{
  "attack_id": "cyera-anthropic-pdf-skill-backdoor-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "create-tampered-skill",
      "profile": "skill-review",
      "title": "Skill bundle provenance / review",
      "hypothesis": "A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes",
        "Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history",
        "Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.",
        "Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution."
      ],
      "limitation": "Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review\nid: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access\n  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - skill.bundle.load\n      - skill.bundle.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/skill-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/skill-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/skill-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "truncate-skill-md",
      "profile": "skill-review",
      "title": "Skill bundle provenance / review",
      "hypothesis": "A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes",
        "Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history",
        "Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.",
        "Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution."
      ],
      "limitation": "Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review\nid: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access\n  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - skill.bundle.load\n      - skill.bundle.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/skill-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/skill-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/skill-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "obfuscate-backdoor",
      "profile": "skill-review",
      "title": "Skill bundle provenance / review",
      "hypothesis": "A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes",
        "Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history",
        "Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.",
        "Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution."
      ],
      "limitation": "Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review\nid: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access\n  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - skill.bundle.load\n      - skill.bundle.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/skill-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/skill-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/skill-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "distribute-skill",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The distribution channel is unknown, so no delivery-specific query is displayed.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "developer-install",
      "profile": "skill-review",
      "title": "Skill bundle provenance / review",
      "hypothesis": "A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.",
      "visibility": "Review / research workflow",
      "telemetry": [
        "Complete skill-bundle inventory and hashes",
        "Scanner results, extracted attachments and review history",
        "Agent load / tool logs if execution is actually observed"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the entire bundle, including images and referenced files, in an isolated static-analysis workflow.",
        "Compare requested capabilities with the skill's purpose; record scanner disagreement and avoid treating a finding as proof of execution."
      ],
      "limitation": "Scanner findings and evasion results are research evidence, not a runtime compromise detector. Do not execute embedded commands or invent a victim chain.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Skill bundle provenance / review\nid: 4941aba2-b392-4f04-ad39-6f0201811d26\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A skill bundle introduces new network, execution or secret-access\n  instructions, including instructions distributed across non-Markdown files.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - skill.bundle.load\n      - skill.bundle.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"skill.bundle.load\", \"skill.bundle.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/skill-review.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/skill-review.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/skill-review.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/skill-review.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "backdoor-execution",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "note": "Apply this to system_linux execution and its connection to the reported endpoint; the IP alone is not a durable behavioral rule.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "create-tampered-skill",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
        ],
        "title": "Create tampered PDF skill with system_linux backdoor",
        "description": "Create tampered PDF skill with system_linux backdoor"
      },
      {
        "id": "truncate-skill-md",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
        ],
        "title": "Truncate SKILL.md (315→19 lines), add curl scan.100tal.com",
        "description": "Truncate SKILL.md (315→19 lines), add curl scan.100tal.com"
      },
      {
        "id": "obfuscate-backdoor",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
        ],
        "title": "garble-obfuscate system_linux Go binary",
        "description": "garble-obfuscate system_linux Go binary"
      },
      {
        "id": "distribute-skill",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
        ],
        "title": "Distribute tampered skill via unknown channel",
        "description": "Distribute tampered skill via unknown channel"
      },
      {
        "id": "developer-install",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
        ],
        "title": "Developer installs tampered PDF skill",
        "description": "Developer installs tampered PDF skill"
      },
      {
        "id": "backdoor-execution",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.cyera.com/research/malicious-copy-anthropic-pdf-skill-carries-linux-backdoor"
        ],
        "title": "system_linux connects 81.70.101.115:2345, attaches /bin/bash",
        "description": "system_linux connects 81.70.101.115:2345, attaches /bin/bash"
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "create-tampered-skill",
        "target": "truncate-skill-md"
      },
      {
        "source": "truncate-skill-md",
        "target": "obfuscate-backdoor"
      },
      {
        "source": "obfuscate-backdoor",
        "target": "distribute-skill"
      },
      {
        "source": "distribute-skill",
        "target": "developer-install"
      },
      {
        "source": "developer-install",
        "target": "backdoor-execution"
      }
    ]
  }
}