{
  "attack_id": "pluto-loadmine-qwen2-malware-2026",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "upload",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "Repository upload is outside the consumer environment; review repository provenance rather than displaying an endpoint rule.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "load",
      "profile": "model-network",
      "title": "Unexpected process → model service",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected script, implant or local model client communicates with a model service near command execution, collection or file modification.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Per-process network / DNS records",
        "AI-service request logs where available",
        "Process and file behavior on the calling host"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the network connection to the process tree and the actions before and after the response.",
        "Compare with approved AI integrations; inspect local model listeners for PoCs that do not use a hosted API."
      ],
      "limitation": "Connecting to a legitimate model domain does not establish malicious use or reveal returned code. Local / in-process models can evade network-only hunts.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected process → model service\nid: 8560daf7-ecd1-4f2b-ad09-b794bb56a394\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected script, implant or local model client communicates\n  with a model service near command execution, collection or file modification.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.connection\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.connection\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.connection\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/model-network.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/model-network.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/model-network.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/model-network.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "execute",
      "profile": "payload",
      "title": "Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific process and file provenance",
        "Signer / hash and software inventory",
        "Per-process network and remote-session records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.",
        "Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization."
      ],
      "limitation": "A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior\nid: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes\n  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - process.unapproved.exec\n      - remote.session.start\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"process.unapproved.exec\", \"remote.session.start\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payload.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payload.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payload.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payload.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "miner",
      "profile": "linux-fileless-execution",
      "title": "Linux fileless or anonymous-file execution",
      "hypothesis": "A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.",
      "visibility": "Linux process and audit telemetry where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines",
        "Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available",
        "Network and persistence activity from the resulting process"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.",
        "Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells."
      ],
      "limitation": "Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution\nid: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files\nlevel: medium\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: linux\ndetection:\n  selection_image:\n    Image|contains:\n      - /memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  selection_command:\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - memfd:\n      - /proc/self/fd/\n      - /proc/thread-self/fd/\n  condition: 1 of selection_*\n",
        "kql": "DeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where OSPlatform =~ \"Linux\"\n| where FolderPath has_any (\"/memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"memfd:\", \"/proc/self/fd/\", \"/proc/thread-self/fd/\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1\n| order by Timestamp desc",
        "spl": "| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  where Processes.process IN (\"*memfd:*\", \"*/proc/self/fd/*\", \"*/proc/thread-self/fd/*\")\n  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process\n     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| sort - lastTime"
      },
      "query_scope": "Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/linux-fileless-execution.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/linux-fileless-execution.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call",
          "id": "42663c0e-572e-4459-bf61-476a81d6aab1",
          "source": "Elastic detection-rules",
          "url": "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "node_id": "escalation",
      "profile": "privileged-container",
      "title": "Privileged container or pod with host access",
      "hypothesis": "A container or Kubernetes pod is created with privileged execution or a host-directory mount that can expose the underlying node and enable container escape.",
      "visibility": "Container orchestration and runtime audit logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Kubernetes API audit or Docker daemon events",
        "Container runtime process and mount telemetry",
        "Cloud control-plane identity and admission-controller decisions"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the creating principal, image digest, namespace, security context, host mounts, and admission result.",
        "Compare with approved workloads, then inspect node-level file access, processes, and credentials."
      ],
      "limitation": "Infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads may legitimately require elevated access. Docker and Kubernetes use different audit schemas, and creation does not prove escape.",
      "note": "Apply this only to the reported GPUStack/container branch; reverse-shell activity needs endpoint process and network correlation.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Privileged Kubernetes Pod or Host Mount\nid: 5a3e19f4-3f1f-46e9-974f-4985b4692d30\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Detects pod creation requests containing privileged containers or hostPath volumes.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-11-06\nreferences:\n  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml\nfalsepositives:\n  - Approved infrastructure, storage, observability, and security workloads\nlevel: high\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: kubernetes\n  service: audit\ndetection:\n  selection_create:\n    verb: create\n    objectRef.resource: pods\n  selection_privileged:\n    requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged: true\n  selection_hostpath:\n    requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path|startswith: /\n  condition: selection_create and 1 of selection_privileged, selection_hostpath\n",
        "kql": "AzureDiagnostics\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where Category in (\"kube-audit\", \"kube-audit-admin\")\n| where log_s has '\"verb\":\"create\"' and log_s has '\"resource\":\"pods\"'\n| where log_s has '\"privileged\":true' or log_s has '\"hostPath\"'\n| project TimeGenerated, Resource, ResourceGroup, SubscriptionId, log_s\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"kube:apiserver-audit\" verb=create objectRef.resource=pods\n(requestObject.spec.containers{}.securityContext.privileged=true\n  OR requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path=\"*\")\n| table _time user.username sourceIPs{} objectRef.namespace objectRef.name\n    requestObject.spec.containers{}.image requestObject.spec.volumes{}.hostPath.path\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Kubernetes audit candidates for privileged pods or hostPath volumes. The KQL and SPL examples need the respective Kubernetes audit sources and local field extraction.",
      "query_kind": "native",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/privileged-container.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/privileged-container.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/privileged-container.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/privileged-container.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-11-06",
      "upstream_matches": [
        {
          "name": "Privileged Container Deployed",
          "id": "c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97",
          "source": "SigmaHQ",
          "url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/application/kubernetes/audit/kubernetes_audit_privileged_pod_creation.yml"
        },
        {
          "name": "Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution",
          "id": "29b888db-d6e7-4286-bbf5-39d9f260444c",
          "source": "Splunk Security Content",
          "url": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_suspicious_privileged_container_execution.yml"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "upload",
        "title": "Malicious models uploaded to repositories",
        "description": "Attacker uploaded trojanized Qwen2 test models to Hugging Face and ModelScope with malicious config.json auto_map fields",
        "kind": "access",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "load",
        "title": "Victim loads malicious model",
        "description": "User loads model with trust_remote_code=True or via vulnerable vLLM <0.14.0 (CVE-2026-22807)",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "execute",
        "title": "Malicious code executes during model load",
        "description": "modeling_evil2.EvilModel runs from config.json auto_map field during model initialization",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "miner",
        "title": "Fileless cryptominer deployed",
        "description": "peakminer runs via memfd_create for fileless execution; establishes .bashrc persistence",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "escalation",
        "title": "Additional payloads and container escape",
        "description": "Reverse shells deployed; GPUStack container escape achieved",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://pluto.security/blog/hugging-face-malware-campaign-load-mine/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "upload",
        "target": "load"
      },
      {
        "source": "load",
        "target": "execute"
      },
      {
        "source": "execute",
        "target": "miner"
      },
      {
        "source": "miner",
        "target": "escalation"
      }
    ]
  }
}