{
  "attack_id": "anthropic-influence-as-a-service-2025-03",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "provider",
      "title": "Provider-side abuse investigation",
      "hypothesis": "A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.",
      "visibility": "Provider / operator records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Provider-owned account / request audit",
        "Abuse-review findings and linked-account context",
        "Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.",
        "For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.",
      "note": "Persona preparation is visible in provider/operator records, rather than victim endpoint logs.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation\nid: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,\n  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator\n  sessions.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.request\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.request\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.request\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/provider.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/provider.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/provider.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/provider.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "provider",
      "title": "Provider-side abuse investigation",
      "hypothesis": "A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.",
      "visibility": "Provider / operator records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Provider-owned account / request audit",
        "Abuse-review findings and linked-account context",
        "Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.",
        "For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation\nid: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,\n  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator\n  sessions.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.request\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.request\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.request\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/provider.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/provider.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/provider.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/provider.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "social",
      "title": "Coordinated messaging / propagation",
      "hypothesis": "Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.",
      "visibility": "Platform / application records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform account and posting audit",
        "Agent session and message-provenance records",
        "Rate, recipient and content-similarity features"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.",
        "Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Coordinated messaging / propagation\nid: c4001568-b68b-4887-a86f-6f05807640f6\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting,\n  forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - social.post\n      - message.forward\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"social.post\", \"message.forward\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"social.post\", \"message.forward\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/social.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/social.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/social.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/social.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "social",
      "title": "Coordinated messaging / propagation",
      "hypothesis": "Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.",
      "visibility": "Platform / application records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform account and posting audit",
        "Agent session and message-provenance records",
        "Rate, recipient and content-similarity features"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.",
        "Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.",
      "note": "Review linked posting and engagement on the platform; coordinated activity does not establish state affiliation.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Coordinated messaging / propagation\nid: c4001568-b68b-4887-a86f-6f05807640f6\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting,\n  forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - social.post\n      - message.forward\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"social.post\", \"message.forward\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"social.post\", \"message.forward\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/social.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/social.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/social.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/social.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Operator defines political personas",
        "description": "Commercial clients supply narratives and personas for social accounts.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Claude plans account activity",
        "description": "Claude helps decide when more than 100 bot accounts should engage or ignore posts.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Accounts distribute content",
        "description": "The operation uses multilingual responses and generated image prompts.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Coordinated influence",
        "description": "Authentic social accounts encounter the coordinated engagement; state affiliation is unconfirmed.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-countering-malicious-uses-of-claude-march-2025"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}