{
  "attack_id": "srm-artex-ir-host-artifacts-2026-11",
  "status": "catalog_recommendations_not_validated_coverage",
  "stages": [
    {
      "node_id": "initial-compromise",
      "profile": "web",
      "title": "Web exploitation → host activity",
      "hypothesis": "Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs",
        "Server process and file events",
        "Outbound DNS / proxy records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.",
        "Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation."
      ],
      "limitation": "A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity\nid: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected\n  server process, file, or outbound connection.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - web.exploit_candidate\n      - web.upload\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"web.exploit_candidate\", \"web.upload\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/web.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/web.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/web.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/web.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "credential-harvest",
      "profile": "credentials",
      "title": "Sensitive store access → credential use",
      "hypothesis": "An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores",
        "Process identity and command lines",
        "Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.",
        "Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure."
      ],
      "limitation": "Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use\nid: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is\n  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - secret.read\n      - credential.store.read\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"secret.read\", \"credential.store.read\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/credentials.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/credentials.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/credentials.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/credentials.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "rapid-pivot",
      "profile": "cloud",
      "title": "Unexpected cloud / inference identity use",
      "hypothesis": "A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Cloud control-plane and identity audit",
        "AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled",
        "Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.",
        "Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized."
      ],
      "limitation": "Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use\nid: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains\n  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - cloud.credential.use\n      - cloud.role.change\n      - model.invoke\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"cloud.credential.use\", \"cloud.role.change\", \"model.invoke\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/cloud.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/cloud.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/cloud.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/cloud.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "msp-pivot",
      "profile": "unassessed",
      "title": "Stage hunt not mapped yet",
      "hypothesis": "A stage-specific hunt has not been reviewed for this part of the source account.",
      "visibility": "Not assessed",
      "telemetry": [],
      "investigate": [
        "Review the cited behavior, identify the observing party and available logs, then propose and test a hunt."
      ],
      "limitation": "An unmapped stage does not mean it is undetectable or that no behavior occurred. It means this catalog has not supplied a reviewed hunt for it.",
      "queries": null,
      "query_scope": "No query has been reviewed for this stage yet.",
      "query_kind": "gap",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/unassessed.yaml",
      "query_downloads": null,
      "validation": "not_assessed",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": null,
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "card-skimmer",
      "profile": "payment",
      "title": "Out-of-band payment verification",
      "hypothesis": "A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or an override of normal payment approval.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Treasury / payment approval and beneficiary-change audit",
        "Meeting and communication metadata",
        "Independent callback / dual-approval records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Review new payees, transfer bursts and approval overrides against established payment policy.",
        "Verify the request using a known contact channel; preserve the meeting record and authorization history."
      ],
      "limitation": "A video call's apparent identity is not authentication. Endpoint application control and malware hunts do not detect a pure business-process fraud.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - Out-of-band payment verification\nid: 813e417f-8751-4479-ad17-0f3d146ff036\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A meeting or message requests a new beneficiary, split transfers or\n  an override of normal payment approval.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - payment.beneficiary.change\n      - payment.approval.override\n      - payment.transfer\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"payment.beneficiary.change\", \"payment.approval.override\", \"payment.transfer\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"payment.beneficiary.change\", \"payment.approval.override\", \"payment.transfer\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/payment.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/payment.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/payment.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/payment.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    },
    {
      "node_id": "persistent-reentry",
      "profile": "persistence",
      "title": "New persistence → recurring execution",
      "hypothesis": "A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.",
      "visibility": "Defender-side logs where collected",
      "telemetry": [
        "Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes",
        "Process creation and file provenance",
        "User / administrative change records"
      ],
      "investigate": [
        "Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.",
        "Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents."
      ],
      "limitation": "Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.",
      "queries": {
        "sigma": "title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution\nid: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is\n  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.\nauthor: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog\ndate: 2026-10-23\nfalsepositives:\n  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate\n    before alerting.\nlevel: low\nlogsource:\n  category: application\n  product: openattacks_audit\n  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,\n    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    EventType:\n      - persistence.create\n      - persistence.modify\n  condition: selection\n",
        "kql": "// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.\n// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).\n// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.\nOpenAttacksAudit_CL\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where EventType in (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId\n| order by TimeGenerated desc",
        "spl": "sourcetype=\"openattacks:audit\"\nEventType IN (\"persistence.create\", \"persistence.modify\")\n| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId\n| sort - _time"
      },
      "query_scope": "Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.",
      "query_kind": "custom_schema",
      "origin": "catalog_authored",
      "definition_url": "https://github.com/magicsword-io/openattacks/blob/main/detections/persistence.yaml",
      "query_downloads": {
        "sigma": "/api/detections/persistence.sigma.yml",
        "kql": "/api/detections/persistence.kql",
        "spl": "/api/detections/persistence.spl"
      },
      "validation": "draft",
      "evidence": [
        "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
      ],
      "reviewed": "2026-10-23",
      "upstream_matches": []
    }
  ],
  "attack_flow": {
    "nodes": [
      {
        "id": "initial-compromise",
        "title": "Exploit vulnerable web plugins",
        "description": "ARTEX agents exploit vulnerable web plugins and misconfigured file upload endpoints for initial access",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "credential-harvest",
        "title": "Credential harvesting and reuse",
        "description": "Rapid credential harvesting from compromised hosts; credentials reused for lateral movement",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "rapid-pivot",
        "title": "Identity/cloud/code/firewall pivot in <24h",
        "description": "Autonomous agents pivot through identity systems, cloud resources, code repositories, and firewall configurations within single day",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "msp-pivot",
        "title": "MSP supply-chain pivot (one case)",
        "description": "In one engagement, ARTEX agents pivoted through compromised MSP to reach additional customer environments",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "card-skimmer",
        "title": "Card skimmer deployment (one case)",
        "description": "In e-commerce compromise, agents deployed card skimmer malware to capture payment data",
        "kind": "impact",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "persistent-reentry",
        "title": "Persistent re-entry after containment",
        "description": "Attackers demonstrated re-entry capability after initial containment, shifting to Tor/VPS infrastructure after IP blocking",
        "kind": "execution",
        "source_urls": [
          "https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/artex-in-the-wild-lessons-from-responding-to-agentic-ai-attacks"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "edges": [
      {
        "source": "initial-compromise",
        "target": "credential-harvest"
      },
      {
        "source": "credential-harvest",
        "target": "rapid-pivot"
      },
      {
        "source": "rapid-pivot",
        "target": "msp-pivot"
      },
      {
        "source": "rapid-pivot",
        "target": "card-skimmer"
      },
      {
        "source": "rapid-pivot",
        "target": "persistent-reentry"
      }
    ]
  }
}