{
  "attack_id": "forever-agents-md-hijack-2026",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "drop",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "launch",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "Launching an agent in Downloads is common and is not independently a detection signal.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "read",
      "profile": "agent-input",
      "title": "Untrusted content enters an agent session",
      "hypothesis": "An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.",
      "visibility": "Application / agent audit records",
      "telemetry": [
        "Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier",
        "Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved",
        "Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.",
        "Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session\nid: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session\n  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved\n  task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-04\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.input.ingest\n      - agent.session.resume\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.input.ingest\", \"agent.session.resume\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-input.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-input.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-input.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-input.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "execute",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "impact",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "drop",
        "title": "Malicious instruction file dropped to Downloads",
        "description": "Website drops AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md into ~/Downloads folder",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "launch",
        "title": "Developer launches agent in Downloads",
        "description": "User starts coding agent in Downloads directory following common workflow for testing downloaded projects",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "read",
        "title": "Agent reads malicious instruction file",
        "description": "Agent discovers and loads AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md based on instruction file precedence",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "execute",
        "title": "Malicious instructions executed",
        "description": "AGENTS.md variant edits ~/.codex/config.toml and runs npm install function-color; CLAUDE.md variant steals OAuth token",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "impact",
        "title": "Malware installed or credentials stolen",
        "description": "function-color MALFEX downloader installed or OAuth tokens exfiltrated",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://forever.security/blog/hijacking-ai-agents-via-downloads-folder/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "drop",
        "target": "launch"
      },
      {
        "source": "launch",
        "target": "read"
      },
      {
        "source": "read",
        "target": "execute"
      },
      {
        "source": "execute",
        "target": "impact"
      }
    ]
  }
}