{
  "attack_id": "deepseek-grok-fake-windows-clients-2025",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "note": "Trace the advertisement and unofficial download to file provenance and later execution.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
        "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
        "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "note": "Use download provenance and follow-on behavior; an AI product name is not sufficient evidence of a malicious installer.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
        "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
        "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "windows-install",
      "title": "Unapproved Windows program execution",
      "hypothesis": "A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation",
        "Download provenance and file hashes",
        "File certificate information and application-control audit / block events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.",
        "Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events."
      ],
      "limitation": "Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution\nid: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable\n  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\AppData\\Roaming\\\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FolderPath contains \"\\\\Downloads\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-install.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-install.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-install.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
        "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
        "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": [],
      "control": {
        "title": "Deny an unapproved executable",
        "action": "Use MagicSword to audit the actual executable's signer, publisher or hash, then enforce a policy that denies unapproved code on managed Windows hosts.",
        "scope": "The reported Windows installers and payloads on managed devices; validate signer and hash policy coverage.",
        "limitation": "Policy opportunity, not tested incident coverage. Requires enrolled Windows devices, a policy covering the actual executable, and enforcement. Audit mode records decisions without blocking; allowed tools and in-process / cloud actions can remain reachable.",
        "url": "https://www.magicsword.io/use-cases/application-control?utm_source=openattacks&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=stage-control"
      }
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
        "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
        "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "User finds an unofficial AI client",
        "description": "Fake DeepSeek or Grok desktop downloads are promoted through sites and ads.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
          "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
          "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "AI product branding is impersonated",
        "description": "The installer presents itself as a trusted model client.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
          "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
          "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Trojanized installer runs",
        "description": "Reported branches deliver stealers, SSH backdoors or RAT variants.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
          "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
          "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Data theft or remote access",
        "description": "Payloads steal browser data, proxy traffic or establish attacker access.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/backdoors-and-stealers-prey-on-deepseek-and-grok/115801/",
          "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/trojans-disguised-as-deepseek-grok-clients/53116/",
          "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/bogus-deepseek-ai-installers-are-infecting-devices-with-malware-research-finds/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}