{
  "attack_id": "fbi-facestealer-bluenoroff-deepfake-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "account",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "meeting",
      "profile": "phishing",
      "title": "Lure → user action / delivery",
      "hypothesis": "An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Email / secure-web-gateway records",
        "Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation",
        "User reports and downstream execution / identity events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.",
        "Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel."
      ],
      "limitation": "Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery\nid: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious\n  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - message.link.click\n      - web.download\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"message.link.click\", \"web.download\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/phishing.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/phishing.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/phishing.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/phishing.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "deepfake",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf",
        "https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "clickfix",
      "profile": "mac-shell",
      "title": "macOS download → shell execution",
      "hypothesis": "A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)",
        "Browser download and proxy records",
        "LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.",
        "Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session."
      ],
      "limitation": "Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution\nid: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,\n  followed by an unexpected download or launched program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: macos\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - /zsh\n      - /bash\n      - /sh\n      - /curl\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - http\n      - base64\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"zsh\", \"bash\", \"sh\", \"curl\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"base64\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:process\"\nImage IN (\"*/zsh\", \"*/bash\", \"*/sh\", \"*/curl\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*http*\", \"*base64*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/mac-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/mac-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/mac-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/mac-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "account",
        "title": "Hijacked messenger account",
        "description": "A prior victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account messages contacts and sends a Calendly invite.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "meeting",
        "title": "Typosquat meeting page",
        "description": "The link, such as uu01webzoom.us or teams.livemeet.us, plays stolen webcam video and starts recording the new target.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "deepfake",
        "title": "Generator-tagged deepfakes",
        "description": "Arctic Wolf found 122 assets from seven generators, identified by embedded tags and C2PA rather than appearance. Stolen footage is still most of the scheme.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261112.pdf",
          "https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "clickfix",
        "title": "ClickFix paste",
        "description": "Windows uses curl piped to powershell ReadToEnd|iex. macOS uses curl piped to osacompile.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://arcticwolf.com/wp-content/bluenoroff_still_in_the_meeting.pdf"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "account",
        "target": "meeting"
      },
      {
        "source": "meeting",
        "target": "deepfake"
      },
      {
        "source": "meeting",
        "target": "clickfix"
      }
    ]
  }
}