{
  "attack_id": "arctic-wolf-antifox-iis-aws-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "webshell",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "webconfig",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "aws-enum",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "secret",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "webshell",
        "title": "IIS worker writes an ASPX shell",
        "description": "w3wp.exe creates pwn*.aspx in an upload directory and runs whoami, icacls, and write tests.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "webconfig",
        "title": "Parse web.config",
        "description": "PowerShell uses WebConfigurationManager to copy connection strings and logs into cfg*.txt, wc*.txt, and el*.txt.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "aws-enum",
        "title": "Burst of AWS List and Get calls",
        "description": "Boto3 1.43.125 from the AntiFox IPs cycles identities across dozens of AWS services in about 30 minutes.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "secret",
        "title": "GetSecretValue and S3 object changes",
        "description": "A successful GetSecretValue hits a production secret. Other activity copies and deletes S3 objects.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://github.com/rtkwlf/wolf-tools/blob/main/pack_alerts/202611-antifox-alibaba-hosted-platforms-facilitate-web-cloud-intrusions/README.md"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "webshell",
        "target": "webconfig"
      },
      {
        "source": "aws-enum",
        "target": "secret"
      }
    ]
  }
}