{
  "attack_id": "hiddenlayer-mcp-param-abuse-2025",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
        "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
        "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
        "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
        "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Connection prerequisite is unspecified",
        "description": "The supplied entry does not document the initial route to the malicious tool.",
        "kind": "unknown",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
          "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Tool schema requests sensitive context",
        "description": "Unused parameter names encourage the model to fill in prompts, history and tool information.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
          "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Model passes context as arguments",
        "description": "Sensitive values are included in the tool invocation.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
          "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Tool exfiltrates the arguments",
        "description": "The demonstrated tool sends the collected context through HTTP.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.hiddenlayer.com/research/exploiting-mcp-tool-parameters",
          "https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/beyond-mcp-expanding-agentic-function-parameter-abuse"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}