{
  "attack_id": "kaspersky-citrus-ransomware-llm-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "contractor-creds",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "llm-scripts",
      "profile": "windows-shell",
      "title": "Suspicious Windows script execution",
      "hypothesis": "A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents",
        "PowerShell script-block logging when enabled",
        "Download / network and installer events"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.",
        "Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation."
      ],
      "limitation": "Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution\nid: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or\n  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith:\n      - \\powershell.exe\n      - \\pwsh.exe\n      - \\mshta.exe\n      - \\wscript.exe\n      - \\cscript.exe\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - -enc\n      - http\n      - FromBase64String\n      - \"javascript:\"\n      - \"vbscript:\"\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"-enc\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"http\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"FromBase64String\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"javascript:\" or ProcessCommandLine contains \"vbscript:\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage IN (\"*\\\\powershell.exe\", \"*\\\\pwsh.exe\", \"*\\\\mshta.exe\", \"*\\\\wscript.exe\", \"*\\\\cscript.exe\")\nCommandLine IN (\"*-enc*\", \"*http*\", \"*FromBase64String*\", \"*javascript:*\", \"*vbscript:*\")\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-shell.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-shell.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-shell.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-shell.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "adcs",
      "profile": "windows-credential-dump",
      "title": "Windows credential dumping with system utilities",
      "hypothesis": "A Windows utility accesses or dumps LSASS memory using comsvcs.dll or a similar system-binary technique, followed by credential use or lateral movement.",
      "visibility": "Windows process and process-access telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Windows process creation with complete command lines",
        "Process-access telemetry for LSASS",
        "Authentication and lateral-movement logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Recover the dump path, process ancestry, account, and initiating remote session or scheduled task.",
        "Correlate the event with new logons, DCSync, ticket creation, and credential use from other hosts."
      ],
      "limitation": "Diagnostic and security tools can dump processes. The command-line hunt covers the common comsvcs pattern and does not detect every in-memory or kernel-assisted credential-dumping method.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Process Dump Via Comsvcs DLL\nid: 1c658574-7d21-4fc8-b272-d6b1508d0aad\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects rundll32 invoking the comsvcs MiniDump export.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized diagnostics or incident-response collection\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|endswith: \\rundll32.exe\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains|all:\n      - comsvcs.dll\n      - MiniDump\n  condition: all of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName =~ \"rundll32.exe\"\n| where ProcessCommandLine contains \"comsvcs.dll\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"MiniDump\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" EventCode=1\nImage=\"*\\\\rundll32.exe\" CommandLine=\"*comsvcs.dll*\" CommandLine=\"*MiniDump*\"\n| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine ProcessGuid\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Windows rundll32/comsvcs MiniDump command candidates. Correlate with process-access telemetry and confirm the target PID belongs to LSASS.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/windows-credential-dump.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/windows-credential-dump.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/windows-credential-dump.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/windows-credential-dump.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL",
          "id": "646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_process_dump_via_comsvcs.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL",
          "id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.yml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "encrypt",
      "profile": "impact",
      "title": "Collection / encryption behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-operation rates and process attribution",
        "Ransomware / DLP behavior alerts",
        "Canary files and recovery / backup audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate file bursts, extension changes and outbound transfer to the same process and identity.",
        "Validate against bulk backup / archiving activity and preserve the research-only qualification of a PoC."
      ],
      "limitation": "A file-write burst is not proof of ransomware; in-process interpreters may not spawn a separate executable.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Collection / encryption behavior\nid: 0b1098da-0957-4f77-a2a4-e89a5a2e1a36\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is\n  followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - file.bulk.modify\n      - data.export\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"file.bulk.modify\", \"data.export\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"file.bulk.modify\", \"data.export\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/impact.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/impact.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/impact.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/impact.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "contractor-creds",
        "title": "Contractor credentials",
        "description": "Stolen contractor staff credentials are used on corporate VPN or exposed RDP.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "llm-scripts",
        "title": "LLM-commented scripts",
        "description": "PowerShell and batch scripts with step-by-step comments disable accounts, enumerate sessions, and edit the GPO deploy script.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "adcs",
        "title": "Certighost and credential tools",
        "description": "CVE-2026-54121 creates GHOST machine accounts. mimikatz, SharpHound, Snaffler, fscan, and a keylogger collect credentials.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "encrypt",
        "title": "GPO deploys Sn00py",
        "description": "A fake Kaspersky GPO scheduled task runs the SFX and encrypts files to .citrus after steal_tgs.ps1.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://securelist.com/citrus-ransomware/121879/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "contractor-creds",
        "target": "llm-scripts"
      },
      {
        "source": "llm-scripts",
        "target": "adcs"
      },
      {
        "source": "adcs",
        "target": "encrypt"
      }
    ]
  }
}