{
  "attack_id": "cl-unk-1211-unit42-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "linux-webshell",
      "title": "Linux web worker → shell / interpreter",
      "hypothesis": "A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation (EDR / auditd normalized to process fields)",
        "PHP / web access logs",
        "File changes to web roots and PHP configuration"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Trace the worker's children and correlate them with inbound requests.",
        "Review auto_prepend_file, .bashrc changes, /dev/shm execution, and outbound tunnels where the report describes them."
      ],
      "limitation": "Legitimate CGI, maintenance, and deployment scripts can match. The query is a process-tree starter, not a complete web-shell detector.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux web worker → shell / interpreter\nid: 068e005a-876e-4ba3-a414-791f9a1c2330\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A PHP or web-server worker launches a shell, interpreter, or\n  reconnaissance utility outside its normal baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /sh\n      - /bash\n      - /python\n      - /python3\n      - /curl\n      - /wget\n    ParentImage|endswith:\n      - /php-fpm\n      - /php-fpm8.2\n      - /apache2\n      - /httpd\n      - /nginx\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"sh\", \"bash\", \"python\", \"python3\", \"curl\", \"wget\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"php-fpm\", \"php-fpm8.2\", \"apache2\", \"httpd\", \"nginx\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:process\"\nImage IN (\"*/sh\", \"*/bash\", \"*/python\", \"*/python3\", \"*/curl\", \"*/wget\")\nParentImage IN (\"*/php-fpm\", \"*/php-fpm8.2\", \"*/apache2\", \"*/httpd\", \"*/nginx\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "linux process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-webshell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-webshell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": [],
      "resource": {
        "name": "GTFOBins",
        "url": "https://gtfobins.github.io"
      }
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "persistence",
      "title": "New persistence → recurring execution",
      "hypothesis": "A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes",
        "Process creation and file provenance",
        "User / administrative change records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.",
        "Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents."
      ],
      "limitation": "Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution\nid: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is\n  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - persistence.create\n      - persistence.modify\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/persistence.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/persistence.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/persistence.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "unassessed",
      "title": "Stage hunt not mapped yet",
      "hypothesis": "A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.",
      "visibility": "Not assessed",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt."
      ],
      "limitation": "An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.",
      "note": "This stage is included for completeness; a query needs a reviewed link between the described behavior and logs available to the observing party.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No query has been reviewed for this stage yet.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unassessed.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_assessed",
      "evidence": [
        "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Web shells land on Linux servers",
        "description": "The campaign targets government and state-affiliated infrastructure.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Persistence and privilege tooling",
        "description": "Reported steps include PHP persistence, sudo credential capture and privilege-escalation tools.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Scripts show signs of AI assistance",
        "description": "Conversational code comments support an inference of AI-assisted generation, not confirmed live agent control.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Remote access and collection",
        "description": "SysGoRAT and tunneling tools support espionage-style operations.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-campaign-targets-linux-infrastructure/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-4"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-2",
        "label": "Code-artifact inference"
      }
    ]
  }
}