{
  "attack_id": "huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "blank-key",
      "profile": "identity",
      "title": "Credential / session use outside baseline",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Identity / service authentication logs",
        "Device, source-IP and session context",
        "Resource access and token issuance audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.",
        "Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise."
      ],
      "limitation": "Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline\nid: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a\n  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - identity.login\n      - identity.token.use\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"identity.login\", \"identity.token.use\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"identity.login\", \"identity.token.use\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/identity.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/identity.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/identity.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/identity.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "install",
      "profile": "windows-install",
      "title": "Unapproved Windows program execution",
      "hypothesis": "A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation",
        "Download provenance and file hashes",
        "File certificate information and application-control audit / block events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.",
        "Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events."
      ],
      "limitation": "Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution\nid: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable\n  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\AppData\\Roaming\\\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FolderPath contains \"\\\\Downloads\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-install.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-install.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-install.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "relaytrap",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "spread",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "blank-key",
        "title": "Blank RMM+ access key",
        "description": "RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept an empty access key when none was configured, so Run Command arrives without a ScreenConnect login.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "install",
        "title": "SYSTEM installs sc.msi and SCKit",
        "description": "The command writes C:\\Windows\\TEMP\\sc.msi and sckit-run.bat, then downloads a UUID-keyed kit into C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "relaytrap",
        "title": "LLM-commented RelayTrap",
        "description": "TrapWatch.ps1 compiles RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says looks LLM-written, and schedules TrapWatch every 10 seconds.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "spread",
        "title": "Cookie theft path not seen succeeding",
        "description": "The kit can read a technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and upload a Shared Toolbox item. Huntress had not seen that jump succeed.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "blank-key",
        "target": "install"
      },
      {
        "source": "install",
        "target": "relaytrap"
      },
      {
        "source": "relaytrap",
        "target": "spread"
      }
    ]
  }
}