{
  "attack_id": "promptlock-gtig-eset-2025",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "step-1",
      "profile": "unobserved",
      "title": "No source-backed runtime hunt yet",
      "hypothesis": "The supplied account does not establish a deployed victim-side behavior for this stage.",
      "visibility": "Not established",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Obtain a source-backed procedure and identify which party could observe it before drafting a detection."
      ],
      "limitation": "Marketing claims, unknown steps and unconfirmed deployments are not detection coverage. No rule is generated for this stage.",
      "note": "The supplied account leaves this stage unestablished. Obtain a source-backed procedure before proposing a runtime query.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No runtime query: the available evidence does not establish one.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unobserved.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_applicable",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-2",
      "profile": "model-network",
      "title": "Unexpected process → model service",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected script, implant or local model client communicates with a model service near command execution, collection or file modification.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Per-process network / DNS records",
        "AI-service request logs where available",
        "Process and file behavior on the calling host"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join the network connection to the process tree and the actions before and after the response.",
        "Compare with approved AI integrations; inspect local model listeners for PoCs that do not use a hosted API."
      ],
      "limitation": "Connecting to a legitimate model domain does not establish malicious use or reveal returned code. Local / in-process models can evade network-only hunts.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected process → model service\nid: 8560daf7-ecd1-4f2b-ad09-b794bb56a394\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected script, implant or local model client communicates\n  with a model service near command execution, collection or file modification.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - model.connection\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"model.connection\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"model.connection\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/model-network.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/model-network.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/model-network.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/model-network.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-3",
      "profile": "agent-tools",
      "title": "Unexpected agent tool use",
      "hypothesis": "Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination",
        "Tool-definition and approval changes",
        "Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.",
        "Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector."
      ],
      "limitation": "Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.",
      "note": "The Go process embeds a Lua execution path; child-process hunts alone will miss in-process Lua.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use\nid: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file\n  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - agent.tool.call\n      - agent.tool.definition.change\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"agent.tool.call\", \"agent.tool.definition.change\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/agent-tools.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/agent-tools.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/agent-tools.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/agent-tools.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "step-4",
      "profile": "impact",
      "title": "Collection / encryption behavior",
      "hypothesis": "A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-operation rates and process attribution",
        "Ransomware / DLP behavior alerts",
        "Canary files and recovery / backup audit"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Correlate file bursts, extension changes and outbound transfer to the same process and identity.",
        "Validate against bulk backup / archiving activity and preserve the research-only qualification of a PoC."
      ],
      "limitation": "A file-write burst is not proof of ransomware; in-process interpreters may not spawn a separate executable.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Collection / encryption behavior\nid: 0b1098da-0957-4f77-a2a4-e89a5a2e1a36\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A process rapidly enumerates or modifies sensitive files and is\n  followed by encryption, export or a ransom-related artifact.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - file.bulk.modify\n      - data.export\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"file.bulk.modify\", \"data.export\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"file.bulk.modify\", \"data.export\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/impact.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/impact.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/impact.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/impact.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
        "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "step-1",
        "title": "PoC starts in a research setting",
        "description": "This entry is a ransomware proof of concept, not a confirmed victim campaign.",
        "kind": "unknown",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-2",
        "title": "LLM generates Lua at runtime",
        "description": "A Go program requests filesystem-related malicious scripts.",
        "kind": "ai",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-3",
        "title": "Generated Lua is executed",
        "description": "The research describes reconnaissance, exfiltration and encryption logic.",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "step-4",
        "title": "Research demonstrates ransomware behavior",
        "description": "The PoC demonstrates potential Windows and Linux impact.",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/threat-actor-usage-of-ai-tools/",
          "https://www.eset.com/blog/en/business-topics/threat-landscape/the-first-known-ai-written-ransomware/"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "step-1",
        "target": "step-2"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-2",
        "target": "step-3"
      },
      {
        "source": "step-3",
        "target": "step-4"
      }
    ]
  }
}