{
  "attack_id": "island-typoprompting-ai-typosquats-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "typo",
      "profile": "web",
      "title": "Web exploitation → host activity",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs",
        "Server process and file events",
        "Outbound DNS / proxy records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.",
        "Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation."
      ],
      "limitation": "A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity\nid: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected\n  server process, file, or outbound connection.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - web.exploit_candidate\n      - web.upload\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/web.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/web.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/web.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/web.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "clickfix",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "netguard",
      "profile": "windows-install",
      "title": "Unapproved Windows program execution",
      "hypothesis": "A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation",
        "Download provenance and file hashes",
        "File certificate information and application-control audit / block events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.",
        "Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events."
      ],
      "limitation": "Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution\nid: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable\n  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|contains:\n      - \\Downloads\\\n      - \\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\n      - \\AppData\\Roaming\\\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FolderPath contains \"\\\\Downloads\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\\" or FolderPath contains \"\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\Downloads\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp\\\\*\", \"*\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-install.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-install.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-install.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-install.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "extension",
      "profile": "extension",
      "title": "Browser extension change / data access",
      "hypothesis": "A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Managed-browser extension inventory and update history",
        "Extension ID, permissions and provenance",
        "Browser / proxy / DLP evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.",
        "Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately."
      ],
      "limitation": "Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access\nid: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses\n  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - browser.extension.install\n      - browser.extension.update\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/extension.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/extension.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/extension.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/extension.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "typo",
        "title": "AI-brand typo loads",
        "description": "A lookalike such as cloude.ai or preplexity.ai is served instead of the intended AI product. A parking page hands the browser to a traffic-distribution system.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "clickfix",
        "title": "Fake Cloudflare check copies a command",
        "description": "The Windows route copies a curl.exe download of W901.ps1 from decimal host 3112851459 and a hidden PowerShell launch.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "netguard",
        "title": "Store-signed Net Guard",
        "description": "Other typos install the real Microsoft Store Net Guard package, whose buntai-sdk can change search settings and run DevTools scripts.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "extension",
        "title": "Search-hijack extension",
        "description": "preplexity.ai leads to an unlisted Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.island.io/blog/typoprompting-from-ai-typos-to-malware"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "typo",
        "target": "clickfix"
      },
      {
        "source": "typo",
        "target": "netguard"
      },
      {
        "source": "typo",
        "target": "extension"
      }
    ]
  }
}