{
  "attack_id": "anthropic-claude-code-trojan-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "fireworks-key",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "supply-chain",
      "profile": "repository",
      "title": "Private access → public repository artifact",
      "hypothesis": "A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Git-provider organization / enterprise audit",
        "Repository and token permission inventory",
        "Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.",
        "Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications."
      ],
      "limitation": "Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.",
      "note": "The observable event is a write of unauthorized extension copies onto the marketplace cache, not a commit to anthropics/anthropic-quickstarts.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact\nid: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,\n  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - repository.public.write\n      - repository.visibility.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"repository.public.write\", \"repository.visibility.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/repository.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/repository.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/repository.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/repository.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-15",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "distribution",
      "profile": "extension",
      "title": "Browser extension change / data access",
      "hypothesis": "A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Managed-browser extension inventory and update history",
        "Extension ID, permissions and provenance",
        "Browser / proxy / DLP evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.",
        "Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately."
      ],
      "limitation": "Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access\nid: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses\n  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - browser.extension.install\n      - browser.extension.update\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/extension.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/extension.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/extension.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/extension.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update",
        "https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "collection",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "backdoor",
      "profile": "linux-ssh-persistence",
      "title": "Linux SSH authorized-key persistence",
      "hypothesis": "A shell or file utility modifies an SSH authorized_keys file and is followed by an SSH session or outbound tunnel that is not part of approved administration.",
      "visibility": "Linux endpoint and SSH logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation with complete command lines",
        "File modification telemetry for user and root SSH directories",
        "SSH authentication and network connection logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Recover the added key and identify the process, user, package, or script that changed the file.",
        "Correlate the change with new SSH sessions, reverse tunnels, and other persistence artifacts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Administrators and configuration-management tools legitimately rotate SSH keys. Process-only telemetry can miss direct file writes, and a matching command does not prove that the write succeeded.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux SSH Authorized Key Modification\nid: ba847b8a-0dd7-4062-a6ba-bc923654f22a\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects shell and file utilities referencing SSH authorized_keys files.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_ssh_authorized_keys_modification.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Approved SSH key rotation and configuration management\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /bash\n      - /sh\n      - /zsh\n      - /cat\n      - /tee\n      - /sed\n      - /cp\n  selection_target:\n    CommandLine|contains: authorized_keys\n  condition: all of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where OSPlatform =~ \"Linux\"\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"authorized_keys\"\n| where FileName in~ (\"bash\", \"sh\", \"zsh\", \"cat\", \"tee\", \"sed\", \"cp\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.process=\"*authorized_keys*\"\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Linux process candidates that reference authorized_keys. The queries require process command lines; correlate with file and SSH telemetry before alerting.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-ssh-persistence.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification",
          "id": "f5ab595e-28e5-4327-8077-5008ba97c850",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_ssh_authorized_keys_modification.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "persistence",
      "profile": "persistence",
      "title": "New persistence → recurring execution",
      "hypothesis": "A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes",
        "Process creation and file provenance",
        "User / administrative change records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.",
        "Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents."
      ],
      "limitation": "Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution\nid: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is\n  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - persistence.create\n      - persistence.modify\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/persistence.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/persistence.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/persistence.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "fireworks-key",
        "title": "Exposed Fireworks access key",
        "description": "The attacker used an access key Cursor had issued to Fireworks and copied a read-only bucket of coding-agent traces. A small number of traces contained credentials.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "supply-chain",
        "title": "Malicious copies placed on the marketplace cache",
        "description": "On Oct 29 a stolen credential was used to place unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, on the cache Cursor used for its marketplace. Open VSX did not have them.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "distribution",
        "title": "Cached versions served for about 11 hours",
        "description": "At most 5,000 users who requested those cached versions could receive them. Cursor's earlier notice placed the marketplace window at about 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM ET.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update",
          "https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "collection",
        "title": "Extension collects host information and secrets",
        "description": "Loader in extension.js collected hostname, username, environment variable names matching secret patterns",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "backdoor",
        "title": "SSH backdoor established",
        "description": "Added svc-telemetry SSH key to authorized_keys and established reverse SSH tunnel to tunnel@134.209.82.225 with beacon to :8099/beacon",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "persistence",
        "title": "Platform-specific persistence installed",
        "description": "com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent (macOS), @reboot cron (Linux), SysMon scheduled task (Windows)",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/30/inside-malicious-claude-code-branded-cursor-extension-persistent-ssh-backdoor/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "fireworks-key",
        "target": "supply-chain"
      },
      {
        "source": "supply-chain",
        "target": "distribution"
      },
      {
        "source": "distribution",
        "target": "collection"
      },
      {
        "source": "collection",
        "target": "backdoor"
      },
      {
        "source": "backdoor",
        "target": "persistence"
      }
    ]
  }
}