{
  "attack_id": "adception-claude-mac-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "note": "Use delivery provenance and the subsequent pasted command; Claude branding alone is not a detection signal.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "mac-shell",
      "title": "macOS download → shell execution",
      "hypothesis": "A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)",
        "Browser download and proxy records",
        "LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.",
        "Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session."
      ],
      "limitation": "Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution\nid: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,\n  followed by an unexpected download or launched program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: macos\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /zsh\n      - /bash\n      - /sh\n      - /curl\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - http\n      - base64\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"zsh\", \"bash\", \"sh\", \"curl\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"base64\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:process\"\nImage IN (\"*/zsh\", \"*/bash\", \"*/sh\", \"*/curl\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*http*\", \"*base64*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/mac-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/mac-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/mac-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/mac-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "mac-shell",
      "title": "macOS download → shell execution",
      "hypothesis": "A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)",
        "Browser download and proxy records",
        "LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.",
        "Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session."
      ],
      "limitation": "Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution\nid: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,\n  followed by an unexpected download or launched program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: macos\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /zsh\n      - /bash\n      - /sh\n      - /curl\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - http\n      - base64\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"zsh\", \"bash\", \"sh\", \"curl\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"base64\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:process\"\nImage IN (\"*/zsh\", \"*/bash\", \"*/sh\", \"*/curl\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*http*\", \"*base64*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/mac-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/mac-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/mac-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/mac-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Search ad redirects",
        "description": "An ad for Claude on Mac redirects through tracking and a compromised retailer to a fake download page.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Claude branding earns trust",
        "description": "The page displays a real-looking Anthropic installation command.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Clipboard command is swapped",
        "description": "The Copy button substitutes a command that decodes a different download URL and pipes content to zsh.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Victim runs attacker content",
        "description": "Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pushsecurity.com/blog/adception-malvertising-another-search-engines-search-results"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}