{
  "attack_id": "ox-security-chrome-ext-chatgpt-deepseek-2025",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "extension",
      "title": "Browser extension change / data access",
      "hypothesis": "A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Managed-browser extension inventory and update history",
        "Extension ID, permissions and provenance",
        "Browser / proxy / DLP evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.",
        "Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately."
      ],
      "limitation": "Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access\nid: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses\n  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - browser.extension.install\n      - browser.extension.update\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/extension.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/extension.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/extension.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/extension.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "extension",
      "title": "Browser extension change / data access",
      "hypothesis": "A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Managed-browser extension inventory and update history",
        "Extension ID, permissions and provenance",
        "Browser / proxy / DLP evidence"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.",
        "Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately."
      ],
      "limitation": "Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access\nid: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses\n  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - browser.extension.install\n      - browser.extension.update\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"browser.extension.install\", \"browser.extension.update\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/extension.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/extension.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/extension.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/extension.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "note": "Collect extension/application access evidence for conversations and URLs; generic file-write telemetry does not demonstrate these reads.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-04",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "exfil",
      "title": "Sensitive data → unusual destination",
      "hypothesis": "Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Sensitive resource access / DLP records",
        "Proxy, egress and cloud upload events",
        "Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.",
        "Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing."
      ],
      "limitation": "An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination\nid: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public\n  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - data.export\n      - agent.external.send\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"data.export\", \"agent.external.send\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/exfil.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/exfil.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/exfil.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/exfil.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "Impersonating extension is installed",
        "description": "A Chrome Web Store extension presents itself as an AI assistant product.",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "Extension accesses AI conversations",
        "description": "The malicious extension reads ChatGPT and DeepSeek chat content.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Chats and browsing URLs are collected",
        "description": "The reported behavior includes conversation and browser activity theft.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Conversation content is stolen",
        "description": "The campaign affects a large population of extension users.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.ox.security/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-steal-chatgpt-deepseek-conversations/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}