{
  "attack_id": "fakegit-agentbaiting-island-2026-10",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "create-fakes",
      "profile": "social",
      "title": "Coordinated messaging / propagation",
      "hypothesis": "Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.",
      "visibility": "Platform / application records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform account and posting audit",
        "Agent session and message-provenance records",
        "Rate, recipient and content-similarity features"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.",
        "Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Coordinated messaging / propagation\nid: c4001568-b68b-4887-a86f-6f05807640f6\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting,\n  forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - social.post\n      - message.forward\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"social.post\", \"message.forward\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"social.post\", \"message.forward\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/social.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/social.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/social.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/social.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "agent-recommends",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "note": "Review recommendation provenance and the subsequent action. A repository appearing in search results is not compromise.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "user-installs",
      "profile": "package-install-execution",
      "title": "Package installation spawns a shell or downloader",
      "hypothesis": "A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.",
      "visibility": "Endpoint process telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Process creation with ancestry and complete command lines",
        "Package-manager, CI, and installation logs",
        "Download, file creation, signature, and network telemetry"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the package, version, publisher, lifecycle hook, resolved source, and parent process.",
        "Recover downloaded content and correlate credential access, persistence, or outbound traffic."
      ],
      "limitation": "Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Shell or Downloader Spawned by Package Installation\nid: c83f22aa-d07c-4f3c-a67f-6d5512818133\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects package-manager processes spawning common shells, interpreters, or downloaders.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_curl_download_from_npm_install.toml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate package build and installation scripts\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\ndetection:\n  selection_parent:\n    ParentCommandLine|contains:\n      - npm-cli.js\n      - npx-cli.js\n      - yarn\n      - pnpm\n      - pip install\n      - python -m pip\n      - gem install\n  selection_child:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - /sh\n      - /bash\n      - /zsh\n      - /curl\n      - /wget\n      - /python\n      - /node\n  condition: all of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (\"npm-cli.js\", \"npx-cli.js\", \"yarn\", \"pnpm\",\n    \"pip install\", \"python -m pip\", \"gem install\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"sh\", \"bash\", \"zsh\", \"curl\", \"wget\", \"python\", \"node\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.parent_process IN (\"*npm-cli.js*\", \"*npx-cli.js*\", \"*yarn*\", \"*pnpm*\",\n    \"*pip install*\", \"*python -m pip*\", \"*gem install*\")\n  Processes.process_name IN (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"sh\", \"bash\", \"zsh\", \"curl\", \"wget\", \"python\", \"node\")\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Process candidates with package-manager ancestry that launch shells or downloaders. Tune known build tooling and correlate with network/file telemetry.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/package-install-execution.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/package-install-execution.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/package-install-execution.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/package-install-execution.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Curl Download Activity from npm Package Install",
          "id": "7a3c9e21-5d84-4b16-9f02-1e8c6a4d0b73",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_curl_download_from_npm_install.toml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Suspicious PowerShell from npm Package Install",
          "id": "c4e8a1d7-2b6f-4e93-8a15-7d0c3f9b6e42",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/windows/execution_suspicious_powershell_from_npm_install.toml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "compromise",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "create-fakes",
        "title": "Create fake repos",
        "description": "Adversary creates 800+ GitHub repos with typosquat/combosquat names mimicking popular AI skills, MCP servers, Cursor rules; optimizes metadata (README, topics, keywords) for LLM search ranking; inflates stars/forks",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "agent-recommends",
        "title": "Agent recommends malicious repo",
        "description": "User asks AI agent to find/recommend skill, MCP server, or Cursor rule; agent searches GitHub/web, ranks FakeGit repos highly due to optimized metadata; agent recommends malicious repo to user as legitimate tool",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "user-installs",
        "title": "User installs per agent recommendation",
        "description": "User trusts agent recommendation and clones repo or installs package; malicious install script or npm/PyPI postinstall executes; Shai-Hulud stealer, SSH backdoor, or worm payload deploys",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "compromise",
        "title": "Credential theft and persistence",
        "description": "Payload harvests AI API keys, GitHub tokens, SSH keys, AWS credentials; establishes persistence (SSH backdoor, cron job); exfiltrates to Discord webhooks or C2; 2,400+ successful compromises tracked Oct-Nov 2026",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/agentbaiting-how-800-fake-ai-skills-and-mcp-servers-delivered-malware"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "create-fakes",
        "target": "agent-recommends"
      },
      {
        "source": "agent-recommends",
        "target": "user-installs"
      },
      {
        "source": "user-installs",
        "target": "compromise"
      }
    ]
  }
}