{
  "attack_id": "air-office-party-anthropic-skills-ld-preload-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "helper",
      "profile": "skill-review",
      "title": "Skill bundle provenance / review",
      "hypothesis": "A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes",
        "Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history",
        "Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.",
        "Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution."
      ],
      "limitation": "Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review\nid: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access\n  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - skill.bundle.load\n      - skill.bundle.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/skill-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/skill-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/skill-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "preload",
      "profile": "linux-fileless-execution",
      "title": "Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution",
      "hypothesis": "A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.",
      "visibility": "Linux process and audit telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines",
        "Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available",
        "Network and persistence activity from the resulting process"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.",
        "Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells."
      ],
      "limitation": "Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution\nid: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|contains:\n      - /memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  condition: 1 of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where OSPlatform =~ \"Linux\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"/memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.process IN (\"*memfd:*\", \"*/proc/self/fd/*\", \"*/proc/thread-self/fd/*\")\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-fileless-execution.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party",
        "https://github.com/anthropics/skills/blob/main/skills/docx/scripts/office/soffice.py"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call",
          "id": "42663c0e-572e-4459-bf61-476a81d6aab1",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "plant",
      "profile": "linux-fileless-execution",
      "title": "Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution",
      "hypothesis": "A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.",
      "visibility": "Linux process and audit telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines",
        "Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available",
        "Network and persistence activity from the resulting process"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.",
        "Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells."
      ],
      "limitation": "Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution\nid: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|contains:\n      - /memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  condition: 1 of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where OSPlatform =~ \"Linux\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"/memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.process IN (\"*memfd:*\", \"*/proc/self/fd/*\", \"*/proc/thread-self/fd/*\")\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-fileless-execution.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call",
          "id": "42663c0e-572e-4459-bf61-476a81d6aab1",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "helper",
        "title": "Document skill calls soffice.py",
        "description": "docx, pptx, and xlsx skills run scripts/office/soffice.py --headless --convert-to pdf. The docx skill does this for every document it writes.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "preload",
        "title": "Failed socket sets LD_PRELOAD",
        "description": "If the Unix socket cannot be opened, soffice.py sets LD_PRELOAD to tempfile.gettempdir()/lo_socket_shim.so with no ownership or content check.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party",
          "https://github.com/anthropics/skills/blob/main/skills/docx/scripts/office/soffice.py"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "plant",
        "title": "First writer of the shim is loaded",
        "description": "Air planted the library in a Claude Code sandbox temp directory, and also unpacked it from a companion skill. Linux loads it. macOS ignores LD_PRELOAD.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "helper",
        "target": "preload"
      },
      {
        "source": "preload",
        "target": "plant"
      }
    ]
  }
}