint connector

## Other tooling
- unknown

## Victims and sectors
unknown

## Target geography
- unknown

## Attribution
unknown

## Scale and metrics
CVE-2024-38206; multi-product impact

## Attack flow
Catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknowns and research caveats are preserved.
### step-1: Original victim-contact route is unspecified [unknown]
The seed describes a malicious agent action and connector retry behavior.
Evidence: https://labs.zenity.io/post/the-power-of-one-ssrf-vulnerability-a-multi-platform-threat ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38206

### step-2: Connector uses an attacker URL [access]
An agent List-folder action points to an attacker-controlled destination.
Evidence: https://labs.zenity.io/post/the-power-of-one-ssrf-vulnerability-a-multi-platform-threat ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38206

### step-3: User connects or retries through the agent [ai]
The SharePoint connector follows the manipulated flow.
Evidence: https://labs.zenity.io/post/the-power-of-one-ssrf-vulnerability-a-multi-platform-threat ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38206

### step-4: SharePoint token is exposed [impact]
The reported SSRF chain can reveal a JWT that enables impersonation.
Evidence: https://labs.zenity.io/post/the-power-of-one-ssrf-vulnerability-a-multi-platform-threat ; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38206

Connections:
- step-1 -> step-2
- step-2 -> step-3
- step-3 -> step-4

## Stage defense and hunting recommendations
Editorial recommendations, not validated coverage. Source-controlled query starters are drafts. Custom-schema examples require telemetry collection and field mapping; absence of a mapping means not assessed. MagicSword policy opportunities require managed Windows scope and enforcement.
### step-1: No source-backed runtime hunt yet
- Visibility: Not established
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: not_applicable; log scope: gap
- Hunt hypothesis: The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.
- Required telemetry: not assessed
- Investigate: Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection.
- Limitation: Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.
- Qualification: The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-2: Unexpected agent tool use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/agent-tools.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
- Required telemetry: Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination; Tool-definition and approval changes; Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
- Investigate: Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Investigate: Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
- Limitation: Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-3: Credential / session use outside baseline
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/identity.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/identity.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/identity.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
- Required telemetry: Identity / service authentication logs; Device, source-IP and session context; Resource access and token issuance audit
- Investigate: Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
- Investigate: Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
- Limitation: Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.

### step-4: Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
- Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
- Query origin: catalog_authored; status: draft; log scope: custom_schema
- SIGMA query download: /api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml
- KQL query download: /api/detections/cloud.kql
- SPL query download: /api/detections/cloud.spl
- Hunt hypothesis: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
- Required telemetry: Cloud control-plane and identity audit; AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled; Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
- Investigate: Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Investigate: Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
- Limitation: Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
- No direct MagicSword prevention claim is recorded for this stage.


## MITRE ATLAS
Mappings are catalog annotations based on described behavior, not assignments or endorsements by MITRE.
No source-backed mapping is currently recorded.

## Defensive notes
Patch; audit public Copilot Studio agents; least-privilege connectors

## Sources
- https://labs.zenity.io/post/the-power-of-one-ssrf-vulnerability-a-multi-platform-threat
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38206
